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This thesis examines how the lived experience of British and Italian colonialisms 
on the two sides of what would become the Kenya-Somalia border transformed 
local society and local politics, through an interactive process in which African 
communities asserted their agency while colonial governments competed for 
sovereignty over the frontier. 
Chapters 1 and 2 examine how socio-political identities and ideas of 
belonging acquired new shapes and functions in the process of state formation 
from the colonisation period to the establishment of a United Nations Trusteeship 
in former Italia Somalia in 1950, following Italy’s defeat in WWII. Chapters 3 
and 4 examine how different social actors in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands 
became involved in negotiating the state during the period of Italian Trusteeship 
until Somalia’s independence on 1 July 1960. Chapters 5 and 6 explore the deeper 
history of political activism and insurrection in the Northern Frontier District 
(NFD) of Kenya during the final years of British rule until the colony became 
independent on 12 December 1963. 
Envisaging factors which are usually associated with a-historical notions 
of identity and culture as social processes grounded in history, local economies, 
and regional reconfigurations of power, this thesis rejects the prevailing argument 
that the state was doomed to fail in these borderlands due to its imported origin 
and to unconducive cultural conditions. It is argued here that historically 
contingent power relations shaped politics in this region in a way that undermined 
the state’s legitimacy and the borderlanders’ trust in state institutions. Challenging 
the idea that state formation was a unidirectional process from which the 
borderlanders attempted to escape, this thesis demonstrates that the local 
negotiation of authority and access to resources influenced socio-economic 
relationships and political options in the ‘periphery’, while peripheral politics 
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Askari: pl. askaris, a local soldier serving in the colonial non-white troops of the 
British empire. 
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Deegaan: Somali term often translated as ‘land tenure’ or ‘clan homeland’; 
deegaan, in fact, is a complex concept which connotes exclusive control 
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area and of the natural resources found there. 
Diya: Arabic term for blood money; the Somali expression is mag. 
Dubas: term used in the Kenya Colony to designate the locally recruited ‘tribal 
police’. 
Dubat: ‘white turbans’; Somali irregulars who were recruited locally and 
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troops who volunteered for the task. 
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Gogle: term used in the Italian colonies to designate the ‘indigenous tribal police’. 
Ilaloes: a force similar to the British-created tribal police established by the Italian 
Trusteeship Administration of Somalia and placed under the direct 
authority of District Commissioners (Residenti). 
Iusbasci: commander of the zaptié corps (see below). 
Jamaaca: pl. jamaacooyin, religious settlements established in the nineteenth 
century along the Jubba River by Somali clerics who called for Islamic 
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reformation. Some kind of cooperative farming was practiced in these 
settlements. 
Jareer: literally ‘kinky hair’; Somali derogatory name for Gosha, Bantu people 
predominantly living in the Jubba Valley, mostly descendants of slaves 
imported from Eastern Africa in the nineteenth century. 
Mag: blood money. 
Qabiila: Arabic word for ‘tribe’ used by the Somalis as synonym of tol (see 
below), usually translated as ‘clan’. 
Residente: the Italian equivalent of ‘District Commissioner’. 
Residenza: the Italian equivalent of the British term ‘District’ in the colonial 
administration. 
Shamba: term designating an indigenous farm in southern Somalia.  
Sheegad: literally ‘pretender’ in Somali; the term refers to a customary system (no 
longer in use) of pseudo-kinship relations allowing individuals or groups 
that were too small or weak to compete for access to resources in a 
particular area to associate themselves with larger or more powerful 
kinship groups. This asymmetric mode of association prescribed that the 
client, called sheegad, named the ancestors of the ‘host’ group as their 
own. In the sheegad system, patrons gained territorial domination, control 
over land, and political power, while clients were kept in a position of 
political inferiority, with no say in collective decisions yet expected to 
make economic and military contributions to the host group.  
Shir: pl. shirarka, Somali term for a customary clan assembly. 
Suldaan: Arabic term used in Somali society (particularly amongst the Isxaaq and 
Ogaadeen clans) to indicate the traditional titular political office of chief 
of clan, or sub-clan where the clan is large. In addition to the universally 
understood Arabic Suldaan, the position has different titles, depending on 
the region, such as Boqor (especially amongst the Majeerteen in north-
eastern Somalia), Ugaas and Garaad (used in most of the Daarood clans 
other than the Ogaadeen). Although the Suldaan symbolises the unity of 
the clan, not every clan can boast a Suldaan. The office is not 
indispensable.    
Tol: Somali term for the concept of agnation. The verb tol means to bind together, 
or to sew.  
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Ugaas: Somali title for clan-head; regional variant of Suldaan (see above). 
Xeer: customary agreements or contracts used in Somali society to form alliances 
and regulate relationships between kinship groups; these contracts are 
made on an ad-hoc basis usually in the context of military operations or 
through solidarity mechanisms regulating the payment of blood money. 
Zaptié: in the Italian colonies, a locally recruited constabulary force modelled on 








Somali personal, clan, and geographic names in this thesis generally follow the 
Somali orthography, except when they appear in direct quotations from primary 
sources. The Latin ‘c’ stands for a sound close to the Arabic ع (ayn), while ‘x’ 




Introduction: Researching the colonial 
borderlands 
 
This is the history of a multifaceted trans-border region in a time of profound 
change under colonial rule. It is a history of social resilience, marked by struggles 
over territory, access to resources, and power, but, above all, it is a history of 
dissent. Here, control over the arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid lands of what 
would become north-eastern Kenya and southern Somalia was contested between 
rival colonial powers and between African herders and farmers.  It was a region 
that no one found it easy to dominate or to regulate, a region in which mobility 
held the key to sustainability, and across which boundaries and territoriality were 
malleable and changing concepts.  During the colonial years, between the 1890s 
and 1963, the Somalia-Kenya borderlands came to be portrayed as an intractable 
periphery. This image of the borderlands as a disorderly and ungovernable space 
has persisted far beyond colonialism and into the present century: Kenya’s border 
with Somalia today continues to be seen primarily as an unruly frontier, 
chronically affected by underdevelopment and blighted by recurrent local 
conflicts, its economy fuelled by smuggling and other illicit activities, and its 
politics inflamed by international Islamist terrorism. The intervention of the 
Kenyan army across the border in 2011, invading southern Somalia to later join 
the Africa Union’s peace-keeping mission (AMISOM), is emblematic of the 
continuing contestations in these borderlands.1 Within Kenya, the government has 
 
1 David M. Anderson and Jacob McKnight, ‘Kenya at War: Al-Shabaab and Its Enemies 
in Eastern Africa’, African Affairs, 114, No.454 (2014), pp. 1–27; International 
Crisis Group,‘The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia’, Africa Report No. 184 
(Brussels, February 2012) 
<https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/184%20The%20Kenyan%20Military%20In
tervention%20in%20Somalia.pdf> [accessed September 2018]; Journalists for 
Justice, Black and White: Kenya’s Criminal Racket in Somalia (Nairobi: Journalists 
for Justice, 2015) <https://www.jfjustice.net/downloads/1457660562.pdf> [accessed 
September 2018]; Claire McEvoy, ‘Shifting Priorities: Kenya's Changing Approach 
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responded to the increasing number of attacks carried out by the Islamist terrorist 
group al-Shabaab on Kenyan soil with an iron fist: the peoples of the borderland – 
mostly Kenyan Somalis but also Swahili-speaking Muslims of diverse origins, 
especially in the coastal area – and Somali refugees have often been subjected to 
beatings, arbitrary arrest and detention, and other forms of extra-judicial 
punishment, including torture, unlawful renditions, killings and disappearances.2 
This has once again raised the issue of the status of Kenyan Somalis, who are still 
 
to Peacebuilding’, NOREF Report (Oslo, May 2013) 
<https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/165125/bca199817c66f0d0f91212128181c024.pdf> 
[accessed September 2018]; Gorm Rye Olsen, ‘The October 2011 Kenyan Invasion 
of Somalia: Fighting Al-Shabaab or Defending Institutional Interests?’, Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies, 36, No.1 (2018), pp. 39–53; Paul D. Williams, 
Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission 
(AMISOM), 2007-2017 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
2 David M. Anderson and Jacob McKnight, ‘Understanding al-Shabaab: Clan, Islam and 
Insurgency in Kenya’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 9, No.3 (2015): pp. 536–
57;David M. Anderson, ‘Why Mpeketoni Matters: Al-Shabaab and Violence in 
Kenya’, NOREF Report (Oslo, September 2014) 
<https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/183993/cc2dacde481e24ca3ca5eaf60e974ee9.pdf> 
[accessed September 2018]; Amnesty International, Somalis Are Scapegoats in 
Kenya’s Counter-Terror Crackdown (London: Amnesty International, 2014) 
<https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/4000/afr520032014en.pdf> 
[accessed September 2018]; Anna Bruzzone, ‘Kenya’s Security Crackdown and the 
Politics of Fear’, Focus on the Horn (April 2014) 
<https://focusonthehorn.wordpress.com/2014/04/23/kenyas-security-crackdown-
and-the-politics-of-fear/> [accessed September 2018]; Human Rights Watch,Deaths 
and Disappearances: Abuses in Counterterrorism Operations in Nairobi and in 
Northeastern Kenya (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2016) 
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/kenya0716web_1.pdf> 
[accessed September 2018]; Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) and Open 
Society Justice Initiative, We are Tired of Taking You to the Court: Human Rights 
Abuses by Kenya’s ATPU (New York: Open Society Foundations, 2013) 
<https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/human-rights-abuses-
by-kenya-atpu-20140220.pdf> [accessed March 2019]. 
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considered second-class citizens and treated with weary suspicion.3 On the Somali 
side of the frontier, the creation, in 2013, of the autonomous regional 
administration of Jubaland – a shorthand for Somalia’s southernmost areas, linked 
by the course of the Jubba River – and the ongoing, contested process of 
federalisation and political decentralisation have reignited controversies over the 
issues of autochthony and citizenship.4 While the current political struggles in 
these borderlands have led to a surge in scholarly publications and analyses of the 
region’s present challenges, the deeper history of state-society relations and the 
role of the transnational in the historical genesis of the state in this region remain 
under-researched and only poorly understood.5 
 
3 Al Jazeera, Not Yet 
Kenyanhttps://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeracorrespondent/2013/10/not
-yet-kenyan-2013102885818441218.html[accessed October 2018]. 
4 Anna Bruzzone, ‘Regional Extraversion and State Formation: Jubaland in Transnational 
Perspective’, paper presented at the 6th European Conference on African Studies 
(ECAS), Paris, 8 July 2015; Joanne Crouch and Oliver Chevreau, Forging 
Jubaland: Community Perspectives on Federalism, Governance and Reconciliation 
(London: Saferworld, 2016); ICG, ‘Jubaland in Jeopardy: The Uneasy Path to State 
Building in Somalia’, Crisis Group blogs (May 2013) 
<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/jubaland-jeopardy-uneasy-
path-state-building-somalia> [accessed March 2019]; Somalia Conflict Early 
Warning Early Response Unit (CEWERU), ‘From the Bottom Up: Southern 
Regions - Perspectives Through Conflict Analysis and Key Political Actors’ 
Mapping of Gedo, Middle Juba, Lower Juba, and Lower Shabelle’ (September 
2013) <http://www.theatm.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/CEWERU-FINAL-
Report.pdf>[accessed October 2018]; Jason Mosley, ‘Somalia’s Federal Future: 
Layered Agendas, Risks and Opportunities’, Chatham House Research Paper 
(August 2015) 
<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20150902S
omaliaFederalFutureMosley.pdf> [accessed September 2018]; Cleophus Thomas, 
‘Federalism in Somalia: Obstacles, Aspirations, and Opportunities in Jubaland’ 
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, George Mason University, 2017).   
5Anderson and McKnight, ‘Understanding al-Shabaab’; Brendon J. Cannon, ‘Terrorists, 
Geopolitics and Kenya’s Proposed Border Wall with Somalia’, Journal of 
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The study of borderlands across the African continent has advanced 
markedly in the past two decades, often integrating the discussion of 
contemporary concerns with an historical perspective on the evolution of the 
border dynamics.6 Scholars have also increasingly challenged the notion that the 
margins of states are peripheral to state formation. Richard Reid, for instance, has 
 
Terrorism Research, 7, No.2 (2016), pp. 23–37; Neil Carrier and Hassan H. 
Kochore, ‘Navigating Ethnicity and Electoral Politics in Northern Kenya: The Case 
of the 2013 Election’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 8, No.1 (2014), pp. 135–
52; Hannah Elliott, ‘Planning, Property and Plots at the Gateway to Kenya’s ‘New 
Frontier’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 10, No.3 (2016), pp. 511–29; Jeremy 
Lind, Patrick Mutahi and Marjoke Oosterom, ‘“Killing a Mosquito with a 
Hammer”: Al-Shabaab Violence and State Security Responses in Kenya’, 
Peacebuilding, 5, No.2 (2017), pp. 118–35;Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, ‘Jubaland: 
Somalia’s New Security Dilemma and State-Building Efforts, Africa Review, 8, 
No.2(2016), pp. 120–32; Paul D. Williams, ‘After Westgate: Opportunities and 
Challenges in the War against Al-Shabaab’, International Affairs, 90, No.4(2014), 
pp. 907–23; Hannah Whittaker, ‘Legacies of Empire: State Violence and Collective 
Punishment in Kenya’s Northern Province, c. 1963-Present’, The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History,43, No.4 (2015), pp. 1–17. 
6 To cite but a few reference works, Fekadu Adugna, ‘Overlapping Nationalist Projects 
and Contested Spaces: The Oromo-Somali Borderlands in Southern Ethiopia’, 
Journal of Eastern African Studies, 5, No.4 (2011), pp. 773–87; Dereje Feyissa and 
Markus Virgil Hoehne, eds., Borders & Borderlands as Resources in the Horn 
of Africa (Woodbridge, Oxford: James Currey, 2010); Benedikt Korf and Timothy 
Raeymaekers, eds., Violence on the Margins: States, Conflict, and Borderlands 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013);Paul Nugent and Anthony Ijaola Asiwaju, 
eds., African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities (London: Pinter, 
1996); Paul Nugent, Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-
Togo Frontier: The Life of the Borderlands since 1914 (Athens: Ohio University 
Press; Oxford: James Currey; Legon: Sub-Saharan Publishers, 2002); Timothy 
Raeymaekers, Violent Capitalism and Hybrid identity in the Eastern Congo: Power 
to the Margins (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Christophe 
Vaughan, Mareike Schomerus, and Lotje De Vries, eds., The Borderlands of South 
Sudan: Authority and Identity in Contemporary and Historical Perspectives 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
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shown how the violent ‘fault lines and frontier zones’ of northeast Africa have 
‘defined the very nature of states’, while Cherry Leonardi has argued for the 
‘fertility of the frontier’ in South Sudan.7 In this emerging body of literature, the 
Kenya-Somalia case has too often been viewed simply from the Kenyan side of 
the border, and not as a transnational issue.8 Regardless of scholarly discipline, 
this literature, whether in history, anthropology, or social sciences, has tended to 
obscure the plurality of narratives, socio-economic dynamics, and geographies of 
power at play in this part of the Horn of Africa. The problematics of resistance 
and conflict in the Kenya-Somalia borderlands have been framed by these 
dichotomies and the dialogues they provoke: the ‘modern’ territorial state versus 
the ‘traditional’ socio-political organisation of borderland communities, the 
 
7 Richard Reid, Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa: Genealogies of Conflict since 
c. 1800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 20, 22; Cherry Leonardi, 
Dealing with Government in South Sudan: Histories of Chiefship, Community and 
State (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2013), p. 217. 
8 See, for example, recent studies by Keren Weitzberg, Hannah Whittaker, and Julie 
MacArthur: Keren Weitzberg, ‘The Unaccountable Census Colonial Enumeration 
and its Implications for the Somali People of Kenya’, Journal of African History, 
56, No.3 (2015), pp. 409–28; by the same author, We Do Not Have Borders: 
Greater Somalia and the Predicaments of Belonging in Kenya (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 2017); Hannah Whittaker, ‘The Socioeconomic Dynamics of the 
Shifta Conflict in Kenya, c. 1963-8’, Journal of African History 53, No.3 (2012), 
pp. 391–408; by the same author, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Kenya: A 
Social History of the Shifta Conflict, c. 1963-1968 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015); 
Julie MacArthur, ‘Decolonizing Sovereignty: States of Exception along the Kenya-
Somali Frontier’, The American Historical Review, 124, No.1 (2019), pp. 108–
43.Lee Cassanelli stands out as the notable exception, along with earlier work by 
Peter Little on trans-border trading: Lee V. Cassanelli, ‘The Opportunistic 
Economies of the Kenya-Somali Borderland in Historical Perspective’, in Borders 
& Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa, ed. by Dereje Feyissa and 
Markus Virgil Hoehne (Oxford: James Currey, 2010), pp. 133–50; Peter D. Little, 
‘Conflictive Trade, Contested Identity: The Effects of Export Markets on 




borderless but resilient livelihoods of Somali pastoralists as against the sedentary 
lifestyles of farming communities, and the ‘rhetoric’ of Somali nationalism versus 
the ‘reality’ of a segmentary society.9 
This thesis challenges much of the existing literature by envisaging factors 
which are usually associated with a-historical notions of identity and culture as 
social processes grounded in history, local economies, and regional 
reconfigurations of power. In so doing, this study explores the historical 
implications of the Somalia-Kenya border in terms of both constraints and 
opportunities. This thesis therefore examines how the political logics and the 
internal economies of different, often competing, colonial projects on the two 
sides of the frontier transformed local society and local politics, through an 
interactive process in which African communities asserted their agency while 
colonial powers sought to determine the process of state formation. 
 
The material covered in this thesis spans four decades, from 1925, when 
the colonial border between the Italian and British spheres was fundamentally 
altered, to independence (1960 in Somalia and 1963 in Kenya). The complex 
social, economic and political transformations of the borderlands in these years 
will be examined with reference to the three inter-connected themes of 
territoriality, trade and political authority.  Key research questions emerge from 
these themes: 
(i) Territoriality: how did imperial rivalries, competing 
sovereignties, and conflicting modes of colonial governance 
transform the way territory was conceived, claimed, 
appropriated, and controlled in the trans-border region? How 
 
9 See, for example, John G. S. Drysdale, The Somali Dispute (London: Pall Mall Press, 
1964); Ioan M. Lewis, ‘The Problem of the Northern Frontier District of Kenya’, 
Race & Class 51, No.1 (1963), pp. 48–60; Nene Mburu, Bandits on the Border: The 
Last Frontier in the Search for Somali Unity (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2005); 
Vincent Bakpetu Thompson, Conflict in the Horn of Africa: The Kenya-Somalia 




did different modes of territorial appropriation affect 
definitions of identity and belonging?  
(ii) Trade: how did colonial policies and the unintended 
consequences of historical events affect cross-border trade? 
How did local agents involved in this trade exploit the 
affordances of the border to advance their economic and 
political goals? How did trade benefit some groups at the 
expense of others and with what consequences? 
(iii) Political authority: how did ‘traditional’ authorities in these 
borderlands participate in constructing the frontier and 
making the state? How was political authority reconfigured, 
negotiated and institutionalised in the process of state 
formation? By tackling these questions, this thesis has two 
aims. First, taking the people of the Somalia-Kenya 
borderlands out of the exotic ‘culture gardens’ to which they 
have been confined, showing that their history is less 
exceptional than it has often been assumed.10 Second, 
situating this region within the broader debates on the state in 
Africa, on the one hand, and on the notion of ‘entangled 
histories’, on the other hand.11 
 
 
10 The term ‘culture gardens’ is borrowed from Steven Feierman, ‘African Histories and 
the Dissolution of World History’, in Africa and the Disciplines: The Contributions 
of Research in Africa to the Social Sciences and Humanities, ed. by Robert 
H.Bates,V. Y. Mudimbe, Jean F.O'Barr (Chicago; London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993), pp. 167–212 (here p. 186). 
11 For the concept of ‘entangled history’, see Shalini Randeria, ‘Entangled Histories of 
Uneven Modernities: Civil Society, Caste Solidarities and Legal Pluralism in Post-
Colonial India’, in Unraveling Ties: From Social Cohesion to New Practices of 




Before we can explore this history in greater detail, however, we must first 
orientate ourselves in the physical and social landscape of the Somalia-Kenya 
borderlands.   
 
 
The borderlands and the borderlanders 
The Somalia-Kenya border runs through a patchwork of geographical and social 
spaces. These are part of different though interlinked ecological, economic, and 
cultural systems spanning nomadic pastoralism (in the arid lowlands 
encompassing north-eastern Kenya and the trans-Jubba region, between the 
homonymous river and the border), agro-pastoralism and sedentary agriculture 
(along the Jubba and Tana rivers), and coastal societies (gravitating around the 
port towns of Kismaayo and Lamu and characterised by a distinct culture of 
traders and urban people of mixed origins). This dynamic space of social, 
economic, and political interactions extends across an area which roughly covers 
– on present-day political maps – the counties of Mandera, Wajir and Garissa, 
predominantly inhabited by ethnic Somalis, in north-eastern Kenya, and the 
regions of Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba and Gedo in southern Somalia. Sometimes, 
however, the scope of the thesis extends beyond this area to include the counties 
of Isiolo, Moyale, and Lamu. These mark the outer reaches of the colonial frontier 
and the limits of Somali influence and action in north-eastern Kenya. Therefore, at 
certain critical junctures, these areas are not marginal at all but, rather, central to 
the borderlands’ history, as we will see.  
The region is predominantly inhabited by Somalis, but this should not 
overshadow the fact that these borderlands are a plural social universe, composed 
of people of different race, ethnicity, language, religion and culture. These 
include, besides the Somalis, Cushitic groups (Boran, Orma, Sakuye, Gabbra, 
Samburu and Turkana), Bantu-speaking groups (Gosha, Meru, Pokomo, and the 
so-called ‘riverine’ tribes along the Tana River), as well as groups of mixed 
origins, including Baajuun, Booni, Arabs, and Indians. This thesis, however, 
focuses particularly on the Somalis, although it brings other groups into the 
narrative whenever required. This is not to argue that these other groups simply 
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acted as ‘walk-ons’ in a fundamentally Somali drama. The status of the Somalis 
vis-à-vis the other groups is the product of a history of violence and 
marginalisation, but also of integration and assimilation. The thesis begins to 
reconstruct this history, examining how Somali groups have ‘appropriated’ the 
borderlands. In this process of appropriation, the identities and statuses of the 
various groups of borderlanders have been subject to constant redefinition. 
Therefore, instead of presenting ethnic and kinship groups as ‘internally 
homogeneous and externally bounded objects’– in Eric Wolf’s words – and 
charting their geographical distribution in the trans-border region, this thesis 
explores the metamorphoses of these groups as fluid social formations, moving 
through space and time within the context of the broader history of the Somalia-
Kenya borderlands.12 
The region has been dominated by Somali groups since at least the later 
nineteenth century, their so-called ‘conquest’ of the area to the west of the Jubba 
River being one of the principal dynamic drivers of the region’s history in the 
twentieth century.13 A brief ethnographic introduction to the Somali kinship 
system is therefore required before we proceed to discuss the relevant 
historiography. During the colonial period, social and political relations among 
the Somalis were regulated predominantly through group membership based on 
patrilineal descent. Kinship has remained an important factor in the formation of 
social identities and political allegiances up to the present time. 
The traditional Somali kinship system is characterised by the formation, 
within the framework of patrilineal descent, of corporate groups which have 
political relevance and present a peculiar feature: they are not stable but can form 
at different levels of genealogical segmentation.14 Therefore, there is no specific 
vernacular terminology to designate these kinship groups. The Somali word tol 
(which literally means ‘to sew’) denotes the principle of patrilineal descent 
 
12 Eric Wolf, Europe and the People without History (London; Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1982), p. 6.  
13 Ioan M. Lewis, ‘The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa’, The Journal of African 
History, 1, No.2 (1960), pp. 213–30. 
14 Marcel Djama, ‘Trajectoire Du Pouvoir en Pays Somali’, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines, 
37, No. 146 (1997), pp. 403–28 (here p. 406). 
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without distinction as to the level of segmentation.15 The socio-political units 
which ‘coagulate’ within the kinship system are associated with an ancestor 
positioned at an intermediary level between the clan family and the individual, 
and only exist in relation to other equivalent units. Two criteria contribute to the 
formation of these corporate groups. Firstly, what the anthropologist Ioan Lewis 
has termed the ‘size factor’.16 This implies that equivalence of status between 
these groups is not related to equal genealogical position but to the groups’ size, 
that is to say to the number of genealogical segments these units consist of. 
Therefore, corporate groups are fluid and contextually defined, rather than given 
within a predetermined, static genealogical order. Secondly, some kind of social 
contract intervenes to reinforce the cohesion of these groups: customary 
agreements (xeer in Somali) or contracts made on an ad-hoc basis in the context 
of military operations or through solidarity mechanisms regulating the payment of 
blood money. This is called mag in Somali, although Lewis uses the Arabic term 
diya to refer to what he calls diya-paying groups.17 
Lewis has argued that the socio-political units which form under the 
combined influence of the ‘size factor’ and xeer have no territorial basis and that 
this is what differentiates the Somali lineage system from the ‘classic’ segmentary 
model theorised by Evans-Pritchard in his seminal works on the Nuer of southern 
Sudan and the Sanusi of Cyrenaica.18 This model implies that socio-political units 
within a segmentary lineage system identify themselves with territory and that this 
reinforces group cohesion. Due to the supposed ‘distortion’ that characterises the 
Somali version of the segmentary lineage model, Lewis prefers the term ‘clan’ to 
 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ioan M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the 
Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 
149. 
17 Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, pp. 127, 161–62; Jama Mohamed, ‘Kinship and 
Contract in Somali Politics’, Africa, 77, No.2 (2007), pp. 226–49. 
18 Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood 
and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 




‘tribe’ to describe the largest socio-political units within the Somali kinship 
system.19 However, as Marcel Djama has rightfully observed, the Somali 
language has no specific word for ‘clan’ and the Somalis often use the Arabic 
word qabiila (‘tribe’ literally), associated with the tribal societies of the Arabian 
Peninsula, as synonym of tol.20 Nevertheless, the use of the terms ‘clan’, ‘sub-
clan’ and ‘sub-sub-clan’ to designate socio-political units within the Somali 
kinship system is predominant in Somali Studies. Lineage identity is thus 
conventionally described in this way: Clan/Sub-Clan/Sub-sub-clan. For lack of 
better terminology, the thesis follows these conventions. 
The Somalis claim an Arabian origin, all Somali genealogies going back to 
the Prophet’s lineage of Quraysh and those of his companions. In this 
genealogical system there are four main clan families: Daarood, Hawiye, Dir, and 
Digil-Raxanweyn. The socio-economic division between northern pastoral and 
southern agricultural groups is represented in genealogy. The pastoral clan-
families – namely, Hawiye, Dir (including Isxaaq), and Daarood – trace their 
origins to an ancestor called Samaale, while the Digil-Raxanweyn cultivating 
clan-families trace descent from an ancestor called Sab. In the Somali social 
imaginary, the Samaale groups represent a ‘pastoral aristocracy’, while the Sab, 
settled mainly along the Shabelle and Jubba rivers in southern Somalia, are seen 
primarily as a hybrid conglomerate of many different Somali groups with Oromo 
(Gaalla in Somali, ‘Galla’ in colonial sources) and Bantu elements (whom the 
Somalis call Jareer, ‘kinky hair’, or Gosha in the Jubba Valley, mostly 
descendants of slaves imported from Eastern Africa in the nineteenth century).21 
 
19 Lewis, Pastoral Democracy, p. 297. 
20 Djama, ‘Trajectoire du Pouvoir En Pays Somali’, p. 407. 
21 Lewis, Pastoral Democracy, pp. 11–14. On the history of the Bantu groups in the 
Jubba Valley, see the seminal works of Catherine Besteman and Francesca Declich: 
Catherine Besteman, Unraveling Somalia: Race, Violence, and the Legacy of 
Slavery (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); Francesca Declich, 
‘I Goscia della regione del Medio Giuba nella Somalia Meridionale. Un gruppo 
etnico di origine bantu’, Africa, 42 No.4 (1987), pp. 570–99; by the same author, 
‘“Gendered Narratives,” History, and Identity: Two Centuries Along the Juba River 
among the Zigula and Shanbara’, History in Africa, 22 (1995), pp. 93–122.   
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Due to their mixed origins and the fact that they are associated with agricultural 
labour, the Sab clan-families are lower in status than the ‘noble’ pastoral groups. 
However, the social history of the Somali-speaking lands is much more complex 
than clear-cut genealogical divisions might suggest, as this study will illustrate. 
During the pre-colonial and colonial periods, the socio-political 
organisation of the Somalis facilitated flexible group formation and alliances to 
regulate recurring migrations and settlement. Individuals or groups that were too 
small or weak to compete for access to resources in a certain area used to enter 
into ‘pseudo-kinship relations with stronger groups’.22 This asymmetrical mode of 
association prescribed that the client, called sheegad (‘pretender’) in Somali, 
named the ancestors of the ‘host’ group as their own, thereby subordinating 
themselves in terms of genealogy. The sheegad system was key to defining the 
patterns of migration and settlement in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands. It allowed 
mobility to be consolidated through alliances and protection, orchestrated through 
a well-understood system of hierarchy. Thanks to this system of patron-client 
relations, larger or more powerful kinship groups gained territorial domination, 
control over land, and political power, while clients were kept in a position of 
political inferiority, with no say in collective decisions yet expected to make 
economic and military contributions to the ‘host’ clan. The sheegad system and 
the transformations it underwent during the colonial period had far-reaching 
political implications, as this thesis will show. 
 
 
Historiography and themes 
The historiography of Somali East Africa, including Somalia, Ethiopia’s Somali 
region, Djibouti, and Kenya’s north-eastern region has been dominated by a 
structural-functional approach to the socio-political organisation of Somali 
 
22 Günther Schlee, ‘Regularity in Chaos: The Politics of Difference in the Recent History 
of Somalia’, in Imagined Differences: Hatred and the Construction of Identity, ed. 
by Günther Schlee (Münster, Hamburg, London: LIT-Verlag, 2002), pp. 251–80 
(here p. 263). 
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pastoralists. An intellectual genealogy going back to explorers and colonial 
administrators has produced the unidimensional picture of a segmentary society 
fundamentally governed by clan-based allegiances and resistant to any form of 
authority emanating from the state.23 This intellectual tradition, originally 
informed by the concerns, categories, and imperatives of colonial administration, 
has crystallized into a dominant interpretive paradigm, which has found its most 
renowned articulation in the work of Ioan Lewis.24 This paradigm argues that the 
historical experiences of colonialism and of the post-colonial state produced 
 
23 To cite but a few of the many travel, ethnographic, and historical accounts by 
explorers, colonial officials and anthropologists: Vittorio Bottego, Viaggi di 
scoperta nel cuore dell’Africa: il Giuba esplorato (Rome: Ermanno Loescher, 
1895); Richard F. Burton, First Footsteps in East Africa (London: J.M. Dent, 1910); 
F. Elliott, ‘Jubaland and its Inhabitants’, Geographical Journal, 41 (1913), pp.554–
61; Ugo Ferrandi, Lugh, emporio commerciale sul Giuba. Seconda spedizione 
Bottego. Memorie e note di U. Ferrandi già comandante di quella stazione (1895-
97); a cura e spese della Società Geografica Italiana (Rome: Società Geografica 
Italiana, 1903); Giuseppe Caniglia, Genti di Somalia (Rome: P. Cremonese, 1935); 
Enrico Cerulli, Somalia: Scritti vari ed inediti, 3 vols. (Rome: a cura 
dell'Amministrazione fiduciaria italiana della Somalia, [poi] Ministero degli affari 
esteri, 1957–64); Charles Guillain, Documents sur l’Histoire, la Géographie et le 
Commerce de l’Afrique Orientale, 3 vols. (Paris: Arthus Bertrand, 1856); Marcello 
Serrazanetti, La politica indigena in Somalia (Bologna: Tipografia La rapida, 1934); 
Thomas S. W. Thomas, Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District (Nairobi: 
Uganda Railway Press, 1917); Richard Turnbull, The Darod Invasion: An Account 
of the Movement of Darod Somalis into Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District 
(Dar-es-Salaam, 1961); Bernardo V. Vecchi, Somalia: Vicende e problemi (Milan: 
Marangoni, 1935). 
24 Lewis, Pastoral Democracy; by the same author, The Modern History of 
Somaliland(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,1965). For a critique of Lewis’ 
approach to the study of Somali society and politics see: Catherine Besteman, 
‘Primordialist Blinders: A Reply to I. M. Lewis’, Cultural Anthropology, 13 (1998), 
pp. 109–20; and Marcel Djama, ‘The Political Anthropology of “Pastoral 
Democracy”: Scope and Limitations of a Political Ecology’, in Milk and Peace, 
Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics, ed. by Markus V. Höhne 
and Virginia Luling (London: Hurst & Company, 2010), pp. 105–15. 
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quantitative alterations rather than qualitative changes in Somali societies. As 
Abdi Ismail Samatar has pointed out, the logic behind this interpretive framework 
leads to the conclusion that the problem with the state in the Somali-lands lies in 
traditional Somali culture.25 This rationale, however, is doubly problematic. 
Firstly, it posits an alleged homogeneity of identities and culture within Somali 
society, thereby obscuring the diversities and inequalities existing between and 
within social groups. Secondly, it reifies society, culture and tradition as self-
contained, bounded entities. 
Until the 1980s, the historiography of the Somali territories was dominated 
by two themes: the Somali ‘conquest’ of the Horn of Africa and the evolution of 
Somali nationalism and irredentism.26 The first theme reflected the concerns of 
the colonial authorities for political stability and orderly administration, while the 
second one provided a historical backdrop to discussions of the drive for national 
unification in the Somali territories in the 1960s and 1970s. Preoccupation with 
unresolved border issues and the stabilisation of frontiers produced a 
unidimensional historical narrative of the Somalis as fiercely independent 
nomads, hungry for territory, and united by an innate sense of national identity.27 
Supported by Somali oral traditions collected and interpreted by colonial officials, 
 
25Abdi I. Samatar, ‘Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal 
Convention’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 30, No.4 (1992), pp. 625–41 (here 
p. 629). 
26 On the theme of Somali expansion see: Turnbull, Darod Invasion; Lewis, ‘The Somali 
Conquest of the Horn of Africa’. For a critique of this interpretation see: Herbert S. 
Lewis, ‘The Origins of the Galla and Somali’, Journal of African History, 7 (1966), 
pp. 27–46; Edmund R. Turton, ‘Bantu, Galla and Somali Migrations in the Horn of 
Africa: A Reassessment of the Juba/Tana Area’, Journal of African History, 16 
(1975), pp. 519–37. On the subject of Somali nationalism and irredentism see: 
Drysdale, Somali Dispute; Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism: International 
Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1963). 
27 See, for example: Ioan M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State 
in the Horn of Africa (Oxford: James Currey; Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002); 
by the same author, ‘The Problem of the Northern Frontier District’, pp. 48–60; 
Drysdale, The Somali Dispute. 
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this unidimensional narrative overlooks the diversity and richness of the Somali 
experience, in and of itself the product of a long and multifaceted historical 
development. In his seminal work on the pre-colonial history of Somali society, 
published in 1982, Lee Cassanelli stressed the need for exploring silent themes in 
Somali history, advocating the adoption of a regional framework to examine the 
role of social, economic, and religious connections in shaping the foundations of 
Somali politics.28 Cassanelli’s pioneering and challenging work threw down 
numerous research questions on the dynamics and drivers of Somali history that 
remain to be fully explored. 
The implosion of the Somali state in the late 1980s and the ensuing civil 
war acted as a watershed in two senses: first, they brought scholarly work on the 
historical themes of Somali history to a grinding, if temporary halt; second, the 
grim reality of state collapse questioned the nationalist perspective which had 
tended to condense Somali history into a linear narrative of political unity. State 
collapse brought with it internecine violence, massive displacement of 
populations, and the creation of multiple political-military factions who struggled 
against one another over resources, power, and authority.  The civil war exposed 
the hollowness and fragility of Somali ‘unity’, reviving the thesis that Somali 
segmentary society was in fact incompatible with the constructs of the modern 
state imported from Western Europe.29 The demise of the previously dominating 
nationalist paradigm in Somalia has led to the emergence of a ‘transformationist’ 
approach, promoted by Abdi Samatar, amongst others, focussing on the ‘the 
nature of the changes that had taken place in the social rather than the 
genealogical order’ to understand the causes of Somalia’s implosion.30 In spite of 
 
28 Lee V. Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a 
Pastoral People, 1600-1900 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982). 
29 See, for instance: Cabdisalaam M. Ciisa-Salwe, The Collapse of the Somali State: The 
Impact of the Colonial Legacy (London: HAAN, 1996); David D. Laitin and Said S. 
Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder and London: Westview, 
1987).  
30 Samatar, ‘Destruction of State’, p. 631. See also, by the same author: The State and 
Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia, 1884-1986 (Madison: University of 
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its proclaimed goal of reversing the traditional functionalist thesis, the work of 
Samatar and his followers did not fundamentally challenge the segmentary 
political model, as Marcel Djama has rightly observed, but instead sought to 
confine it to the pre-colonial era and the realm of tradition.31 
At the same time, a new stream of scholarship, led by Somali intellectuals, 
began to criticize the ‘invention’ of ‘Somalia as a textual construction’, 
highlighting how the existing historiography simply reproduced the structures of 
domination and social exclusion which marginalise subaltern groups in the agro-
pastoral south.32 This new trend in the production of Somali history stemmed 
primarily ‘from the effort by exiled Somalis – and particularly those from the [so-
called] ‘minority’ clans – to publicize the history of their particular 
communities’.33 Mainly focusing on the riverine areas in southern Somalia, these 
revisionist scholars, including Ali Jumale Ahmed and Abdi Kusow, have 
criticized the one-sidedness of the northern nomadic bias in Somali studies. In 
doing so, however, they have tended to replace the dominant northern-centric 
paradigm with a south-centric one, reproducing the historical binary of nomadic 
north versus agro-pastoral south, as Abdurahman Abdullahi ‘Baadiyow’ has 
noted.34 Intersecting in part with this new historiographical stream, Catherine 
Besteman, Lee Cassanelli, Francesca Declich, and Kenneth Menkhaus have each 
 
Wisconsin Press, 1989); ‘Somali Studies: Towards an Alternative Epistemology’, 
Northeast African Studies, 11 (1989), pp. 3–17.   
31 Marcel Djama, ‘Trajectoire du Pouvoir en Pays Somali’, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines, 
37 (1997), pp. 403–28. 
32 Ali Jumale Ahmed, ed., The Invention of Somalia (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 
1995); Abdi Kusow, ed., Putting the Cart before the Horse: Contested Nationalism 
and the Crisis of the Nation-State in Somalia (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2004). 
33 Lee V. Cassanelli, ‘History and Identity in the Somali Diaspora’, in Variations on the 
Theme of Somaliness: Proceedings of the EASS/SSIA International Congress of 
Somali Studies, Turku, Finland, August 6-9, 1998, ed. by Muddle S. Lilius (Turku: 
Centre for Continuing Education, Abo Akademi University, c2001), pp. 272–80 (p. 
275). 
34 Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow), Making Sense of Somali History. Volume 1 
(London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers, 2017), p. 19. 
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produced seminal work on land, slavery, and the political economy of violence in 
southern Somalia, particularly in the Jubba River valley.35 This work begins to 
take up some of the challenges first identified by Cassanelli in recognizing the 
diversity and the regional dimensions of the Somali past, while also providing 
much empirical evidence to support a reorientation of the historical focus from the 
north to the south. 
Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that the historiography of Somali 
nationalism has tended to foster the assumption that it represents an exceptional 
case in modern African history. For some writers this revolves around the alleged 
homogeneity of the Somali nation, while for others it is due to the centrifugal and 
fissiparous forces of the Somali lineage system.36 Both groups tend to examine 
only the workings of the Somali independent state, overlooking the proximate 
history of the late colonial period, and especially the political circumstances of 
decolonization. Despite a long-standing debate over the exceptionality of the 
Somali case in relation to state-making and nation-building, the historical 
 
35 Besteman, Unraveling Somalia; Catherine Besteman and Lee V. Cassanelli (eds), The 
Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War behind the War (Boulder: 
Westview Press; London: HAAN, 1996); Lee V. Cassanelli, ‘Hosts and Guests: A 
Historical Interpretation of Land Conflicts in Southern and Central Somalia’ 
(London; Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute, 2015); Francesca Declich, ‘Unfree Labour, 
Forced Labour and Resistance among the Zigula of the Lower Juba’, in Resisting 
Bondage in Indian Ocean Africa and Asia, ed. by Edward E. Alpers and others 
(London; New York: Routledge, 2007), pp.24–39; Kenneth J. Menkhaus, ‘Rural 
Transformation and the Roots of Underdevelopment in Somalia’s Lower Jubba 
Valley’ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, South Carolina, 1989). 
36 See, for instance: Cristopher Clapham, The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay 
(London: Hurst & Company, 2017); Latin and Samatar, Nation in Search of a State; 
Ioan M. Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call for Kingship in Somali Society 
(Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1994); Abdalla Omar Mansur, ‘Contrary to a 
Nation: The Cancer of the Somali State’, in The Invention of Somalia, pp. 107–134; 
Ahmed I. Samatar, Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality (London: Institute for 
African Alternatives; London: Zed, 1988); Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism: 
International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). 
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processes surrounding Somalia’s decolonisation have received little attention from 
historians.  This is in large part due to the difficulty of accessing Italian archival 
sources dating after the Second World War. In recent years, however, a new 
generation of Italian historians including Antonio Morone and Annalisa Urbano, 
along with a few Somali scholars, has begun to reverse this trend, conducting 
pioneering research on the history of decolonisation in Somalia with the benefit of 
Italian and Somali sources.37 This emerging historiography has greatly enlarged 
the scope of Somalia’s political history, but nonetheless remains predominantly 
focused on Mogadishu and the institutional mechanisms of state-building, 
overlooking the importance of local power relationships and the role of the 
‘margins’ in the process of state formation. 
The ways in which scholars have approached the ‘Somali question’ and its 
transnational implications were fixed long before archival sources were available 
to historians.  The studies which set the tone for our understanding of nationalism 
and irredentism in the Horn region were written in the 1960s, the influential works 
of Ioan Lewis, John Drysdale, and Saadia Touval, remaining largely unchallenged 
until very recently.38 This is a literature of its time, drawing up a synthesis of the 
key events from a relatively uncritical reading of official reports, newspaper 
articles and extant secondary sources, and often being grounded in personal 
observations. The fresh perspectives now being brought to Somali history 
emanate from the rigorous examination of multiple archives and the judicious use 
of wide-ranging oral histories, these providing a wholly different set of evidence 
that can allow for challenging and divergent interpretations.   
 
 
37 Antonio M. Morone, L’ultima Colonia: come l'Italia è tornata in Africa 1950-1960 
(Rome; Bari: Laterza, 2011); Annalisa Urbano, ‘Imagining the Nation, Crafting the 
State: The Politics of Nationalism and Decolonisation in Somalia (1940-60)’ 
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, Edinburgh, 2012); Abdi I. Samatar, Africa’s 
First Democrats: Somalia’s Aden A. Osman and Abdirizak H. Hussen 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016); Mohamed I. Trunji, Somalia: The 
Untold History 1941-1969 (Leicester: Looh Press, 2015); Abdurahman Abdullahi, 
Making Sense of Somali History. 
38 Drysdale, The Somali Dispute; Lewis, Modern History; Touval, Somali Nationalism.  
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This has been clearly apparent on the Kenya side of the border, where a 
range of new historical studies of Kenya’s Somali region have begun to explore 
new sources to reveal more complex and contested histories.39 Keren Weitzberg, 
in particular, has provided an important contribution to the historiography of the 
‘Somali problem’ in Kenya, showing how historically specific, non-Western 
traditions of transnationalism have challenged the hegemony of the nation state. 
Hannah Whittaker has examined the history of the 1960s, focussing on the social 
dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency in north-eastern Kenya during the 
so-called shifta war (1963-67) that erupted in this region in the final months of 
colonial rule.40 Deconstructing long-standing assumptions about Somali 
nationalism, Weitzberg has convincingly argued that the politics of Kenya’s 
Somali region in the decolonisation era ‘cannot be encapsulated through any 
binary – whether moderate/radical, collaborator/resister, loyalist/rebel, 
modernist/traditionalist, or tribalist/nationalist’.41 Nonetheless, she has reproduced 
the trope of borderless mobility versus territorial sovereignty. Equating mobility 
with non-territoriality, she has used non-territoriality and de-territorialisation as 
categories for understanding the emergence of alternative forms of belonging and 
the complexity of Somali political discourses. In so doing, she has overlooked the 
gaps, mismatches, and discrepancies between discourse and practices, without 
 
39 Weitzberg, We Do Not Have Borders; Whittaker, ‘Socioeconomic Dynamics of the 
Shifta Conflict’; by the same author, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Kenya 
and ‘Legacies of Empire’. 
40  The term shifta is derived from the Amharic shefta (bandit or rebel), which itself stems 
from the root verb shaffata (to rebel). As Donald Crummey and Richard Reid have 
noted, sheftenat is an ambiguous term, covering both rebellion and banditry. 
Because of the prevalence of banditry in the Ethiopian highlands during the 
twentieth century, the term shifta found its way into English usage across north-east 
Africa, where ‘it refers to any arm band at odds with the state’ but also to ‘low-level 
criminal behaviour’. Donald Crummey, ‘Banditry and Resistance: Noble and 
Peasant in Nineteenth-Century Ethiopia’ in Banditry, Rebellion, and Social Protest 
in Africa, ed. by Donald Crummey (London; Portsmouth, N.H.: James Currey, 
Heinemann, 2002, c1986), pp. 133–149 (here p. 135); Reid, Frontiers of Violence, 
p. 50.       
41 Weitzberg, We Do Not Have Borders, p. 95. 
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considering the ways in which territoriality influenced local power relationships 
and the production of politics. Whittaker’s book on the shifta war has provided a 
pioneering contribution to the study of an under-researched topic.42 However, her 
understanding of the multi-layered nature of the conflict suffers from a lack of 
transnational perspective, as she overlooks the role that cross-border networks of 
social, economic, and political exchange played in shaping secessionism and 
insurgency in north-eastern Kenya. As a result, the historical background to the 
shifta war has yet to be deeply investigated. 
On the Kenyan side of the border, scholars have been able to consult a rich 
array of colonial sources on the history of the borderlands, sources that reflect the 
preoccupations and perspectives of the British colonisers rather than those of the 
local inhabitants. In their reports on clashes between Somali clans and between 
the Somalis and other ethnic groups, British colonial administrators identified 
competition for scarce water and grazing resources as the cause of ‘perennial’ 
strife in this region. In this way, colonial officials downplayed or ignored other 
historically contingent factors, such as competition over trade, or the impact of 
government policies. These were factors that had considerable transformative 
power across the region, redefining social relationships and sometimes provoking 
or influencing ethnic and clan conflicts. This thesis will provide many illustrations 
of the way in which these factors shaped local histories by defining the response 
of local communities. Scholars who have rightfully argued that violence and 
dissent in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands have deep historical roots in socio-
economic inequalities and struggles over access to resources have focused 
predominantly on the issue of land appropriation, and have tended only to 
examine these conflicts on one side of the border.43 Notable exceptions to this 
criticism are to be found in the works of Peter Dalleo and Peter Little, who have 
each documented the effects of trade, particularly livestock markets, on Somali 
pastoralists, Dalleo focusing on Kenya’s Northern Frontier Province over the 
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colonial period, and Little on the lower Jubba region in southern Somalia over 
more recent decades.44 The deeper political implications of economic factors and 
the local effects of trade corridors taken up by Dalleo and Little are yet to be fully 
explored for the trans-border region over the twentieth century. 
Since the early 1990s, following the collapse of the Somali state and the 
outbreak of civil war, mainstream scholarship on the historical roots of conflict in 
the Somali territories has been burdened (and to some extent blinded) by the trope 
of state failure. Research framed around this concept presents a major problem, as 
Tobias Hagmann and Markus Hoehne have rightfully observed: the tendency to 
overlook empirical statehood.45 Following the warnings of Hagmann and Hoehne, 
this thesis rejects a definition of the state that is grounded in the notions of ‘lack’ 
of authority, or the ‘failure’ of institutions, focusing, instead, on the ways in 
which sovereignty was negotiated on the ground. As Keren Weitzberg has argued, 
colonial officials developed governance arrangements and techniques that, 
although they were inconsistent with normative forms of statecraft, should not be 
portrayed as ‘failures’, but, rather, as an intentional policy, which enabled local 
agency in the borderlands to assert some form of state power.46 
The teleology of failure has gone hand-in-hand with the structural-
functional approach to Somali societies. Writing about the role of boundaries in 
the history of the Horn of Africa, Christopher Clapham has argued that the 
sources of state failure in the Somali-lands ‘most basically derive from the 
problems of creating a territorial state on the inadequate foundations of clan-based 
pastoral societies’.47 ‘Clan’, however, is an institution that should not be taken for 
 
44 Peter T. Dalleo, ‘Trade and Pastoralism: Economic Factors in the History of the Somali 
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granted and regarded as a self-contained unit, as a simple matter of genealogical 
descent. Rather, as Keren Weitzberg has noted, in Somali society clan ‘is defined 
relationally and what it means in any given context varies’.48 Both the 
significance and political relevance of clan change depending on circumstances 
and geographical location. The dominant paradigm in Somali Studies, however, 
identifies the particularity of the Somali segmentary model as being the ‘absence 
of a territorial basis’ for social and political bonds.49 By this interpretation, 
territory does not matter to identity or affiliation. Nonetheless, the works of Lee 
Cassanelli, Virginia Luling, and Catherine Besteman have shown that the agro-
pastoral people of southern Somalia forged communal identities that were based 
more on spatial proximity than on genealogy. These agro-pastoral groups formed 
confederacies which reflected ‘a growing sense of territoriality’, although they 
were expressed in the idiom of kinship.50 Building on the work of these scholars, 
this thesis challenges the prevailing assumption that socio-political identities 
among the Somalis had no territorial basis, specifically exploring the relationship 
between genealogical identities, allegiances, and territory. 
As Cedric Barnes has pointed out, academic controversies between 
‘primordialists’ and ‘transformationalists’ have essentially fallen into the north-
south divide of historical lineage and territorial identification.51 Barnes has sought 
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to bypass the dichotomy between genealogical and territorial discourses using 
empirical evidence from the Ethiopia-Somalia borderland. He has argued that 
descent by lineage should be seen as only one part of the repertoire of political 
legitimacy in Somali societies. Barnes has highlighted the historicity of the so-
called u-dhashay - ku-dhashay debate which has been raging in the Somali-
speaking areas since the collapse of the Somali state in the late 1980s. The couplet 
u-dhashay - ku-dhashay can be roughly translated as ‘born to’ (a family) and 
‘born at’ (a place). However, as Roland Marchal has noted, this formula has come 
to signify ‘born for’ (a region, i.e. to the family/clan that claims to be the ‘natal’ 
clan of the place/region and, therefore, to ‘own’ the territory)’ and ‘born in’ (a 
place/region).52 The u-dhashay - ku-dhashay debate is important for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is key to defining who is entitled to resource access and political 
representation and who is not and, therefore, to determining how a Somali state 
should be built. Second, the main line along which Somali studies have split, 
dividing into what Abdi Kusow has called ‘lineage narratives’ and ‘territorial 
narratives’, echoes the u-dhashay - ku-dhashay couplet.53 
Barnes has convincingly argued that the ‘lineage’ and ‘territorial’ 
paradigms are ‘far more intertwined than they might first appear’, showing that 
traditional ‘segmentary’ identity ‘has at certain historical moments chimed with 
territorial identity’.54 Building on Lewis’s argument that colonialism may have 
fostered the identification of clan and territory to pursue its own administrative 
and political goals but certainly did not invent it, Barnes has shown that ‘the 
dominance of genealogically related clans (or lineages) over territories has a long, 
albeit episodic and contradictory history, in the Somali-speaking lands’.55 He has 
argued that this history is reflected in ‘multiple local narratives’ which emerged at 
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the inception of Somali nationalism. Barnes has presented these discourses as 
manifestations of ‘dissent from the nationalist genealogical narrative, and its 
accompanying irredentist “pan-territorial” narrative’, emphasising the ‘subaltern’ 
character of these ‘expressions of genealogical and territorial particularity’.56 This 
thesis builds on Barnes’s argument that genealogical and territorial identities are 
historically intertwined to suggest that the struggles over genealogical claims to 
territory represented by the present-day u-dhashay - ku-dhashay debate were 
already apparent during the colonial period. This study will show how and why 
these struggles acquired particular salience in concomitance with the eventual 
fixation of the colonial border following the transfer of Jubaland in 1925 and 
during the long moment of decolonisation, from the end of the Second World War 
until independence. However, this thesis deconstructs the opposition between 
particularistic genealogical and territorial narratives on the one hand, and 
hegemonic nationalist trans-territorial discourse, on the other hand. In so doing, 
this thesis will demonstrate that the identification of clan with territory was not 
necessarily a ‘subaltern’ mode of dissent but, rather, played a fundamental role in 
defining who could enter the struggle for resources and, therefore, participate in 
negotiating the state in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands and who could not. It is 
argued here that, although colonialism did not ‘invent’ the connection between 
clan and territory, the territorialisation of genealogical identities was a key feature 
of colonial governance over these borderlands (despite the fact that it took on 
different forms on each side of the frontier) and was employed by the 
borderlanders as a means to assert their political and economic goals vis-à-vis one 
another, with the result that genealogical claims to territory acquired a new 
significance and new functions in the process of state formation.         
Following Elden’s consideration of the meaning of territory, we will view 
territoriality as an ‘historical question: produced, mutable and fluid’.57 This study 
will contextualise the meaning of territory in the borderlands, tracing its 
connections with political phenomena and understanding territoriality as a key 
concept in the way that local communities appropriate the borderlands. As David 
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Delaney has effectively argued, territoriality cannot be reduced to a strategy for 
the control of space; rather, it is ‘better understood as implicating and being 
implicated in ways of thinking, acting, and being in the world’.58 The term 
‘territorial appropriation’ is adopted here as a conceptual tool for understanding 
transformations of territoriality. However, some precisions about the term territory 
are required to explain and justify our use of ‘territorial appropriation’. Territory is 
not quite the same for anglophone and francophone scholars. In the anglophone 
tradition, ‘the term territory is considered to coincide with state territory’, whilst 
among francophone scholars the notion of ‘territoire has never been so strictly 
linked with national boundaries’.59 The difference between territory and territoire 
- which is often translated by ‘place’ and not by ‘territory’ - is not simply lexical, 
but epistemological. The anglophone conception of territory is centred around two 
main ideas. Firstly, a reading of territoriality ‘concerned, predominantly, with the 
study of geopolitical strategies of control/defence of space and with the resulting 
political-territorial arrangements’.60 Secondly, the idea that human territoriality is 
‘fundamentally distinct from animal territoriality in that the former is not the 
product of instinct but is instead a culturally situated process intended to achieve 
particular political and social ends’.61 While in the anglophone tradition territory 
has never been detached from the state, in francophone scholarship territoire has 
assumed varied and complex connotations since the 1970s.62 
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In the francophone tradition, territory is generally understood as the area 
of day-to-day practices and relations, whose limits are determined by the surface 
where these practices and relations take place.63  Some Anglo-Saxon scholars such 
as Kevin Cox and John Agnew share this view and see territory as ‘the container 
of localized social and/or (non-invariably state) power relations’.64 Territory thus 
denotes ‘at the same time a political circumscription and the group’s living space’, 
in Jaillet’s words.65 These two areas, though, are not always spatially equivalent. 
For this reason, anglophone researchers have tended to abandon ‘territory’ and to 
prefer ‘place’ instead. They have sought to resolve this conceptual conundrum by 
distinguishing the ‘sense of territory’ – understood as ‘inextricably tied to the 
modern state system’ – from the ‘sense of place’.66 However, the problem is not 
territory itself but ‘certain ways of thinking about territory’, as Elden has pointed 
out.67 The French geographer Debarbieux has defined territory as a social 
construct which connects a geographical space to a system of values that gives 
multiple and combined meanings to each component of this space and to the 
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discontinuities this space encompasses.68 This is the definition that it is adopted 
here. This way of thinking about territory implies that a territory, insofar as it is 
such, has to be appropriated materially and/or symbolically by individuals or 
groups. The concept of territorial appropriation is thus inherently connected with 
the issues of control over resources, differentiation, and domination. Therefore, 
this concept is particularly useful for studying identity formation and power, 
conceived as not necessarily linked to state power but as inherent to any social 
relationship.69 
To revisit how colonial domination worked in the Somalia-Kenya 
borderlands and take the borderlanders’ agency into account, this thesis examines 
how ‘colonial transactions’, understood as relations of both material and symbolic 
exchange, influenced the internal politics of borderland societies, shaping their 
relationships with the state.70 To explore these transactions, this study focuses 
particularly on the negotiation and transformation of ‘traditional’ authority, 
drawing inspiration from Cherry Leonardi’s work on state-society relations across 
South Sudan. Leonardi has argued against the idea that chiefs are ‘interstitial 
actors’, mere ‘intermediaries between distinct, antagonistic entities of state and 
society’.71 Her approach to both state and tradition ‘not as fixed entities but as 
ideas, discourses and imaginaries, as well as institutions, actors and processes’ has 
proved particularly relevant to studying processes of state formation in the 
Somalia-Kenya borderlands.72 This is due to the fact that there are similarities 
between the ways state-society relations have been conceived in the contexts of 
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South Sudanese History and Somali Studies. In both contexts, the notion of state-
society separation has gone largely unquestioned. Leonardi’s book has challenged 
the assumption shared by pioneers of political anthropology that the state was 
‘irrelevant to the political cultures of the southern Sudanese “segmentary lineage 
systems”’ as well as the idea that ‘such political cultures were fundamentally at 
odds with the modern state systems imposed through colonialism’.73 Similarly, 
this thesis challenges both the ideas of the state as irrelevant to Somali traditional 
political culture and of state power as an alien imposition whose transplant into 
the Somali segmentary lineage system was doomed to fail. Building on Leonardi’s 
argument that state formation should be understood in terms of local relations, this 




Methodology and sources 
Drawing inspiration from seminal works on African borderlands by Dereje 
Feyissa, Markus Hoehne, Paul Nugent, Anthony Asiwaju, and Cedric Barnes, this 
thesis adopts an actor-centred approach to challenge the argument that the 
artificiality of the colonial border explains its problematic nature.75 This approach 
 
73 Ibid., p. 6. 
74 Ibid., p. 8. 
75 Dereje Feyissa and Markus Virgil Hoehne, ‘State Borders and Borderlands as 
Resources: An Analytical Framework’, in Borders & Borderlands as Resources in 
the Horn of Africa, ed. by Dereje Feyissa, and Markus Virgil Hoehne (Oxford: 
James Currey, 2010), pp.1–26; Nugent and Asiwaju, eds., African Boundaries; Paul 
Nugent, ‘Arbitrary Lines and the People’s Minds: A Dissenting View on Colonial 
Boundaries in West Africa’, in African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and 
Opportunities, ed. by Paul Nugent and Anthony Ijaola Asiwaju (London: Pinter, 
1996), pp. 35–67; Cedric Barnes, ‘The Ethiopian State and its Somalia Periphery, 
c.1888-1948’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Cambridge, 2001); by the 
same author, ‘The Ethiopian-British Somaliland Boundary’, in Borders & 
38 
 
allows us to explore social, economic and political processes that have been 
largely ignored by old-fashioned historiographical research on inter-state politics 
and their effects on borderland peoples. This approach, however, risks to leave the 
actors themselves – their emergence, their interests and identities – unexplained. 
This thesis, therefore, seeks to develop a combined understanding of agency and 
structure, inspired by Anthony Giddens’s theory of structuration.76 The notion of 
structuration involves the concept ‘of the duality of structure, which relates to the 
fundamentally recursive character of social life, and expresses the mutual 
dependence of structure and agency’.77 The theory of structuration thus rejects 
‘the identification of structure with constraint’.78 Drawing on this theory, the 
thesis seeks to apprehend structure not ‘as a barrier to action, but as essentially 
involved in its production’.79 The state is not considered here as an actor, as an 
autonomous power over society, but, rather, as a ‘résumé of society’ – as Bruce 
Berman has called it.80 This thesis, therefore, adopts the distinction proposed by 
Berman and John Lonsdale between state-building, ‘as a conscious effort at 
creating an apparatus of control’, and state-formation, ‘as an historical process 
whose outcome is a largely unconscious and contradictory process of conflicts, 
negotiations and compromises between different groups’, focusing primarily on 
state formation.81 
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Moving beyond formal institutions as the loci of politics, this study uses 
the borderlands as a vantage point to observe the politics of state formation not 
only in the state’s periphery, but also at its centre. As Niccolò Machiavelli wrote 
in the The Prince’s dedication to the Magnificent Lorenzo de’ Medici, ‘those who 
paint landscapes place themselves in a low position on the plain in order to 
consider the nature of the mountains and the heights, and place themselves high 
on top of mountains in order to study the plains’.82 In a similar way, this thesis 
shows how particular socio-economic and political configurations in the Somalia-
Kenya borderlands participated in ‘doing the state’, and how changes at the state’s 
centre influenced social, economic, and political transformations in the 
borderlands. 
Throughout the thesis the heuristic framework of ‘negotiation’, proposed 
by Tobias Hagmann and Didier Péclard to grasp some complex dimensions of 
statehood, will be utilised.  The term ‘negotiation’ in this sense allows us to close 
in on the peculiar set of social, economic, and political arrangements which 
characterised the process of state formation in the trans-border region.83 This 
framework has proved particularly helpful in better understanding how 
heterogeneous actors at the local, national, and regional levels forged the state 
through processes of negotiation and contestation. As Hagmann and Péclard have 
pointed out, ‘negotiation does not occur between co-equal parties or in an 
inclusive manner […]. Not everything is or can be negotiated and not everyone 
takes part in negotiating statehood’.84 To understand how local processes of 
negotiation and contestation shaped the state in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands, 
this thesis will consider how different actors (soldiers, chiefs, farmers, traders, 
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middlemen, and politicians) became involved in shaping political authority; how 
negotiation arenas (such as cross-border trade corridors, plantation agriculture in 
the Jubba Valley, and electoral politics) conditioned social actors’ inclusion in or 
exclusion from the negotiation process; how the main objects of negotiation were 
resolved, namely security provision and the balance of power between the state 
and its periphery (in particular, the instrumentalization of identity politics at the 
local level in attempts to claim authority and gain access to the state’s resources); 
and how negotiation affected the questions of sovereignty and citizenship. To 
better implement the idea of ‘negotiation’, this thesis also adopts an ‘externalist’ 
approach – ‘one deliberately detached from the national as the place/people/period 
in which nationalising processes occur’– to write a history of state formation 
outside the framework of national historiography, using the borderlands’ vantage 
point to rethink established historical problems.85 In so doing, this study then 
deals with the transnational as a ‘a phenomenon that extends across, and thereby 
links as well as transcends, different (territorial) “levels”’, rather than a ‘level’ per 
se, as opposed, for instance, to the ‘national’ level.86 
This transnational way of seeing is exemplified in the methodology of the 
thesis and its emphasis upon ‘seeing’ from both sides of the border. The thesis 
makes extensive use of both Italian and British colonial sources. While the 
emerging historiography of Kenya’s frontier region has looked northwards from 
metropolitan Nairobi, and while Somali studies continue to be dominated by a 
Mogadishu-centred focus, this study has eyes on both sides of the frontier.  Local 
perspectives from the borderlands are the dominant feature of the archives used 
here.  The bulk of the source material used in this thesis is drawn from archives in 
Kenya, the United Kingdom, and Italy: the Kenya National Archives in Nairobi; 
the Bodleian Library’s Commonwealth and African collections in Oxford; The 
National Archives in Kew; the Historical-Diplomatic Archives of the Italian 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Historical Archives of the Historical Museum of 
the Carabinieri Corps, the Historical Archives of the Historical Office of the 
Carabinieri General Command, and the Archives of the Historical Office of the 
Italian Army General Staff, all in Rome. Amongst the sources I examined in the 
Historical-Diplomatic Archives of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Historical Archives of the Historical Museum of the Carabinieri Corps are several 
files concerning the Italian Trusteeship Administration in Somalia during the 
1950s that no other historian had seen before.  Alongside archival documents, this 
thesis draws on published primary sources, including travel accounts, memoirs 
and essays by both British and Italian colonial officials, government publications 
and newspaper articles.  These sources were accessed in various libraries in the 
United Kingdom and Italy: the British Library and the SOAS Library in London, 
the Bodleian History Faculty Library and the Weston Library in Oxford, the 
Historical Library of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Library of the 
Central State Archives in Rome, the Library of Modern and Contemporary 
History and the National Central Library, both in Rome. 
Conducting archival research in Italy presents several challenges. None of 
the Italian archives mentioned above, with the exception of the Archives of the 
Historical Office of the Italian Army General Staff and of certain collections in 
the Historical-Diplomatic Archives of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has 
an online catalogue. Moreover, applying for access to reading rooms sometimes 
entails byzantine procedures. For instance, visits to the Historical Office of the 
Italian Army General Staff have to be booked via telephone, one month in 
advance, on the first working day of the month, between 9.00 am. and 12.00 noon. 
Prospective visitors are only allowed to book one seat for three consecutive days 
and for no more than five days each month. Moreover, the Historical Office’s 
study rooms are open only from 8:30 am to 13:30 pm Monday to Thursday and 
from 8:30 am to 11:30 am on Friday. None of the Italian archives mentioned 
above is open after 2:00 pm or during the month of August. Furthermore, the most 
serious problem in terms of access to archival documents stems from the fact that 
there is no Freedom of Information Act in Italy. As a result, in the Historical 
Archives of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a special authorisation is 
required to access files dating from or after 1949.  An authorisation request has to 
be made for each of these files and sent to the Director of Collections, who is 
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authorised to refuse permission for accessing documents without providing an 
explanation. In the Historical Archives of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
access to files dating from after 1950 is further limited by the fact that the records 
of the Directorate General of the Italian Trusteeship Administration of Somalia 
have been inaccessible since the spring of 2015 because of structural damage 
caused by heavy rains in the main storage building. According to the Director of 
Collections, this situation is likely to last indefinitely due to lack of funding. 
These challenges notwithstanding, colonial archives in Rome have proved to be a 
goldmine, whose potential is, for the most part, yet to be tapped.   
Collecting and using the voices of local informants has been perhaps the 
most challenging but also the most interesting and, no doubt, the most humanly 
rewarding aspect of this study. In order to verify the solidity of oral evidence and 
to unpack local voices and imperial perspectives, I have triangulated archival and 
oral sources. I spent over nine months in Kenya between 2015 and 2017, 
alternating periods of intensive archival research with stints of fieldwork. This 
enabled me to move back and forth between different sets of evidence, using oral 
testimonies to identify concealed threads in the colonial archives and using 
archival sources to check, whenever possible, information or broader insights 
obtained during interviews. Each new visit to the archives generated new 
questions for more interviews, and each new set of interviews ushered me back to 
the archives. Often, the local voices I gathered are not in agreement with the 
colonial archive. Still, I have used those voices to bring out points of dissent. No 
matter how elusive and fraught with problems locally-understood history may be, 
this history is often more important than the official record because it governs 
people’s behaviour. If, however, one voice is isolated, I have not used it, unless it 
represents a body of opinion.  
I interviewed seventy-four informants (mostly Somalis but also several 
Boran) including chiefs, descendants of chiefs, businessmen, politicians, former 
soldiers and policemen, local government officials, and former civil servants, in 
various locations in Kenya and in the Somali capital Mogadishu. In Kenya, I 
conducted interviews in Nairobi, particularly in the predominantly Somali 
neighbourhood of Eastleigh (also known as ‘Little Mogadishu’), and in the 
counties of Wajir, Garissa, and Isiolo. Unfortunately, I was unable to visit 
Mandera county (wedged between Ethiopia and Somalia in the north-easternmost 
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part of Kenya) and Somalia’s border region due to extremely volatile security 
conditions. Nevertheless, among the informants I interviewed in Nairobi, Garissa, 
and Mogadishu are several Somalis from Kismaayo, Afmadoow, and 
Garbahaarrey, in Somalia’s border region. I conducted some interviews in 
English, some in Italian (nearly all the elderly informants from southern Somalia 
could speak Italian), and many others in either Somali or Oromo. 
I relied upon assistants to provide on-the-spot translations into spoken 
English of vernacular interviews in Somali and Oromo. I worked intensively with 
my assistants to verify written notes and interview transcriptions and to ensure 
that as much original idiom as possible was retained. Nonetheless, every quoted or 
paraphrased interview I have cited in translation has passed through an 
interpretative process, with the risk of potential loss or shift of meaning. 
Interviews were not taped but recorded as field notes. People in the Somalia-
Kenya borderlands and Somalis in Nairobi and Mogadishu are wary and worried 
by the power of a voice recorder, due to their lived experiences of violence, state 
repression and conflict, and to the volatile security situation in these areas. Putting 
a voice recorder on the table would have either prevented the interview from 
taking place or distorted the interaction with my informants and, therefore, 
irremediably compromised the quality of historical information. Lengthy 
interview notes were discussed with interpreters - in the case of interviews 
conducted in Somali and interpreted on the spot - and with the informants 
themselves - in the case of interviews conducted in English or Italian - to check 
specific points. Indeed, this source material was fundamentally mediated by 
interpreters and assistants. This, though, doesn’t make it less valuable than 
government sources, as these were ‘similarly mediated by clerks, interpreters and 





87 Leonardi, p. 10. 
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Argument and thesis structure 
The thesis chapters are organised into three parts. The first part, consisting of 
Chapters 1 and 2, examines how socio-political identities and ideas of belonging 
acquired new shapes and functions in the process of state formation from the 
colonisation period to the establishment of a United Nations Trusteeship in former 
Italia Somalia in 1950, following Italy’s defeat in the Second World War and the 
dismembering of Italian East Africa. Challenging time-honoured ethnographic 
and anthropological traditions, these two chapters examine how group fault-lines 
and processes of identification and affiliation metamorphosed as the borderlands’ 
economic and political geographies changed. 
Building on work by Peter Dalleo and Peter Little (discussed previously in 
this Introduction), Chapters 1 and 2 use cross-border movements and trade as 
lenses for observing social relationships and the local dynamics of power. 
Particular attention is paid to export markets, whether legal or ‘illicit’ (livestock, 
hides and skins, game trophies, and agricultural produce), and the social groups 
and actors associated with them, in order to examine the effects of these markets 
on the people of the Somalia-Kenya borderlands in the process of colonial state 
formation.  
In parallel with trade, these chapters focus on the politics of territory, 
exploring how transformations of territoriality, along such variables as ethnicity, 
clan, and class, affected local power balances and the negotiation of political 
authority. More specifically, Chapter 1 documents the emergence of colonial 
regimes of territorialisation following the redrawing of the British-Italian border 
in 1925 and explores how local actors exploited imperial rivalries and conflicting 
modes of governance on the two sides of the border to assert their own political 
and economic goals. Chapter 2 investigates how mobilisation policies in the lead-
up to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the second Italo-Ethiopian war in 1935-36, 
and the East Africa Campaign in 1940-41 transformed the imperial frontier, 
affecting allegiances, alliances, and conflicts among the people of the Somalia-
Kenya borderlands. In so doing, Chapter 2 also lays the groundwork for 
reconstructing the history of war in these borderlands, a history which, for the 
most part, is yet to be written. This Chapter then jointly discusses the socio-
political implications of colonial development policies in north-eastern Kenya, on 
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the one hand, and the political impact of certain strategies of economic 
development and territorial control adopted by the British Military Administration 
(BMA) in southern Somalia, on the other hand, using Wajir District and the 
Lower Jubba Valley as case studies. In so doing, Chapter 2 shows how British and 
Italian agendas influenced identities and political alignment as different social 
groups translated these (conflicting) agendas into Somali politics.  
Only recently has a new generation of historians begun to explore the 
relationship between ideas of territory and belonging and the emergence of 
Somali nationalism, emphasising the plurality of actors, struggles and ideas that 
characterised this phenomenon. Keren Weitzberg has explored the deeper history 
of the debates around identities and allegiances among the Kenyan Somalis and 
how these debates intertwined with the politics of Somali nationalism, while 
Annalisa Urbano has provided important insights on the emergence of the so-
called ‘pro-Italian’ political parties in southern Somalia in the late 1940s.88 
Urbano has discussed the meanings of political alignment in connection with 
territorial appropriation and land issues, yet focusing essentially on the discursive 
level. Another few scholars have examined the impact of agricultural and resource 
management policies on certain areas of southern Somalia and north-eastern 
Kenya in the 1940s. Kenneth Menkhaus has documented the relationship between 
agricultural exploitation in the Lower Jubba Valley and the development of 
Somali political parties in this region, while Hannah Whittaker has showed that 
increased colonial interventionism in the Northern Frontier Province was 
motivated by political and security interests as well as ecological and economic 
considerations.89 
 
88 Annalisa Urbano, ‘“That Is Why We Have Troubles”: The Pro-Italia Movement’s 
Challenge to Nationalism in British-Occupied Somalia (1946-9)’, Journal of 
African History, 57, No. 3 (2016), pp. 323–44; Keren Weitzberg, ‘The Promise of a 
Borderless World: Diaspora, Nativism, and the Kenyan Somali population (1890-
2010)’ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 2013); Weitzberg, 
We Do Not Have Borders. 
89 Menkhaus, ‘Rural Transformation’, pp. 278–308; Whittaker, ‘Frontier Security in 
North East Africa’. 
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Building on this scholarship, Chapters 1 and 2 treat the Somalia-Kenya 
borderlands as a single unit of analysis and take a comprehensive view. The main 
argument put forward in these two chapters is that different social actors exploited 
the colonial categories of political ordering and the administrative and economic 
differentials created by the imperial border to either maintain a dominant position 
or challenge their adversaries, with the result that social identities and the bases of 
‘indigenous’ power were transformed in the process. Hegemonic struggles 
between British, Italian, and Ethiopian imperialisms magnified these issues, 
telescoping the temporalities of global history and those of local histories. This 
created new configurations of space, power, and belonging which are crucial for 
understanding the historical trajectory of the Somalia-Kenya borderlands and the 
emergence of Somali nationalism.  
The second part of this thesis, consisting of Chapters 3 and 4, examines 
how different social actors in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands became involved in 
shaping political authority and negotiating statehood during the period of Italian 
Trusteeship, from 1 April 1950 until Somalia’s independence on 1 July 1960. 
Challenging prevailing views of state and institution building, Chapters 3 and 4 
focus on social order below conventional politics, exploring how commoners – 
subjects on the road to becoming citizens – participated in the process of state 
formation, navigating and sometimes reproducing the dynamics of power and 
domination that they were experiencing under the Italian Trusteeship 
Administration. These two chapters also account for the effects that the 
negotiation of political control, access to resources (both material and symbolic), 
and state-sanctioned authority in the Jubba Valley had across the Kenya-Somalia 
border.  
Chapters 3 and 4 build on Cedric Barnes’s observation that ‘the seemingly 
simple nationalist genealogical discourse of a Somali territorial commonwealth is 
cross-cut by any number of particularistic genealogical and territorial histories’ 
and pushes this line of reasoning further.90 By exploring the meaning of sub-
national clan and territorial discourse within the politics of state formation in the 
Jubba River valley, these two chapters suggest that territorial and genealogical 
 
90 Barnes, ‘U Dhashay—Ku Dhashay’, pp. 496–97.  
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(clan) polarisation were two sides of the same coin – rather than the 
manifestations of two conflicting identity paradigms – and that these struggles 
ultimately coincided with the emergence of a national system of power. These 
genealogical and territorial histories did not constitute an autonomous domain of 
anti-elitist politics; rather, they were subsumed within the power contest at the 
state’s centre, as we shall see. 
Building on the emergent literature on Somalia’s decolonisation, Chapters 
3 and 4 offer a different perspective on the politics of Somali nationalism and on 
the formation of the post-colonial state in the Trust Territory of Somaliland 
(hereafter Somalia) from a peripheral and trans-border vantage point. Despite all 
we may think we know on these topics, there remain a number of issues that 
complicate the prevailing picture of Somalia’s transition to independence. I am 
now going to address these points. 
The first surrounds the tendency to describe the emergence of the Somali 
post-colonial state as either a laboratory example of distorted state making and 
nation building or, conversely, a lost golden age of Somali politics. In the first 
instance, Italian scholars such as Angelo del Boca, Paolo Tripodi, and, more 
recently, Antonio Morone and Annalisa Urbano have interpreted the Italian 
Trusteeship Administration as an ill-conceived experiment which ambiguously 
mixed the modern politics of state building with tribalism, with the result that the 
imported state failed to overcome the fractured and fissiparous realities of 
traditional clan-oriented society.91 Annalisa Urbano, for instance, has argued that 
‘the imposition of self-government and democratization through the trusteeship 
system’ led to the establishment of an institutional framework which ‘was marked 
by ambivalent tensions between its modernist character and “traditional” 
features’.92 According to Urbano’s interpretation, this produced a ‘state system 
based on a distorted model of nation-state’ which negatively affected the process 
 
91 Angelo Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa orientale. Volume 4: Nostalgia delle colonie 
(Milano: Mondadori, 1992); Paolo Tripodi, The Colonial Legacy in Somalia. Rome 
and Mogadishu: from Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999); Morone, L’ultima colonia; Urbano, 
‘Imagining the Nation’.     
92 Urbano, ‘Imagining the Nation’, p. 5. 
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of national unification.93 The problem with this approach is that it explains 
Somalia’s predicaments as a consequence of distorted political development or 
political under-development, thereby assuming the linearity of political 
development and raising broader theoretical issues concerning the relationship 
between state formation and nomadic tribes, conventionally regarded as 
precursors and opponents of the nation state. Offering an empirical alternative to 
the prevailing normative approach, Chapters 3 and 4 show that the so-called 
‘traditional’ features of the emerging Somali state were in no sense a residue of 
the past but an outgrowth of the particular form that the process of state formation 
took in Somalia. 
In the second instance, Somali scholars such as Cabdi Ismaaciil Samatar 
and Maxamed Ciise Trunji have tried to rehabilitate the image of Somalia’s post-
colonial past, showing ‘a political reality that contrasts with today’s Somalia’.94 
These scholars have stressed the democratic practice of Somali leaders during the 
decades of Italian trusteeship and civilian government to challenge the assumption 
that post-colonial Somalia lacked democratic culture and governance capability. 
The critical narratives of Somalia’s decolonisation offered by Samatar and Trunji 
are intended to act as an antidote to Somali-pessimism, and Afro-pessimism more 
broadly. Their practice-oriented approach, though, tends to overlook or downplay 
the structural constrains – inherited from the Italian administration but also related 
to Cold-War politics – that conditioned Somali social actors’ scope.  
The second problem lies in the fact that Somali nationalism, although it 
has been treated in greater detail than have most other aspect of the history of 
Somalia’s decolonisation, has been contended in terms which oppose the myth of 
Somali unity and the ‘nation in search of a state’ thesis – what Jean-François 
Bayart has termed ‘the illusion of cultural identity’ – to the constructivist critique 
of the ‘invention of Somalia’.95 This nationalist/revisionist dichotomy has 
emphasised the hiatus between the ‘rhetoric’ of nationalism and the ‘reality’ of 
Somali politics. Ioan Lewis and Alphonso Castagno, for instance, have stressed 
 
93 Ibid., p. 27.  
94 Samatar, Africa’s First Democrats, p. 1; Trunji, Somalia: The Untold History. 
95 Jean-François Bayart, The Illusion of Cultural Identity (London: Hurst in association 
with the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, 2005). 
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that the Somali Youth League, in spite of its nationalist rhetoric, tended to operate 
on age-old principles of clan politics.96 Kenneth Menkhaus has argued that ‘the 
SYL, in fact, was neither as nationalistic nor as anti-colonial as its rhetoric led 
observers to believe’.97 While these analyses have highlighted the need for a 
critical approach of the nationalist narrative, they have failed to grasp the locally- 
and temporally-specific dimensions of Somali nationalism’s uneven trajectories in 
the process of state formation. Cedric Barnes has provided more nuance to this 
debate, highlighting the importance of the interaction between external forces and 
‘the internal histories of Somali society’ in the making of modern Somali political 
history.98 
Thirdly, in examining the transnational dynamics of state formation in the 
Somalia-Kenya borderlands we should not assume that cross-border trade and 
smuggling were purely a ‘subversive economy’, undermining state authority and 
legitimacy. In his historical overview of the opportunistic economics of the 
Kenya-Somalia borderland, Lee Cassanelli has shown how Somali actors with a 
foot in both economies took advantage of the cross-border affordances, although 
these were ‘neither automatic nor invariably beneficial for borderlanders’.99 Yet, 
in exploring the agency of these opportunistic traders, Cassanelli has emphasised 
the elusive dimension of their business and their autonomy from ‘squabbling 
politicians’.100 Chapter 4 engages with the politics of cross-border trade, both 
‘formal’ and ‘informal’, during the 1950s to show how the ‘second economy’ 
actually depended on channels that where opened by the state and were managed 
by elements who operated within both the ‘official’ and the ‘informal’ economy. 
 
96 Alphonso A. Castagno, ‘Somali Republic’, in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg 
Jr, eds, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley; Los 
Angeles; London: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 512–59 (p. 512); Ioan 
M. Lewis, ‘Modern Political Movements in Somaliland. II’, Africa, 28, No.4 (1958), 
pp. 344–63 (p. 354).   
97 Menkhaus, ‘Rural Transformation’, p. 296. 
98 Barnes, ‘U Dhashay-Ku Dhashay’, p. 497. 
99 Cassanelli, ‘Opportunistic Economics’, p. 144.  
100 Ibid., p. 148. 
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These were licensed traders, askaris, and government-paid chiefs and most of 
them were involved in the politics of state formation.       
Finally, for all that we think we know about the making of the Somali 
post-colonial state during the 1950s, scholars have focused on the institutional 
mechanisms of state- and nation-building and on party politics from a Mogadishu-
centred perspective. The only concrete study we have that attempts to look at the 
history of Somalia’s southern ‘periphery’ during these years ‘from the bottom up’ 
is Kenneth Menkhaus’s doctoral thesis on rural transformation and the roots of 
underdevelopment in the lower Jubba Valley.101 Menkhaus’s focus, though, is on 
the political economy of cash-crop production, while the deep connections 
between this economy and party politics, particularly during elections, remain to 
be explored.  
The argument put forward in Chapters 3 and 4 is that binary categories 
such as modern state/traditional society, nationalism/clannism, and borderless 
nation/territorial state, although they are widely used in British and Italian sources 
and scholarly literature alike, are unhelpful heuristic tools. They are, in fact, 
misleading when it comes to understanding Somalia’s colonial legacy and the 
formation of the Somali nation-state. While territorial boundaries and the links 
between territory and belonging, land and political subjectivity acquired new 
meanings and unprecedented relevance in the 1950s, the boundaries between state 
and society, public and private, centre and periphery blurred. As a result, a 
national system of power emerged by transforming but also by strengthening local 
systems of powers in a dialectic process which kept the connections between the 
two fragile and open to monopoly. Within this context, middlemen and power 
brokers in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands stood guard over the synapses of 
relationships which connected the local systems to the larger whole. A network of 
personal links thereby worked to offset the tensions inherent in the relationships 
between the antagonistic but interdependent groups that made up this emerging 
national configuration. What seems the antithesis of strong government and 
authority actually constituted a pragmatic dimension of the state, one which 
 
101 Menkhaus, ‘Rural Transformation’, pp. 309–67. 
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renders ill-suited any idea of political development as the unidirectional struggle 
of a particular government over the forces of tradition and particularism. 
The third part of this thesis, including Chapters 5 and 6, explores the 
deeper history of political activism and insurrection in the Northern Frontier 
Province (NFP) – formerly Northern Frontier District (NFD) – of Kenya at the 
end of colonial rule. In so doing, Chapters 5 and 6 bridge the two main 
approaches which have so far characterised scholarly works on Somali 
secessionism in Kenya. The few existing studies fall into two broad categories. 
The first is made up of research that has mainly focused on the issues of territorial 
sovereignty and self-determination.102 The second category comprises research 
which is local in scope and has primarily centred on local experiences.103 
Research in the first category is mostly based on official documents and news 
reports and has tended to present the NFD problem as a territorial dispute ‘created 
by Somalia’s irredentist preoccupation’ – as Vincent Thompson has argued – and 
rooted in what John Drysdale has termed ‘Somali ethnic pride’.104 As for the 
second category, recent works by Hannah Whittaker and Keren Weitzberg have 
offered new perspectives on the question of Somali secessionism, drawing on 
interview-based fieldwork and highlighting the agency of local actors. 
Four fundamental problems, though, remain to be tackled. First, the 
assumption that Pan-Somali nationalism in the NFD was an imported construct 
which succumbed to the ground realities of clannism and age-old conflicts over 
land and water between ethnic groups. Works as different as those of Thompson 
and Whittaker share this assumption. 
Second, the tendency to study Kenyan Somalis merely as an ethnic group 
and to consider the arid pastoral ‘North’ a homogeneous space, without exploring 
locally-grounded dynamics of social differentiation. As a result, the existing 
literature is not very insightful when it comes to understand the social 
 
102 Alphonso A. Castagno, ‘The Somali-Kenyan Controversy: Implications for the 
Future’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 2, No.2 (1964), pp.165–88; Drysdale, 
The Somali Dispute; Lewis, ‘The Problem of the Northern Frontier District’, pp. 48–
60; Mburu, Bandits on the Border; Thompson, Conflict in the Horn of Africa.  
103 Weitzberg, We Do Not Have Borders; Whittaker, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. 
104 Thompson, Conflict, p. xi; Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, p. 113. 
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underpinnings of political alignment and to explain alliances and conflicts within 
the boundaries of ethnicity, except for primordialist interpretations of lineage-
based divisions. 
Third, the assumption that ‘tribe’ and religion determined political 
allegiance. This assumption can be traced back to the 1962 Report of the Northern 
Frontier District Commission (as we shall see in Chapter 5) whose interpretive 
categories have remained largely unquestioned in the existing literature. These 
categories, though, overlook the complexity of social relationships across lineage, 
ethnic, and religious boundaries.  
Fourth, scholars have primarily studied the influence of Somali 
nationalism on the attempted secession of the Kenya-Somalia frontier as a spill-
over effect from across the border with Somalia, equating Somali nationalism 
with a self-evident, ancestral Somali nation. Keren Weitzberg is the only scholar 
so far who has examined Somali nationalism in Kenya as a social construct and 
the nation as a category of action. She has rightly argued that ‘one cannot speak of 
a singular Somali nationalism, but rather of multiple nationalisms that drew the 
boundaries of belonging in different and sometimes incommensurable ways.’105 
Weitzberg has thoughtfully analysed the ideational aspects of the debates around 
Somali secessionism in Kenya. What is yet to be explored, though, is how 
different actors accommodated these debates into the social fabric within which 
power and authority were being negotiated.    
Drawing on theoretical insights from recent works by Miles Larmer and 
Baz Lecocq, Chapters 5 and 6 aim to reveal the inner struggles which 
characterised political activism in the NFD and how these struggles reflected 
inequalities of resources, influence, and power.106 In so doing, these chapters 
challenge two engrained perceptions. First, that non-Somali herders were lured 
into the secessionist movement as simple figureheads. Second, that pastoralists 
 
105 Weitzberg, We Do Not Have Borders, p. 106. 
106 Miles Larmer, ‘Historicising Activism in Late Colonial and Post-Colonial Sub-
Saharan Africa’, Journal of Historical Sociology, 28, no.1 (2015), pp.67–89; Miles 
Larmer and Baz Lecocq, ‘Historicising Nationalism in Africa’, Nations and 
Nationalism, 24, No.4 (2018), pp. 893–917. 
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were either passive recipients or rejecters of change, in either case unruly masses 
largely devoid of political consciousness. 
Chapter 6 also breaks with previous reconstructions of the historical 
background of the so-called shifta war. Hannah Whittaker has portrayed the 
politics of secession in the run-up to Kenya’s independence as a struggle between 
‘moderates’ and ‘radicals’, reproducing the binary categorization used in British 
sources. She has argued that ‘political factionalism and personal rivalries within 
the NFD’ weakened the secessionist movement from within, setting the stage for 
‘both a military confrontation with the newly independent Kenyan government 
and radical secessionists, and the outbreak of hostilities between rival NFD 
communities.’107 Such an interpretation, however, is problematic in several ways. 
Firstly, it obscures the social underpinnings of the choices of allegiance made in 
such difficult circumstances. Secondly, it describes a symptom, at best, but does 
not explain the underlying causes of the partisan divide. Thirdly, it downplays the 
responsibilities of the British and Kenyan governments in deliberately closing 
political space and pushing secessionists into violent confrontation. 
The argument put forward in Chapters 5 and 6 challenges the notion that 
the secessionist movement was merely driven by the attempt to avoid state power, 
or, to put it another way, by local dissent against the modern nation-state as a 
product of political globalisation. Rather, secessionist insurrection in the Kenya-
Somalia borderland was driven by anti-colonial sentiments and attempts to 
achieve political emancipation within global processes of change. At stake was the 
question of who was entitled to power and resources (including the state) after the 
end of colonial rule. The secessionists – just like their antagonists – wanted more, 
not less. They thought that by joining the Somali Republic they would be able to 
achieve their goals and aspirations, while they feared to be marginalised if they 
remained within Kenya. Therefore, these chapters argue for a shift in focus from 
secessionism as an anti-state phenomenon to political activism as a historical 









Map 1: The Kenya-Somalia border today 









Map 2: European spheres of influence in East Africa following the Anglo-Italian Treaty 








Map 3: Kenya, Administrative Boundaries as at 1918 
Source: Great Britain, Foreign & Commonwealth Office. Kenya: Report of the Northern 





Map 4: The New Western Boundary of Italian Somaliland, 1928 
Source: L. N. King, ‘The Work of the Jubaland Boundary Commission’, The 






Map 5: Kenya, Administrative Boundaries Proclamation 158 of 1929 
Source: Great Britain, Foreign & Commonwealth Office. Kenya: Report of the Northern 






Map 6: Kenya, Administrative Boundaries, 1961 
Source: Great Britain, Foreign & Commonwealth Office. Kenya: Report of the Northern 












1 BOUNDARY POLITICS, TRADE CORRIDORS, 
AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF 
TERRITORIALITY, c.1925-1934 
 
1.1 Historical background: a complex social universe 
During the period between the early nineteenth century and the late 1920s, the 
region encompassing the Dawa, Jubba, and Tana rivers underwent profound 
transformations, becoming a locus of migrations, trade, violence, and re-
compositions of power.108 These transformations involved and contributed to 
create a mosaic of people of different ethnicity, religion, and culture. Until the 
mid-nineteenth century, an Oromo-speaking group who originated from the Dirre 
and Liban areas of southern Ethiopia, the Warday or Warr(a) D(a)ay(a) (usually 
referred to as ‘Galla’ in colonial sources) inhabited almost all of present-day 
north-eastern Kenya and the hinterland between the Jubba and Tana rivers. 
Raxanweyn groups lived on the left bank of the Jubba, hosting an increasing 
number of Daarood immigrants as their clients. The Gharri, a Cushitic group who 
later became associated with the Hawiye and Digil Somalis as a result of localised 
patterns of assimilation, inhabited the right bank of the Dawa River. The Baajuun, 
a variegated Swahili-speaking group mostly composed of fishermen and sailors, 
along with Arabs and Asians, populated the villages on the Indian Ocean coast 
between the Jubba and Tana rivers and the islands off the littoral between the 
 
108 Other scholars have documented population movements in detail and the history of 
different groups in this region: Besteman, Unraveling Somalia; Cassanelli, The 
Shaping of Somali Society; Dalleo, ‘Trade and Pastoralism’; Declich, ‘I Goscia’; by 
the same author: ‘“Gendered Narratives”’; Menkhaus ‘Rural Transformation’; 
Edmund R. Turton, ‘The Pastoral Tribes of Northern Kenya, 1800-1916’ 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, University of London, 1970); by the same author, 
‘Bantu, Galla and Somali Migrations’; Gufu Oba, Nomads in the Shadows of 
Empires. Contests, Conflicts and Legacies on the Southern Ethiopian-Northern 
Kenyan Frontier (Leiden: Brill, 2013). 
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present-day town of Kismaayo and the Lamu archipelago. Groups of hunting and 
fishing nomadic people known as Ribi and Boni, whose ethnic affiliation remains 
obscure, also lived in the coastal area and many of them were clients of the 
Baajuun, while the Bantu-speaking Pokomo occupied the agricultural lands in the 
lower basin of the Tana River. A Sab group (see general Introduction), the 
Gasaargude, and their Gabaweyn associates inhabited the area around the trading 
town of Luuq, in the upper Jubba Valley. The Ajuuraan (who claim Hawiye 
descent, but only by a female ancestor) lived in what is today north-eastern 
Kenya. Meanwhile, Daarood pastoralists began to cross the Jubba river in small 
numbers as clients of the Oromo, gradually absorbing external aggregates through 
the sheegad system (see general Introduction), as they needed new elements to 
strengthen their own position vis-à-vis their patrons. 
At the same time, a group of Somali Muslim clerics who called for Islamic 
reform established a religious settlement, jamaaca in Somali, on the Jubba River, 
laying the foundations of what was to become the town of Baardheere. After 
modest beginnings in 1819, the jamaaca attracted an increasing number of 
adherents from many clans, to the point that in about 1840 ‘the movement 
probably counted twenty thousand supporters’, according to Lee Cassanelli.109 In 
the mid-1830s, ‘the Baardheere movement entered a militant phase’, remembered 
in oral traditions as the Baardheere jihaad.110 Allying themselves with Daarood 
pastoralists who had recently arrived in the surrounding areas, the jamaaca’s 
supporters attacked the Warday to the west of the Jubba river, raided Luuq, and 
spread in the pasturelands south-east of Baardheere, before being stopped by an 
army of about forty thousand men led by the Suldaan of Geledi.111 This 
improvised army, drawn from the clans of the inter-riverine areas, captured the 
town of Baardheere after a long siege and burnt it to the ground. Cassanelli has 
convincingly argued that such a strong counter-offensive was prompted, among 
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other factors, by ‘the threat that the reform movement posed to the ivory trade’, 
which the Geledi Suldaan Yuusuf Maxamed swiftly moved to revitalise.112 
Migratory movements and attempts at Islamic reformation intertwined 
with the expansion of international trade. This was linked to the rise of the island 
town of Zanzibar and the industrial revolution in Europe, which created an 
increasing demand for skins and vegetable dyes for the leather and shoe 
industries. Boosted by foreign demand, the agricultural sector in southern Somalia 
grew dramatically, absorbing slaves from other parts of East Africa, while ivory 
and game trophies continued to sustain the expansion of upcountry caravan trade. 
These economic transformations produced a phenomenon which was to play a 
crucial role in the history of southern Somalia: the development of a peasant 
society composed of runaway slaves and freedmen in the Jubba Valley. It seems 
that the first fugitive slaves who settled along the Jubba River were Zigua (Zigula-
speaking people) from Tanzania, who escaped from Banaadir plantations around 
1840.113 As the importation of slaves into Somalia grew, so did the number of 
fugitives who took refuge along the lower course of the Jubba River, where they 
found fertile land and forested riverbanks that protected them from their former 
masters. In her seminal study of the social history of the Jubba riverine area, 
Catherine Besteman has insightfully observed that the name the Somalis coined to 
designate these ex-slaves-turned-peasants, Gosha (or Wa Gosha, ‘the people of 
Gosha’) can be rendered in English as ‘unhealthy forest’ and refers to the stretch 
of riverine jungle and inland puddles bordering the lower and middle course of the 
river.114 According to Kenneth Menkhaus, at least 20,000 slaves made their way 
into the Jubba valley between 1865 and 1895.115 This phenomenon also 
contributed to foster Islamic proselytising in the Jubba Valley, as several ex-
slaves joined communal farms in Islamic religious settlements, jamaacooyin in 
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Somali (plural of jamaaca), which ‘offered religious instruction and fed needy 
families’.116 
The rise of Goshaland was part of an ongoing process of socio-genesis. 
From the 1840s to the turn of the twentieth century, migrations and conflicts 
reconfigured population distribution as well as social and economic relationships, 
shifting the balance of power between various ethnic and kinship groups, whose 
identity and status were being redefined in the process. The Daarood pastoralists 
who had begun to settle as sheegad amongst the Oromo and the Raxanweyn in the 
Jubba valley belonged to a confederation of related clans known as Kablalax. 
These included various Ogaadeen sub-clans, namely Maxamed Subeer, 
Cawlyahan, Maqaabul, Bartiire, Cabudwaaq, and Cabdalla, as well as the Xarti 
confederation (composed of Majeerteen, Dhulbahante, and Warsangeli). Groups 
of Daarood/Mareexaan attached themselves to the Kablalax – so named after the 
common ancestor of Ogaadeen and Xarti – as they migrated into the Jubba Valley. 
The Kablalax also hosted among themselves a number of clients, including groups 
of Hawiye/Gaaljecel (sheegad to the Xarti) and Shiikhaal (mostly sheegad to the 
Ogaadeen).117 For the most part, though, these client groups remained invisible to 
the eye of the colonial administrators, who were preoccupied with classifying 
Somali clans into neat genealogies.  
Thanks to the incorporation of new immigrants and associates, the 
Kablalax gradually increased their strength to the point that they were able to 
challenge their patrons in a series of wars, defeating first the Eelaay (a section of 
the Raxanweyn/Mirifle), presumably between 1855 and 1860, then the Oromo, 
 
116 Besteman, Unraveling Somalia, p. 67. 
117 Interview with Maxamed Maxamud Ibraahim ‘Goodir’, Mogadishu, 13 April 2016. 
Ministero delle Colonie, Oltre Giuba: notizie raccolte a cura del Commissariato 
generale nel primo anno di occupazione italiana (1925-1926) (Roma: Sindacato 
Italiano Arti Grafiche, 1927), pp. 140 and 273. Although now aligned with the 
Hawiye, the Shiikhaal trace their genealogy back to an Arab ancestor, a descendant 
of the first Caliph Abu Bakr.   
65 
 
between 1865 and 1869, and finally the Raxanweyn/Digil, in 1869-1870.118 
Severely weakened by a smallpox epidemic, the Warday Oromo were 
simultaneously attacked by the Kablalax from the east and an alliance of Boran 
Oromo, Ajuuraan and Gharri from the north. As a result, most of the defeated 
Warday were sold by the Ogaadeen into slavery or became serfs to the Ogaadeen, 
while others retreated to the Tana River. Numerous women captured from the 
Warday were absorbed into Ogaadeen groups, creating a mixed population.119 
Following the expulsion of the Warday, the Gharri gained access to the wells of 
Ceel Waaq. 
Pushed by Ethiopian raids and inter-clan conflicts, large numbers of 
Ogaadeen continued to move into the lower Jubba hinterland in the 1870s and 
1880s, taking control of this area. During the same period, groups of Xarti began 
to settle on the coast to the south of the Jubba River’s mouth. Following the 
destruction of the port of Giumbo during the Kablalax-Digil war, the Kablalax 
obtained some help from the Lamu Arabs to establish a market in what was to 
become the town of Kismaayo, in exchange for the recognition of the sovereignty 
of the Zanzibar Sultanate on the coastal strip to the south of the Jubba. After the 
Oromo withdrew to the Tana River, some Boni became clients of the Somalis, 
while Xarti and Ogaadeen traders began to sell cattle and slaves in Lamu. As 
Marguerite Ylvisaker has remarked, the Somalis ‘preferred to sell the Oromo and 
“Abyssinian” slaves whom they captured in war, replacing them with slaves from 
the south who, being farther from home, were less tempted to run away’.120 After 
a caravan route was opened between Lamu and Baraawe in 1871 to channel slaves 
to the Banaadir region, the Xarti monopolised the slave trade north of Lamu.121 
The rise of Kismaayo attracted more Xarti families along with their clients from 
north-eastern Somalia. The Xarti were experienced traders who had developed 
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long-standing commercial and cultural ties with the Arabian Peninsula. Gradually 
adopting a settled lifestyle, the Xarti became ‘the dominant group of petty traders 
along the coast between the Jubba and Tana Rivers’.122 Some of them also settled 
in Kismaayo’s hinterland as pastoralists, intermarrying with Ogaadeen groups. 
The Kablalax confederation, however, gradually broke down, as the Xarti and the 
Ogaadeen, particularly the Maxamed Subeer, began to compete over control of 
Kismaayo port, of the nearby pastures and of livestock trade routes to the 
interior.123 
At the same time, sections of the Digoodiya clan moved from the Oddo 
region in southern Ethiopia into the area inhabited by the Oromo Boran and the 
Ajuuraan near present-day Moyale. In the early years of the twentieth century, the 
Digoodiya moved further south towards present-day Wajir and the Uaso Nyiro 
basin.124 Meanwhile, between approximately 1848 and 1892, a combination of 
migratory movements by groups of Ogaadeen ensured the influence of this clan 
over the territory stretching from the western side of the Jubba River inland to 
Wajir, the Lorian Swamp, and the Tana River.125Colonial sources show that the 
increase in Somali population in north-eastern Kenya during this period provoked 
conflict not only between the Somalis and the Boran, but also among the Somalis 
themselves.126 Nevertheless, it would not be accurate to ‘portray this period as 
solely one of conflict’, as Dalleo has pointed out, nor would it be correct to pit the 
‘Somali’ against the ‘Boran’.127 Social and cultural assimilation occurred through 
the sheegad system and trade. 
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Between the 1870s and the early twentieth century, a segmented system of 
long-distance caravan trade supplied the coastal ports of Mogadishu, Baraawe and 
Marka, in southern Somalia, with goods (including ivory, rhino horns, slaves, and 
animal skins) from southern Ethiopia.128 Somali clans such as the Ajuuraan and 
the Gharri entered into client-host relationships with the Boran and acted as 
middlemen in the trade between the Borana region in southern Abyssinia and the 
towns of Luuq and Baardheere in the upper Jubba valley, thereby drawing 
present-day northern Kenya into the Borana-Luuq-Banaadir economy. At the 
same time, caravans largely controlled by Arab merchants from the coast began 
extending further inland. At the turn of the twentieth century, however, this 
system of mobility and trade was progressively undermined by the advent of 
European imperialism and by the recurrent raids of Ethiopian troops that sought to 
stop the flow of goods out of the Abyssinian Empire. 
Following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and Egypt’s withdrawal 
from areas around the Sudan and Ethiopia, European powers vied for influence 
over the strategically important zones of the Horn of Africa. Between 1885 and 
1907, Britain, Italy, and France staked claims around the Somali Peninsula, 
through treaties with a variety of Somali leaders and negotiations with the 
Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II, dividing the Somali people among five different 
administrations (see Map 2). In the 1890s, British, Italians, Ethiopians, and 
Somalis began to assert their territorial claims in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands. 
British expansion in Somali territory began at Kismaayo. The Anglo-Italian treaty 
of 1889 stipulated that the Jubba River marked the boundary between the British 
and Italian spheres of influence in East Africa.129 That same year, Italy established 
the Somalia Protectorate, which became the colony of Italian Somalia in 1908, 
and in 1890 obtained control of Eritrea. In 1891, the Imperial British East Africa 
Company assumed charge of what was to become Kismaayo district, which was 
transferred to the British East Africa Protectorate in 1895 as part of the Jubaland 
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Province.130 This extended from the right bank of the Jubba River to the eastern 
part of present-day Wajir (see Map 3). British expansion in the interior gradually 
encompassed the territory inhabited by the Somalis, the Boran, the Gabbra, the 
Rendille, the Sakuye, and the Samburu.  This area formed the Northern Frontier 
District (NFD), which was officially established in 1909 with headquarters at 
Moyale.131 The spread of British administration in the NFD had two main goals. 
First, preventing unrest along the border between the East Africa Protectorate and 
the Ethiopian empire. Second, containing the south-westward migration of the 
Somalis to protect the settled areas in the Protectorate. The British also sought to 
divert some portion of the trade between the Borana region and the Banaadir 
coast, under Italian administration, to British-controlled markets. To this end, a 
British garrison was established at Wajir in 1912.  
Meanwhile, in down-country Kenya, groups of Isxaaq and Xarti, to whom 
the British referred as ‘alien’ Somalis to distinguish them from the ‘indigenous’ 
Somali clans of the NFD, became involved in the livestock trade. They first 
arrived in Kenya from British Somaliland as soldiers and British employees. 
Following the creation of the Jubaland Province, several Xarti who had recently 
migrated to Kismaayo, entered the British service as askaris, clerks, interpreters, 
mail runners, and syces, some of them subsequently moving to Kenya. In the 
following decades, these groups of Xarti maintained strong contacts in the lower 
Jubba region, while the Isxaaq developed extensive connections in the Rift Valley 
and Nairobi. On retirement, these ‘alien’ Somalis often became livestock traders, 
eventually dominating the trade between southern Ethiopia and the settled areas of 
the Kenya Colony. The ‘aliens’ occupied the nascent townships of the Northern 
Frontier District and the Rift Valley, along with Arab and Indian traders, 
gradually developing an urban life-style.   
Divisions of self-interest emerged between those groups who were 
involved in the caravan trade and, increasingly, in British- controlled markets and 
those who were not. As John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman have acutely observed, 
‘local economic differences became the frontiers of British security’ in Kenya at 
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the turn of the twentieth century.132 Rifts developed between those whom the 
British colonisers saw as friendlies and those whom the British considered 
‘recalcitrant’. These rifts became the fault-lines of violence, as British ‘friendship’ 
and clientage created a realignment of the balance of power among the 
borderlanders. The Xarti’s close association with the British in Jubaland further 
strained their relationship with the Ogaadeen, particularly those groups of 
Maxamed Subeer and Cawlyahan who engaged in armed resistance against British 
colonial rule on various occasions between 1898 and 1916.133 Somali resistance 
was quelled by a series of ‘pacification’ campaigns, which contributed to 
crystallise the image of Somali pastoralists as ‘resisters par excellence’, 
suspicious of state power and ‘treacherous’, in the eye of the British colonial 
administration.134 Significantly, more punitive expeditions were conducted against 
the Somalis in the Jubaland Province than against any other people in Kenya. 
Although these expeditions failed to durably secure and stabilise the frontier, they 
had long-term effects on the patterns of interaction between British colonial 
officials and Somali agents in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands. Keeping away 
from the incipient state and not complying with government orders, while 
gradually appropriating the colonisers’ political idiom and resorting to selective 
cooperation through customary chiefs was the Somali response. As for the British 
administrators, they considered ‘firmness’ in the form of authoritarian rule and 
violent repression to be the only language that the Somalis understood and, 
therefore, the only way in which the colonial state could effectively make its 
presence felt in these borderlands, as we shall see in the next chapters. 
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During this period of migrations, wars, and population adjustments, 
powerful jamaacooyin situated along the Jubba River continued to exercise their 
influence among the Kablalax. These religious settlements were usually affiliated 
to one of the three predominant Sufi orders (Ahmadiyya, Qadiriyya, and 
Salihiyya), which the Italian administration supported as a means to facilitate the 
extension of colonial rule in Italian Somalia. In the 1910s, the most important 
jamaacooyin in the Jubba valley were those of Baardheere, Sheekh Murjaan, and 
Bandar Salaam. The latter was founded by Sheekh Cali ‘Nairobi’, a Dhulbahante 
who had migrated to the East Africa Protectorate (hence his nickname). 
Interestingly, he began his career as an informant of the Italian Government, then, 
‘harnessing the benefits of his service’ to the Italians, Cali ‘Nairobi’ settled to the 
south of Baardheere on the left side of the Jubba River, where he established the 
jamaaca of Bandar Salaam. He was subsequently recognised as vicar of the 
Salihiyya order.135 
British-Italian competition over control of trade on the Jubba, the creation 
of a British-induced and Kismaayo-oriented economy, and the consequent 
‘pacification’ of the Jubaland frontier, all these factors contributed to transform 
the social universe of the Somalia-Kenya borderlands, creating new tensions, 
alliances and conflicts between ethnic and lineage groups who were in the process 
of shaping themselves. Contrary to the image conveyed by colonial ethnographies, 
these heterogeneous groups were the ever-incomplete result of recurrent mobility 
and contingent modes of settlement, rather than self-contained entities that 
conquered new territory in tidal waves of migration. 
 
 
1.2 Competing imperialisms, border making, and local politics 
The border between the Kenya Colony and Italian Somaliland was finally settled 
with the transfer of the Jubaland Province from Britain to Italy in 1925. The 
cession took place in pursuance of Article 13 of the Treaty of London of 1915 
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between Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy which provided territorial 
compensation for Italy’s support to the Allies during the First World War.136 The 
new Anglo-Italian border stretched from the confluence of the Ganale and Dawa 
rivers, on the Anglo-Abyssinian frontier, to Ras Kamboni, on the Indian Ocean 
Coast, and followed the 41st meridian east from Ceel Waaq (in present-day Gedo) 
to near Kolbio (in the lower Jubba region) (see Map 4). 
With the acquisition of former Jubaland, which was renamed Oltre Giuba 
(Trans Juba), Italy took a further step towards the conquest of Ethiopia, thereby 
asserting its imperial agenda in the Horn of Africa.137 In the eye of the British 
Government, the cession of Jubaland allowed for concentrating government 
expenditure in ‘more worthwhile’ regions in the Kenya Colony and for a 
‘simplification’ of British possessions in East Africa.138 The new Anglo-Italian 
border was considered to be instrumental for the creation of a buffer zone, 
‘occupied by a limited number of Somalis directly under British control’ between 
the Somali tribes under Italian sovereignty and the non-Somali tribes in British 
territory.139 This buffer-zone policy was aimed at facilitating the containment of 
the Somalis to the east of the Somali-Galla line. Drawn in 1909, this line ran 
along the western border of Wajir District from the Tana River to the south to 
Moyale to the north and was intended to separate the Somalis from the Oromo, 
marking the south-westernmost limit of Somali expansion.  
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With this goal in mind, British diplomats rejected Italy’s repeated request 
of including the Wajir wells and the Lorian Swamp in the territory to be ceded.140 
Italy’s chief negotiator at the Paris Peace Conference Tommaso Tittoni requested 
the new border to be traced along the Dooloow-Moyale-Lorian Swamp-Dick’s 
Head (Ras Kamboni) line, which was to be referred to as the ‘Tittoni line’.141 
Officially, the Italian government coveted the Dooloow-Moyale-Lorian Swamp 
triangle to preserve the geographic, economic and ethnic homogeneity of the 
territory to be ceded. The unofficial reason was that this triangle would have 
provided an effective springboard for the invasion of Abyssinia. Tittoni’s demand, 
however, was unacceptable to London, as the territory Italy coveted exceeded by 
far the borders of the Jubaland Province, trespassing into Tanaland and the 
Northern Frontier District (see Map 3). 
Britain and Italy adopted conflicting approaches to the imperial frontier 
which reflected two different visions of colonial order. On the one hand, the 
British considered territorial segregation to be the best way to prevent conflict 
between the Somalis and their neighbours (Boran-speaking groups, Rendille, 
Gabbra, Sakuye, Samburu, Turkana, and Bantu groups along the Tana River) and 
to protect the interests of white settlers in Kenya.142 With this goal in mind, the 
British administration declared the Northern Frontier District, whose name 
changed to Northern Frontier Province in 1925, a closed area. This meant that 
residents needed a special pass to be allowed to move across or out of the NFD 
and non-resident people were not allowed to proceed through the NFD unless they 
received a special authorisation from the administrative authorities.143 On the 
other hand, cross-border migration was not a major concern for the Italians, who 
regarded Somali pastoralists as a strategic asset, for two main reasons. First, the 
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Italian Government intended to make the most out of its new territorial acquisition 
in terms of economic exploitation. Despite the Juba valley’s agricultural potential, 
pastoralism was the dominant mode of production in the borderland; therefore, the 
Italians were ready to make concessions to the Somali pastoralists to advance their 
own interests. Secondly, Italy needed not only exploitable economic resources, 
but also potential recruits to fulfil its imperial ambitions towards Abyssinia.144 
While British rule emphasised territorial control and taxation, the Italian colonial 
regime encouraged mobility and trade to pave the way for territorial expansion. 
Italy was concerned with the economic self-sufficiency of the territory to be 
ceded, and thereby refused to consider the border as static and definitive.  
In the run-up to the cession of Jubaland, imperial rivalries intermingled 
with clan politics. Italy attempted to use the claims of the Ogaadeen clan (which 
was numerous and scattered all over the Somalia-Kenya-Ethiopia borderlands) 
over the area between the Jubba river, Wajir, and the Lorian Swamp to strengthen 
its own position vis-à-vis the British and Ethiopian empires. The British, on their 
part, were determined to contain the westward migration of the 
Ogaadeen/Maxamed Subeer for fear that the Italians could use the seasonal 
migrations of this clan across the border to de facto extend their control over the 
Wajir-Lorian area and eventually annex it.145 Meanwhile, the Ogaadeen, through 
their Suldaan and government-paid chiefs, petitioned both the Italians and the 
British to assert their claims over the area stretching from the Jubba River to 
Wajir and the Lorian Swamp, which they portrayed as ‘the land of the Ogaden’, at 
the expense of the other groups that were also living in this area.146 If, on the one 
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hand, the new border failed to contain the seasonal migrations of Somali 
pastoralists, on the other hand, the rivalry between the British and the Italians was 
accommodated into local politics, gradually transforming a fluid space of 
migration and trade into chunks of territory over which dominant clans asserted 
their claims. 
Imperial politics also intermingled with the rivalry between the Xarti and 
the Ogaadeen in the lower Jubba basin. In the lead-up to the transfer of Jubaland, 
the Somalis in the area between Kismaayo and Afmadoow split into two factions, 
one self-identifying as ‘pro-British’ and the other one as ‘pro-Italian’. The former 
included a majority of Xarti, while the latter was largely composed of 
Ogaadeen/Maxamed Subeer.  These choices of allegiance were influenced by the 
fact that, thanks to their collaboration with the British, ‘the Herti chiefs held 
undisputed sway’ in Kismaayo: ‘no other tribe could hope for justice, decisions 
being entirely governed by what was to the benefit of the Herti, and the poorer 
litigant invariably lost his case’.147 The Xarti, therefore, feared that the cession of 
Jubaland would diminish their status, while the Maxamed Subeer hoped they 
would reassert themselves after the Italians took over from the British.148 
Meanwhile, the Italian administration, under the iron fist of Count Cesare Maria 
De Vecchi di Val Cismon (nicknamed ‘the sabre Governor’) was carrying out a 
series of ‘pacification’ campaigns in the Xarti’s homeland in north-eastern 
Somalia. These campaigns provoked a new influx of Xarti immigrants into 
Kismaayo, which deepened tensions between the Xarti and the Maxamed Subeer 
and complicated the Xarti’s position vis-à-vis the Italians, fuelling divisions 
within the Xarti clan.  
It is within this context that a pending issue over water and grazing rights 
escalated into a deadly conflict between the Xarti and the Maxamed Subeer just a 
couple of months before the cession of Jubaland. Since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the British had attempted to delimit the territory assigned to 
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various clans, namely the Xarti, Maxamed Subeer, Cawlyahan, and Mareexaan, 
through the imposition of ‘tribal boundaries’. The Xarti had thereby obtained 
control of the Dhasheeg Waamo, a large depression rich of pastures in the lower 
Jubba basin to the west of the river. This area marked a contested frontier between 
the zones controlled by the Xarti and the Ogaadeen. In February 1925, a dispute 
between these two clans over access to the wells of Curcumesa in the Dhasheeg 
Waamo rapidly escalated, leading to livestock raids, counter-raids and murders on 
both sides.149 The Senior Commissioner of the Jubaland Province Hastings Horne 
reportedly distributed a few hundred rifles and ammunitions among the Xarti and 
participated in their offensive against the Maxamed Subeer.150 Following a 
punitive campaign during which regular troops were deployed from Kenya to 
Kismaayo, the Maxamed Subeer were requested to surrender twenty-thousand 
head of cattle to the Xarti as blood money and compensation for the raided 
livestock.151 The Maxamed Subeer thus lost most of their cattle, which was sold 
off to Indian merchants and exported to Mombasa and Zanzibar.152 
When the cession took place, on 29 June 1925, the situation in the 
Kismaayo-Afmadoow area was still unsettled. The Italians profited from the 
strained relations between the Xarti and the Maxamed Subeer to insinuate 
themselves into a dominant mediating position. In October 1925, the 
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Commissioner in charge of Oltre Giuba Corrado Zoli deployed troops to the 
Dhasheeg Waamo-Afmadoow area and struck a peace deal (known as the ‘peace 
of Curcumesa’) between the Xarti and the Maxamed Subeer. Both British sources 
and oral testimonies suggest that the Italians were successful in their peace-
making efforts because they promised the Maxamed Subeer that their claim over 
territory across the Anglo-Italian border would be satisfied.153 The Maxamed 
Subeer chiefs reportedly ‘told the Italians that, if they wanted the tribes to be 
peaceful, they must gain access for them to the Uaso [Nyiro]’.154 Following the 
peace of Curcumesa, the Dhasheeg Waamo, which now fell within the boundaries 
of Afmadoow district, was split into two parts: the southern one was given to the 
Xarti while the northern one was assigned to the Maxamed Subeer.155 
 
 
1.3 The reorganisation of the frontier, 1925-26 
The re-drawing of the Anglo-Italian border was accompanied by the 
administrative, political and economic reorganisation of the frontier.156 From 29 
June 1925 to 29 June 1926, Oltre Giuba was administered as a self-contained 
colonial possession. The fascist propaganda spoke in very optimistic terms about a 
future European plantation economy on the ‘rich, fertile soil’ bordering the lower 
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and middle course of the Jubba River, which was even compared to the Nile.157 
However, the limited budget of the Oltre Giuba administration and labour 
shortage prevented, at least temporarily, the establishment of a plantation 
economy in the Jubba Valley.158 Instead, the Italian administration focused on 
developing the strategic potential of the frontier. Under British rule, government 
control in the upper Jubba valley did not extend beyond the garrisons at Serenli 
(opposite Baardheere) and Luuq.159 Following the Italian occupation of Oltre 
Giuba, which involved the deployment of about 2,000 troops, temporary sub-
districts (Vice-Residenze) were established along the Somalia-Kenya border at 
Garbahaarrey, Ceel Waaq (both in in upper Jubba valley) and Wama Idu (between 
Kismaayo and Kolbio). In order to expand government control, the Italian 
administrator recognised some Mareexaan chiefs in Garbahaarrey and put them on 
payroll. He used the same strategy with the Gharri in Ceel Waaq and with the 
Ogaadeen/Cabdalla and the Ogaadeen/Maqaabul in Wama Idu.160 In this way, 
each of the three sub-districts was ‘assigned’ to a clan, the one which appeared to 
be dominant in that particular area. Although customary chiefs were not a colonial 
invention, the Italian administrator recognised clan chiefs even where there was 
none, for the purpose of making the borderland ‘legible’.  
Oltre Giuba was divided into three districts (residenze): Residenza del 
Nord (northern district), including Serenli, Garbahaarrey, and Ceel Waaq; 
Residenza del Centro (central district), with headquarters in Afmadoow; and 
Residenza del Sud (southern district), with headquarters in Kismaayo, also 
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including Alexandra, Goobweyn, and Wama Idu. In principle, Mr Zoli re-
appointed the chiefs and headmen who had been recognised by the British, 
choosing to maintain the statu quo. He did not want to bet on people who claimed 
chieftaincy but whose actual authority had not been tested yet. Those ‘dissident 
chiefs’, particularly among the Xarti/Majeerteen, who had hoped for a revolution 
‘under the pretext of sympathy for Italy’ received no concessions.161 Nevertheless, 
in a few cases, the Italian administrator appointed new chiefs to empower a 
particular type of sheegad. This group was composed of Arabs, Baajuun, and 
Banadiiri (a heterogeneous conglomerate of people of various origins mainly 
inhabiting the Banaadir region) who had migrated to the coast of Trans-Jubba for 
trading purposes and had become clients of the Kablalax to do business in the 
coastal areas and near Kismaayo and Goobweyn. This type of sheegad, therefore, 
was particularly common among the Xarti.162 The Italian administrator appointed 
two chiefs for the Baajuun and one chief for the Arabs in Kismaayo and allowed 
the Banadiiri to do business as they pleased, without recurring to the intercession 
of Xarti chiefs. This move was motivated by economic as well as political 
considerations, as Arab merchants, in particular, dealt in livestock products, ivory, 
and agricultural produce from the Gosha areas and controlled, along with the 
Indians, a large part of the Kismaayo trade.163 
Along with chiefs, another group of agents of empire was to play a key 
role in the Somalia-Kenya and Somalia-Ethiopia borderlands: the dubat (‘white 
turbans’). These were Somali irregulars who were locally recruited and organised 
into ‘bands’ (bande in Italian) by officers of the colonial troops who volunteered 
for the task. First established by Governor Tommaso Carletti in Italian Somalia in 
1908 following the occupation of Afgooye, these irregular forces were given new 
impetus by the ‘sabre Governor’, Cesare Maria De Vecchi, who instituted the so-
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called ‘frontier bands’ (bande di confine) in 1924 and increased the dubat’s 
numerical strength the following year.164 Meant to be ‘the assault militia of the 
colony in action’, the dubat operated independently from the colonial troops 
(Regio Corpo Truppe Coloniali).165 Three dubat bands, one for each district, were 
created in Oltre Giuba in October 1925.166 These forces were entrusted with 
several tasks: border policing and custom surveillance; guarding remote locations; 
‘services of a political nature’ in the territory of the Residenze; and the 
enforcement of government orders.167 The dubat were ‘stationed as police and 
spies in every Somali section’ and moved about with the pastoralist clans 
throughout the country.168 The newly appointed chiefs in Garbahaarrey, Ceel 
Waaq, and Wama Idu supplied the Italian administration with camels for the 
colonial troops and recruits for the dubat bands in exchange for government 
recognition.169 
As they received no rations but lived on the local population, the dubat 
were cheaper than the regular troops.170 This made them a particularly valuable 
asset in a context of economic uncertainty. As the Italians sought to the sever 
Kismaayo’s ties with British markets and link the region’s economy to Italy, the 
Oltre Giuba administration adopted the Italian lira, while the Italian rupee, a sub-
multiple of the British pound, remained the official currency in Italian Somalia 
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until 1926. While it was being introduced in Oltre Giuba, however, the lira 
underwent a severe depreciation and rampant inflation undermined the purchasing 
power of the colonial troops.171 As a result, the value of the troops’ salary (paid in 
Italian liras) was equivalent to about one sixth of the average salary of a 
longshoreman at Kismaayo port.172 To avoid the risk of mutiny and desertion, 
regular troops were replaced by dubat bands at Unsi (on the Dawa River, on the 
frontier with Ethiopia) and along the Anglo-Italian border by the end of 1925.173 
Dubat bands were also stationed at Curcumesa (on the Dhasheeg Waamo), 
Afmadoow, and Kismaayo.174 
In charge of custom posts on the border with Kenya, the dubat were 
involved in poaching and ivory smuggling. Organised poaching played an 
important part in the economic life of the Somalis in the Somalia-Kenya 
borderlands. Cooperating with several other groups (such as the Samburu, 
Turkana, Boran, Gabbra, Sakuye, Warday, Boni, and Pokomo), Somali 
pastoralists, middlemen, and traders dealt in ivory, rhino horn and game products. 
As this activity conflicted with British colonial interests, game laws were enacted 
as early as 1897 in the East Africa Protectorate. While the British imposed a 
complex system of hunting and trade licenses to ensure that ‘no trading of game 
take place without government sanction’, the Italians adopted a different 
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approach.175 In Italian Somalia, ivory was a duty-free article which was sold by 
auction on the markets of Mogadishu and other coastal towns. In order to offset 
the loss of government revenue which resulted from the fact that the greatest part 
of the caravan trade from southern Abyssinia passed through Moyale, Wajir and 
western Kenya, the Oltre Giuba administration ‘tacitly tolerated’ the smuggling of 
ivory and rhino horns from the Northern Frontier District across Oltre Giuba into 
Italian Somaliland.176 The smuggled ivory was thus sold to foreign buyers in 
Mogadishu to the profit of the Italian treasury. Although a few scholars have 
already written about poaching and the trading of game trophies in north-eastern 
Kenya and the Tana River area during the colonial period, the role that the dubat 
played in these activities has remained undocumented so far.177 
As the ivory buyers (mostly Xarti and Arabs) in Oltre Giuba were 
awaiting the establishment of free ivory markets such as existed in Italian Somalia 
and poachers were burying their ivory, due to the little money offered by the 
Italians following the depreciation of the lira, the dubat searched everywhere for 
concealed ivory, which, if found, they took to Kismaayo in exchange for 
rewards.178 In July 1926, Captain Erskine, the Political Officer of the Jubaland 
Boundary Commission in charge of demarcating the Anglo-Italian border, 
reported:  
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They [the dubat] arrest at once on suspicion any native suspected of 
being in possession of ivory. As there is no Habeas Corpus act in Italian 
Somaliland the suspect languishes in gaol without trial for an indefinite 
period. When information is wanted the prisoner’s food supply is cut 
off.179 
 
The dubat harassed especially those who were in a subservient position, 
such as the Boni. These were clients – ‘slaves’, according to Captain Erskine – to 
the Ogaadeen Somalis, particularly the Cabdalla and the Maxamed Subeer, and 
hunted game for their masters in the Wama Idu area and in the south of the Tana 
River basin.180 The dubat proffered ‘false charges of all kind’ against the Boni and 
arrested them, then offered to release them if they disclosed ‘ivory secrets’ – 
Erskine recorded.181 
Although the Italians and the British adopted different, often conflicting 
methods to assert their sovereignty and expand government control in the 
Somalia-Kenya borderlands, both colonial administrations sought to delimit 
‘tribal’ areas, in order to ‘stabilise’ Somali clans, and to make ‘tribal’ boundaries 
coincide with administrative boundaries. Between 1925 and 1926, the military 
gave way to a civilian administration in the newly-titled Northern Frontier 
Province (NFP). This included the districts of Moyale, Gurreh (Mandera), Wajir, 
Telemugger (intended to regroup the Ogaadeen/Talamooge – i.e. Cabdalla and 
Cabudwaaq – between the Tana River and the Coast), Garba Tulla, Marsabit, and 
Samburu. As a way to halt the penetration of Somali pastoralists into the frontier 
districts, the British administrators attempted to disrupt the system of patron-client 
relationships which had served, for decades, to regulate migration and settlement 
in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands. As the British regarded the sheegads as illegal 
trespassers, they sought to sever the ties between the sheegads and their hosts. 
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Groups of sheegads in the NFP consequently adjusted to the new policy. In his 
handing-over report of 1925, Captain Mahony, Wajir District Commissioner, 
observed that: 
 
A weaker tribe only desires to cease to be ‘Shegat’ in order to obtain 
separate recognition, and thereby possibly greater concessions, while it 
is the ambition of every petty Chief or Headman to receive a 
Government subsidy, no matter how small, and he is more likely to do 
so as the chief of a recognised and distinct tribe.182 
 
Territorial segregation and trade control represented two sides of the same 
coin. The restriction of trade to designated stations, under the eyes of British 
officials, was an essential component of the Government’s policy towards the 
Northern Frontier Province. ‘Sundry alien tribes’ (Xarti, Isxaaq, Arabs and 
Indians) were encouraged to trade and set up dukas (licensed shops) in the 
townships of the NFP, but they were kept from ‘trading, swindling or settling 
among the natives of the district’, for fear that, if they were allowed to live in the 
bush, these ‘townspeople’ would have a subversive influence on the nomads, 
stirring up tensions.183 The British administrators gave trade licenses to the 
‘aliens’, but prevented the ‘natives’ from trading, settling, or getting employment 
in the townships. Trade control was also motivated by budgetary considerations, 
as trade and livestock licences, along with the Non-Native Poll Tax (which the 
‘alien’ tribes had to pay), were the main sources of revenue in the NFP. The new 
duka economy, de facto, excluded the pastoralists from the legal cross-border 
trade, which was controlled by Arabs, Indians, ‘alien’ Somalis and Italian 
merchants based in Kismaayo and Luuq.184 
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Following the cession of Jubaland, both colonial administrations sought to 
redirect trade flows to suit their own interests. In 1925-1926, however, Oltre 
Giuba’s economy remained largely dependent on imports from British markets, 
where prices were relatively low, as most of the goods that were imported into 
Oltre Giuba (maize, tea, sugar, coffee, flour, and rice) were produced in British 
colonies.185 At the same time, the import trade into the NFP chief buying districts 
of Wajir, Moyale and Mandera, remained tributary to Kismaayo. As imports from 
Oltre Giuba were duty-free, commodities were cheaper in Wajir and Moyale than 
in Meru. Goods from down-country Kenya and Kenyan ports could not compete 
with cross-border imports due to heavy duties and freight rates.186 Starting from 
1925, both the British and the Italian administrations gave impetus to road 
construction and the introduction of mechanical transport as a means of expanding 
trade as well as government control. In 1925, the tracks linking Ceelwaaq to Wajir 
and the Lorian Swamp were repaired, thereby establishing a road connection 
between Nairobi, Wajir and Ceelwaaq.187 The following year, a new road linking 
Wajir to Mandera was opened and motor tracks were created between all frontier 
outposts in Oltre Giuba.188 
 
 
1.4 Territorialisation, trade, and violence, 1926-1930 
In July 1926, Oltre Giuba merged with Italian Somalia. This led to the creation of 
the Jubba Province (Commissariato del Giuba), which included the districts of 
Kismaayo, Margherita (present-day Jamaame), Afmadoow, Jilib, and Baardheere, 
and to the absorption of the upper Jubba Valley into the Frontier Province 
(Commissariato del Confine), created in 1925, which consisted of the districts of 
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Luuq, Dooloow and Beledweyne.189 The Commissariato del Confine was intended 
to interface with the British administrators in Mandera and the Ethiopian 
authorities in Dooloow. In both provinces, the dubat were entrusted with border 
surveillance and their number was increased.190 In Luuq, the strength of the banda 
varied as the situation required, but ‘increased above the normal’ in the summer of 
1926, following Governor De Vecchi’s order to disarm the Mareexaan.191 This 
was considered necessary in view of attracting commercial flows from southern 
Ethiopia. Two platoons of Italian native troops with two machine guns were also 
deployed to Unsi to collect rifles from the Mareexaan. From there, the two 
platoons proceeded to Dooloow, Luuq, and Serenli, while another platoon was 
sent from Goobweyn to Ceelwaaq and Garbahaarrey, along the border with 
Kenya. According to British intelligence sources, about 1,600 rifles and only one 
cartridge were collected, although Governor De Vecchi boasted that disarmament 
operations had been a complete success.192 
Between 1926 and 1927, dubat bands were increased in all northern posts, 
as counter-raiding became an important part of the Italian frontier policy. The 
dubat were employed to raid and subdue people across the boundaries with Kenya 
and Ethiopia with the aim to eventually attract sections of Somali clans to Italian 
territory.193 Although Article 9 of the Treaty of London of 1924 read that ‘the two 
Governments undertake that they will respectively endeavour to prevent any 
migration of Somalis or other natives across the frontier’, ‘this article of the 
agreement the Italians have never kept and are not keeping or endeavouring to 
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keep now’ – Captain Erskine commented in November 1926.194 The policy of the 
Italian administrators was to induce Somali families with livestock to migrate 
from British territory into Somalia, as the Italians believed that the livestock so 
obtained and the product thereof enriched the colony and that the additional 
manpower was beneficial for prospective labour and taxation. As a result, in the 
autumn of 1926, a dubat band seized livestock in British territory on the Lagh 
Dera (Uaso Nyiro) and an ‘international incident’ occurred at Ceelwaaq when 
some of the Italian banda were dealt with by a patrol of King’s African Rifles.195 
Besides, it was reported that the Deputy District Commissioner in charge of Ceel 
Waaq was encouraging an influx of Gharri into the Serenli area.196 At the same 
time, the dubat bands were put in charge of preventing Somali livestock from 
leaving Italian territory. The banda frequently followed up Somalis into British 
territory and took prisoners as well as witnesses and livestock across the border 
into Italian territory. According to British intelligence sources, a ‘picturesque 
rumour’, which reportedly emanated from the Italian officers stationed at Luuq, 
spread in Mandera at the beginning of 1927: it was said that the Gurreh (Mandera) 
District would shortly be handed over to Italy. It was also alleged that the 
Residente of Baardheere Signor Gaglione had purposefully smashed three border 
stones near Ceelwaaq, while declaring that Italy’s sovereignty extended much 
further west.197 
Some chiefs were also involved in drawing people from Kenya to Somalia. 
For instance, the former Suldaan of the Ogaadeen/Cabdalla Xasan Cismaan, who 
had been deposed by the British because they considered him a source of trouble, 
had crossed into Italian territory following the cession of Jubaland and had been 
recognised as chief of the Reer Cabdalla by the Italian Government.198 Xasan 
Cismaan was thereby able to establish himself once again as a salaried headman, 
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but on Italian pay. In the spring of 1927, he raided across the border into British 
territory at the head of twenty armed men and forcibly removed over twenty reer 
(families) into Italian territory near Wama Idu, with the support of the local dubat 
band.199 Living on killing game and extortion, the dubat regularly ‘invaded’ 
Sankuri district in search of animals, ‘giving orders to British natives and 
committing excesses’.200 The dubat used to kill large numbers of antelopes, 
zebras, and giraffes in British territory. At the banda station in Wama Idu, near 
the border with Kenya, the dubat kept a large deposit of skins of these animals, 
which they reportedly sent to the Italian authorities in Kismaayo from time to 
time.201 
The British interpreted the ‘disinterested’ – not to say complicit – ‘attitude 
of the Italian higher officials’ in connection with the trespassing of their subjects 
into British territory as a trick to advance pretensions to the area between the 
Anglo-Italian border and the ‘Tittoni line’ up to Moyale. According to an 
intelligence report by the 3rd KAR regiment for July 1928, the possible reason 
behind the Italians’ attitude was that: 
 
... they wish to make out a case to show that the territory handed 
over to them in 1925 was inadequate for the grazing of their tribes, 
and that, by being able to show that their subjects must seek grazing 
in British Territory every year, they may be able to obtain an 
extension of the area handed over.202 
 
The Italians were clearly still interested in the Dooloow-Moyale-Lorian 
Swamp triangle, as this adjoined part of the Abyssinian territory which they hoped 
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ultimately to conquer. Writing from Mandera to the Provincial Commissioner, 
NFP, in September 1929, the District Commissioner, Moyale, remarked: 
 
we are dealing with a civilised nation whose officers are 
superficially polite and helpful, but in reality they are unpleasant 
neighbours. […] I have just patrolled the 100 miles of our own 
frontier between here and Eil Wak. […] I discovered that in this 
sector of the boundary all of the numbered cement pillars which 
were erected by the Boundary Commission have been destroyed – 
and intentionally destroyed. In each case the identification numbers 
were missing. During my Predecessor’s time the pillar at Eil Wak 
was smashed, and it was reported to him that this had been done by 
an Italian Officer from Afmadu. I do not know who destroyed the 
others, but it is clearly not the work of local natives. […] the Italian 
‘Banda’ are constantly telling our people that the present boundary 
is going to be extended westwards.203 
 
While the British and the Italians were struggling for hegemony over the 
frontier, road construction was given further impetus. In 1927, the Italians built a 
road that ran from Afmadoow to Diff, on the Kenya-Somalia border; from there, 
the road continued into British territory for about fifty kilometres until it joined 
one of the main roads in the NFD, thereby establishing a connection between 
Mogadishu and Nairobi. That same year, the Northern Frontier Province was 
linked to Lamu via Sankuri by motor road. This intersected with the main road to 
Wajir, Moyale, and Mandera at Muddo Gashi.204 The year 1927 also saw the 
introduction of mechanical transport. As a result, the departure of commercial 
lorries from Meru to Wajir, Marsabit, Moyale and Garba Tulla was almost a daily 
occurrence in the dry seasons.205 However, general government policy, aimed at 
increasing government revenue through the creation of new townships and the 
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expansion of trade connections across the NFP, was thwarted by specific 
veterinary policy on disease control intended to protect livestock in the white 
settled areas in the Colony. As a consequence, trade expansion was severely 
hampered by the introduction of permanent quarantine restrictions that banned the 
export of livestock from the NFP.206 This further marginalised the nomads, who 
could not sell their livestock nor participate in the duka trade, this being reserved 
to the ‘aliens’.  
The ‘wave of prosperity’ in trade that British colonial officials reported in 
1928 was somewhat artificial, as markets benefited from the effects of an 
abnormal drought. This affected particularly the Muddo Gashi and Lorian areas 
and caused the Ogaadeen/Cawlyahan to lose ninety per cent of their livestock, 
according to British estimates.207 The year 1928 was one of the worst British 
officials could remember for drought in the NFP. During a visit to the Lorian 
Swamp in September, the District Commissioner, Wajir, remarked: ‘a depressing 
sight – dead cattle, sheep and goats lying all over the place’.208 The heavy losses 
in livestock caused by the drought, combined with high market prices, temporarily 
boosted the hides and skins trade in the NFP and accidentally increased the 
purchasing power of Somali pastoralists. This, however, was an ephemeral 
parenthesis.209 The drought also provoked an influx of Italian subjects (including 
groups of Bartiire, Cawlyahan, Liisaan, Shiikhaal, and Ashraaf) to British 
territory, especially in the Wajir and Uaso Nyiro areas in the spring of 1928. Petty 
indirect taxation, the introduction of forced labour in newly established Italian 
plantations in the lower Jubba Valley, and the depredations of the dubat were 
reportedly further reasons why these groups of Somalis crossed into British 
territory.210 The British authorities’ response was to send out patrols to search for 
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Italian natives in Wajir District. Trespassers were heavily fined, and ten percent of 
their livestock was sized. Over one thousand pounds were collected in fines in 
connection with these ‘incursions’.211 
In 1928, the northern part of Kipini District was absorbed into the 
Northern Frontier Province as part of Telemugger District, whose headquarters 
were transferred from Sankuri to Bura.212 This move was officially aimed at 
bringing the Ogaadeen/Cabdalla, the dominant group in the area, under closer 
administrative control and to protect the riverine tribes from encroachment by the 
Somalis.213 The new administrative boundary, in fact, acknowledged an existing 
state of affairs, as the Pokomo of Kipini District were mainly dependent on the 
NFP for the marketing of their crop production and an increasing number of them 
was entering employment under the Somalis.214 This administrative change was 
also intended to facilitate the attempts of British officials to divert trade from 
Kismaayo to Lamu, with a view to introducing taxation in the Northern Frontier 
Province. 
A road linking Lamu to Bura, which was established as a trading centre, 
was opened up with the aim of further developing trade in the districts of 
Telemugger and Wajir. The opening of the Bura-Lamu road, however, had 
unintended consequences, as it brought Somali livestock into competition with 
Orma livestock. The Orma, who had ‘practically a monopoly of the Mombasa 
meat market’ theretofore, ‘made representation to the Coast administration to 
prevent the passage of Somali stock to Mombasa’.215 Moreover, British efforts to 
increase trade between the NFP and Lamu were frustrated by the decision of the 
 
211 ASDMAE, ASMAE, AA. PP., 1919-30, Somalia, b.1583, fasc. 7257, Ministry of the 
Colonies to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 1928; PC/NFD 3/1/1, 3rd KAR, 
Intelligence Report for June 1928, p. 1.  
212 KNA, PC/NFD 4/2/2, Butler to Asst. DC, Sankuri, 15 February 1928. 
213 KNA, PC/NFD 4/2/2, Mahony, Asst. DC, Telemugger, to Senior Commissioner, 
Northern Frontier Province, 21 March 1928. 




new Italian Governor Guido Corni to allow goods imported via Kismaayo to pass 
through Italian territory in transit.216 
While the British unsuccessfully attempted to re-orient the NFP trade 
towards Lamu, the Italians focused on asserting economic and political control 
over the northern frontier, exploiting the issue of the border between Somalia and 
Ethiopia to advance their imperial policy. In the Italo-Ethiopian negotiations of 
1897 after Italy’s débacle at Adwa, the Italian sphere of influence had been 
defined as an area 180 miles in depth running from the Jubba River north of 
Baardheere to the boundaries of the British Somaliland Protectorate. The peace 
treaty of 1897 had thus left Luuq, where the Ethiopian Emperor ‘Menelik had 
agreed to an Italian commercial concession’, outside the Italian sphere.217 The 
Anglo-Ethiopian agreement of 1907, however, had enhanced Italy’s position, 
fixing the frontier between Abyssinia and Kenya at Dooloow on the Jubba River, 
well north of Luuq. The Italo-Ethiopian treaty of 1908 had then established a 
frontier running from Dooloow northwards to the Shabelle River where it joined 
the line agreed to in 1897. As there were no clear lines of demarcation on the 
ground, the frontier between Somalia and Ethiopia was based on the principle of 
‘ethnic separation’.218 This provided for the allocation of different Somali clans on 
the frontier to either Italian or Ethiopian control, regardless of the watering and 
grazing needs of the people concerned, who, therefore, continued to move across 
the boundary following the pattern of seasonal migration. Under Governor Corni, 
the Italian administration sought to take advantage of this fluid situation, by 
encouraging the clans on the Italian side to trespass into Abyssinian territory 
under the armed protection of the dubat and by adopting a policy of commercial 
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penetration intended to attract the trade of western and southern Ethiopia to Luuq 
instead of Moyale.219 
As part of this policy, the dubat were further empowered. They were 
entrusted with gathering cross-border intelligence, patrolling roads along the 
Anglo-Italian border and on the Ethiopian frontier, and channelling trade to 
Italian-controlled markets.220 Dubat bands were hailed as the ‘connecting link’ of 
Fascist empire-building.221 They were also a source of trouble though, as they 
were ‘above all rules’ and operated independently from any other military and 
police authorities in the outlying areas of the colony.222 According to British 
sources, ‘shooting was free for the Banda and ammunition was a free issue’, 
thanks to masses of old stock from the First World War.223 In 1928, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Regio Corpo Truppe Coloniali Lieutenant Colonel 
Vittorio Ruggero reported that the dubat, unlike regular troops, were allowed to 
maintain ‘the greatest opacity with regard to the loads of military materials, arms 
and ammunitions’.224 Moreover, as the dubat were rewarded with a large 
percentage of what they had captured after successful operations, it became 
necessary for the Italian administration to provide them with opportunities for 
raiding, even when there was no need for punitive action.225 As a result, it was not 
uncommon that the dubat committed abuse and violence against other Somalis not 
only in foreign territory but in Italian territory as well. 
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At the same time, the Italian administration advanced commercial 
penetration by building more roads and establishing automotive transport services 
on the Somalia-Kenya and Somalia-Ethiopia frontiers. The Frontier Province 
(Commissariato del Confine) was organised around a road axis that linked the 
administrative centres of Luuq, Xudur and Beledweyne, whose strategic role was 
thereby strengthened. This main road axis, which ran east to west, intersected the 
roads which came from the south and those that ran northwards to reach the so-
called ‘bands’ motor road’ (camionabile delle bande).226 This connected all the 
dubat posts on the Ethiopia-Somalia frontier with Malka Rie near the Kenya-
Somalia border. Along the motor track between Xudur and Luuq, small 
permanent villages emerged near the posts where the frontier bands (bande di 
confine) were stationed, as the dubat and their families were joined by relatives 
and families of ex-dubat as well as a few shopkeepers and traders. Permanent 
villages were also created near the bands’ posts on the Somalia-Kenya frontier at 
Ceelwaaq and Malka Rie.227 In 1929, the general headquarters of the frontier 
bands were established at Dooloow, forty kilometres from Mandera. That same 
year, the Luuq-Dooloow-Mandera road was opened to motor traffic, pushing 
Moyale’s traders to get their supplies from Mogadishu, as this was cheaper than 
importing goods via Mombasa and Lamu. In the two months following the road’s 
opening, twelve lorries carrying cotton cloth, oil, petrol, and various other 
products left Mogadishu for Moyale and came back loaded with coffee, precious 
wood, ivory, rhino horns, hides and skins.228 Goods in transit between Ethiopia 
and Somalia were granted customs exemption and free crossing was allowed on 
the Dawa River to attract caravans from the Boran and Digoodiya areas to 
Somalia. Free ferry services were established on the Jubba River at Malka Rie, 
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Luuq, Dooloow, and Baardheere.229 Connections between the frontier and the 
coast were also enhanced through the construction of the Luuq-Serenli-Kismaayo 
road and the Luuq-Baydhabo-Mogadishu road.         
In order to enhance their economic policies as well as political control, 
both colonial administrations rearranged administrative boundaries between 1929 
and 1930. In 1929 the seven districts of the Northern Frontier Province became 
five, including Telemugger, Wajir, Gurre, Marsabit, and Isiolo. Tana River was 
absorbed into Telemugger district, until then administered separately, in order to 
subsume ‘all Galla’ in the NFP.230 The provincial headquarters were then shifted 
from Meru to Isiolo and, concurrent with this, the Samburu and Garba Tulla 
Districts were amalgamated with headquarters at Isiolo. It also became necessary 
to remove the headquarters of Telemugger District from Bura, a place ‘infested 
with mosquitoes’ and disliked ‘by everyone, black and white, officials and non 
officials’.231 In fact, despite the (misplaced) efforts of the colonial administration, 
it had proved impossible to develop Bura as a livestock market and trade centre, 
as the place was at the western end of the Tana River ‘fly belt’. As the District 
Commissioner, Telemugger, insightfully observed in December 1930: ‘it is no 
good trying to build up a thriving trade unless people are fairly healthy and a 
mixed prosperous village springs up. Five “dukas” in a row will not do it’.232 All 
‘consulted native opinion’, including Somalis, Orma, and Riverine tribes, voted in 
favour of moving the district headquarters from Bura to Garissa, which was done 
in 1931.    
In Italian territory, the reorganisation of provincial and district 
administration in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands went hand in hand with the 
demarcation of ‘tribal boundaries’. These were meant to regulate grazing and 
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watering rights and to ‘enforce the principle of authority’, placing each ‘tribal 
territory’ under the responsibility of a chief. Based on this rationale, the Upper 
Jubba Province (Commissariato dell’Alto Giuba) was created in 1930, 
Commissariato del Confine being subsequently dismembered.233 Conceived as a 
‘Raxanweyn Province’, Alto Giuba consisted of the four districts of Luuq, Xudur, 
Baydhabo (where the provincial headquarters were established) and Buurhakaba, 
thus bringing the greatest part of the vast alluvial region between the Jubba and 
the Shabelle rivers under a single administration. According to a 1931 census, this 
was the most populous province in the colony, inhabited by about 300,000 people 
– mainly Raxanweyn groups with their clients – out of an estimated total 
population of about one million.234 Through the creation of Alto Giuba, the Italian 
administration aimed to bring these groups under tightened control and to favour 
the creation of a manpower pool for the concessionary plantations that were 
emerging in the lower Shabelle valley, particularly in the Janaale area, and near 
Jilib, in the lower Jubba basin. 
Since the mid-1920s, the Italian Government had championed the 
‘fascistisation’ (fascistizzazione) of agriculture, providing Italian settlers with ‘a 
series of incentives, subsidies, and loans’ aimed at facilitating the development of 
concessionary plantations.235 The number of private concessions increased from 
four in 1919 to 90 in 1929 and to more than 115 (extending over 30,000 hectares) 
in 1933.236 The Upper Jubba Province became part of a regional network for the 
recruitment of forced labour for the Italian plantations. As the demand for 
agricultural manpower was huge and constantly increasing (according to 1929 
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estimates, about 100,000 individuals were needed every six months in Janaale 
alone) a major change in the system used to marshal labour for the Italian 
plantations was introduced in 1929.237 Forced labour was ‘cynically disguised’ as 
a labour contract which was, in fact, ‘far worse than slavery’ – Marcello 
Serrazanetti, the federal secretary of the Fascist Party in Mogadishu yet also a 
vocal critic of the forced labour policy in Somalia, commented in 1933.238 Under 
the new regime, labourers were even deprived of their economic value: when one 
of them died, all the concessionaire had to do was asking the relevant government 
office for a replacement, free of charge. Labourers were usually recruited from 
those tribes who were regarded as ‘devout’ and ‘docile’. A certain number of 
families were requested from each clan and the clan chiefs were entrusted with 
selecting these families, who were often fictitiously created. 
Following the introduction of the new ‘contract’, many labourers 
attempted to run away from the concessions, seeking refuge in forested and 
remote areas for fear of being denounced to the police, imprisoned, beaten up, and 
forcefully brought back to the plantations. It was not even possible for the 
runaways to go back to their clans, as these were obliged to replace fugitives and 
severely fined if they were caught hosting any of them. In 1929, several hundred 
runaways were rounded up near the Jubba River, about four hundred kilometres 
away from Janaale.239 That same year, groups of Raxanweyn/Eelaay from 
Baydhabo and Buurhakaba fled from their home areas to escape forced 
recruitment and established new villages along the Jubba and on the right bank of 
the Shabelle river, where it was harder for the Italian administration to reach 
them.240 The introduction of forced labour reconfigured the administrative and 
social geographies of the Jubba valley, creating a situation of social and economic 
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malaise. This amplified the impact of the devastating drought which struck the 
Jubba Valley from 1931 to 1934, as we will see in the next section.  
 
 
1.5 Taxation, drought, and displacement, c. 1930-34 
While Somali agriculturalists attempted to escape forced recruitment or to run 
away from plantations seeking refuge near the Jubba River, Somali pastoralists 
from Kenya crossed into Italian territory to escape taxation. When the Kenya 
Government first announced the imposition of poll tax in the NFP in 1928, the 
response of the majority of the Somalis was a flat refusal to pay an individual tax. 
The nomads pointed to the problems caused by the livestock quarantine and 
complained of the difficulty of obtaining cash. Moreover, they feared that taxation 
would weaken their contacts (through the herding of livestock, ‘illegal’ trade, and 
marriage connections) with their kin across the border with Somalia. As Dalleo 
has rightly observed, ‘the nomads realised that taxation would enable the British 
to identify more easily anyone who was not a Kenyan subject’.241 Also, Somalis 
opposed taxation for religious reasons – sheikhs and holy men exhorted their 
fellow Muslim nomads not to pay what they regarded as a Christian tax. 
The British attitude towards the Somali pastoralists was either ‘pay or get 
out’.242 Those who did not want to pay tax could move to either Abyssinia or 
Italian Somaliland, although by so doing they risked being stripped of the rights 
they had previously enjoyed over grazing and wells.243 Yet, generally speaking, 
the nomads appeared to be more inclined to temporarily leave the NFP than to pay 
tax. Some Somali chiefs, however, attempted to take advantage of the situation to 
reassert their own authority. Sanbul Cabdi, for instance, chief of the 
Ogaadeen/Cabudwaaq, asked the District Commissioner, Telemugger, whether 
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the Government would back him ‘if he ordered all his people to stay’.244 The chief 
also complained that too much had been said about people having the option of 
going. It would seem that all Cabudwaaq headmen in Telemugger District were 
very pleased when the DC announced that ‘no one would leave if his headman 
wished him to stay’.245 Despite this, a ‘silly rumour’ was circulating among the 
Somalis: it was said that Italy would soon take over the area between the border 
and the Tana and those who had paid tax would be moved by force across the 
river.246 
Due to these Somali objections to the poll tax, its introduction was delayed 
in the NFD until 1931, and then the Government did eventually concede to some 
Somali demands – reducing the tax from Shilling 20/- to Shilling 10/- per poll, 
and promising to improve water and veterinary facilities in the Province. But the 
government refused to accept livestock in lieu of cash payments.247 In Wajir 
District, where the opposition to taxation was particularly strong, the Government 
initially allowed local Somalis to pay a commuted tax by section, instead of the 
individual poll tax. Despite these palliative concessions, several groups of Somalis 
still left the NFP and moved across the Italian border: various Ogaadeen families, 
especially from the Cabudwaaq and Cabdalla clans, along with some Gharri 
sections, crossed into Italian territory with their livestock in January 1931.  
According to estimates made by the Italian authorities, more than seven hundred 
people, together with 15,300 head of cattle and 1,100 goats, moved from Kenya to 
Italian Somalia.248  Later that year, in September, it was reported that groups of 
Gharri had crossed into Abyssinia to avoid paying the tax, while further 
migrations were made into Somalia during the following year.249 The Italian 
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Government welcomed these groups into their territory and assigned them to 
specific areas, mostly seeking to align them with members of their own clan or 
sub-clan. This contravened the Anglo-Italian Treaty of 1924 but was justified for 
‘reasons of political convenience’.250 In the following years, however, the Somalis 
in the NFP became more acquiescent to taxation, their freedom of mobility being 
to some extent constrained by the Italo-Ethiopian war.  This war also generated a 
temporary trade boom and popularized the use of cash, as we shall see in the next 
chapter.251  Conditions within Italian Somalia were also changing after 1925, 
especially with the introduction of a modernised fiscal system in 1926.  This 
allowed for the introduction of a British-styled hut tax and saw the Italian 
administration issue cultivation licences for indigenous farms (shambas) – which 
many viewed as a penalty upon agriculturalists.252 
Heavy taxation and forced labour undermined the coping mechanisms of 
the Jubba Valley’s agricultural populations to deal with environmental and 
economic volatility, which became evident during the severe drought which 
plagued the borderlands, particularly Alto Giuba, from 1931 to 1934. Lack of 
pastures due to poor rains provoked increasing unrest between pastoralist groups 
and between pastoralists and agriculturalists in the Italian territory during 1931.253 
By the end of the year, the effects of drought were being felt beyond the Upper 
Jubba region, spreading into Lower Jubba and affecting Baardheere, in 
Afmadoow District, and the Gosha areas near Jilib. In the Lower Jubba the impact 
of drought was aggravated by repeated locust invasions, similar attacks being 
experienced in parts of northern Kenya.254 As the drought decimated the livestock 
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herds by 1932, pastoralists in the districts of Baardheere and Afmadoow turned to 
poaching, with increased quantities of ivory and rhino horn being smuggled in 
from Kenya.255 Estimate suggested that an average of one hundred kilograms of 
ivory and three hundred leopard skins were being sold every month during 1932 
in Afmadoow.256 
By the end of 1932, a drought-led food crisis had assumed regional 
proportions, provoking massive displacement of populations who feared famine. 
As groups of agriculturalists moved to the irrigated areas along the Jubba and 
Shabelle rivers in order to survive, clashes erupted between them and pastoralist 
groups, who were now all competing for the same meagre resources.257 Following 
two years of nearly uninterrupted drought, 1933 was probably the most difficult 
year in the entire colonial period for the people of Alto Giuba, as famine 
descended on the region, accompanied by a severe smallpox epidemic.258 The 
Italian Government organised ‘relief operations’ in Alto Giuba which consisted in 
food distributions and the creation of ‘job opportunities’ in public works.259 
‘Relief’, though, also assumed other forms, with the Italian administration seeking 
to control and restrict the extent of displacement. By January 1934, the Italian 
administration had established three ‘concentration camps’ in Xudur, Buurhakaba, 
and Baydhabo.  These camps were intended to facilitate ‘aid delivery’, and to 
improve public health control. Undernourished people, most of whom were also 
suffering from smallpox, were transferred from the areas of Luuq and Uegit to the 
concentration camp in Xudur, some of them being taken in trucks, while others 
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made the journey on foot.260 By the end of March 1934, more than 5,700 people 
had been interned in these camps.261 
Meanwhile, large numbers of pastoralists had moved from the districts of 
Luuq, Buurhakaba, Baydhabo and Xudur, where drought and famine were 
especially severe, to the Lower Jubba region, on the right bank of the river.262 By 
the time that the drought finally came to an end in 1934, those Raxanweyn, 
Gaaljecel, Shiikhaal, and Liisaan pastoralists who had moved into Afmadoow 
district were increasingly regarded as unwanted squatters by the local populations, 
who feared that these new immigrants might seek to settle permanently.  Fearing 
conflict, the Italian administration ordered the removal of the immigrant 
pastoralists from Afmadoow; gogle patrols (tribal police) escorted them back to 
the areas the colonial administration saw as their homelands.263 In other areas, 
where displaced groups had provided labour for local agriculture, those people’s 
presence was regarded favourably by the Italian administration. The Raxanweyn 
groups who had migrated from Alto Giuba to the lower Shabelle valley, for 
example, boosted the supply of labour to the concessionary plantations, 
particularly in the Janaale area, allowing for the substitution of cotton, whose 
profitability had severely decreased due to the global economic crisis, with 
bananas.264 Plantation agriculture also expanded elsewhere in the Lower Jubba 
Valley, wherever additional manpower had been made available by the food 
crisis, thereby becoming the fulcrum of the Valley’s political economy. The 
socio-political repercussions of colonial cash-crop production continued to be felt 
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The first three decades of the twentieth century saw profound social, economic, 
and political transformations in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands, as a result of 
inter-imperial competition and colonisation. The redefinition and eventual fixation 
of the border between the Kenya colony and Italian Somalia in 1925 catalysed the 
efforts of the incipient colonial states to assert their control and territorial 
sovereignty over the borderlands. The definition of the Anglo-Italian border and 
of internal administrative boundaries prompted the emergence of new regimes of 
territorialisation, which gradually reshaped a fluid space characterised by 
recurrent migrations, social, economic, and environmental interconnections into 
clusters of appropriated territories. In this process, competing modes of territorial 
appropriation became entangled in issues of resource access and control, identity 
and belonging. This generated new divisions of self-interest, re-compositions of 
power, and new fault-lines of violence, as different individuals and groups 
responded to colonial interference in different ways: the people of the borderlands 
selectively appropriated governmental practices and discourses and 
accommodated them in local struggles to advance their own goals.  
As the colonial states on both sides of the frontier aimed at securing 
control over trade routes, they were initially more present in the borderlands than 
elsewhere. As Paul Nugent has remarked, empires had to make their power felt 
especially in the frontier because ‘maintaining the mystique of the state was 
fundamental to securing compliance’.265 In order for the state to exist in the 
borderlands, these had to be made legible. Instead of creating cadastral maps and 
population rolls, British and Italian colonial officials resorted to the tribal 
mapping of territory, through the registration of chiefs, attempts to control the 
movement of people and goods, and the imposition of taxes, especially in Kenya. 
Establishing a formal border proved much easier than converting the 
borderlanders, particularly the Somalis, into compliant colonial subjects. They 
rejected the terms of the state imaginary, as they could imagine belonging to a 
political community which lacked such assumption of hierarchy. The Somalis 
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welcomed being liberated from the threat of raids by their Ethiopian neighbours 
but did not acknowledge the border. Nevertheless, they somehow ‘domesticated’ 
the idiom and practices of colonial territorialisation to advance their claims, 
compete against each other, and take advantage of volatile opportunities. This was 
particularly apparent in the case of agents of empire such as government-paid 
chiefs, irregulars (dubat), and traders, whose behaviour and choices were marked 
by conflicting interests and ambivalent attitudes toward the colonial state. During 
the late 1920s and the early 1930s, a fundamental tension emerged between the 
borderlanders’ need to rely on cross-border connections for their own survival and 
the attempts of the colonial administrations to assert territorial control through 
movement restrictions, deportations, and routinized violence. The incentive to 
expand commercial trade to generate government revenues clashed with the effort 
to territorialise the ‘tribes’ and with the livelihoods of the borderlanders, reducing 
their ability to cope with a volatile environment. As a result, the people of the 
borderlands were often left with no choice but to not comply with government 
orders.              
The Somalis relied on cross-border networks to avoid colonial 
interference. However, considering their responses to colonial rule to be purely 
aimed at circumventing the state would obscure the complex dynamics of 
resistance and cooperation which influenced not only power relationships between 
colonisers and colonised, but also inter-group relations and identities among the 
borderlanders. As this chapter has shown, kinship groups in the Somalia-Kenya 
borderlands were neither consolidated nor bounded entities in the early decades of 
colonisation. Internal tensions and the external politics of alliance and competition 
prompted group cohesion, while the changing salience of territory contributed to 
(re-)define intercommunal boundaries and allegiances. The social, economic, and 
political transformations we have discussed so far accelerated in the 1930s and 





2 WAR, DEVELOPMENT POLICIES, AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF SOMALI NATIONALISM, 
1934-1950 
 
2.1 The Italo-Ethiopian war: irregular levies, trade, and refugees, 
1934-39 
After Italian and Ethiopian forces clashed near Beledweyne, on the Shabelle 
River, in 1932, rumours spread that allied Italian and German troops were 
preparing to size Moyale, Wajir, Lamu and the Tana River.266 Countering these 
allegations, other rumours circulated that not only would the British Government 
retain control over the NFP, but it would also retake its former territory of 
Jubaland.267 On 5 and 6 December 1934, Italian and Abyssinian forces clashed at 
Wal Wal, and the next month Luuq and Dooloow were established as military 
bases.  By February 1935, some 3,000 troops were concentrated in Luuq. As the 
recruitment of local levies continued, the situation became tense in the district: 
‘all strangers were very carefully watched and questioned, and many reported to 
have been detained in prison and made to build houses in Luuq’, claimed British 
intelligence sources.268 
The dubat were to play a crucially important role in the Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia. By the end of 1934, numerous frontier bands (bande armate di confine) 
consisting of about 2000 dubat each, and nominally under the authority of the 
Italian district commissioners, had been recruited. As mobilisation went on, the 
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dubat bands became part of the Italian colonial troops (Regio Corpo Truppe 
Coloniali) and were organised into four mobile groups, each composed of a 
varying number of sub-groups (sotto gruppi); these were commanded by low-
ranking officers of the colonial troops. Each sub-group consisted of bands (whose 
number varied depending on operational tasks) led by Somali band leaders, capi 
banda in Italian. Training and discipline, though, were kept to a minimum, as 
each dubat group (about 900-1000 men) counted only five officers in total.269 The 
1st mobile group of frontier bands (1° Gruppo Mobile Bande Armate del Confine) 
was established in December 1934, with its headquarters in Luuq. 
Dooloow became the mobilisation centre for the entire Jubba region. Ex-
dubat and voluntary recruits were regrouped there. Except a few hundred dubat 
who came from Kismaayo, Mogadishu, and God Dere (Ethiopia), most of the 
recruits were people who were considered by the Somalis (and by the Italian 
colonists as well) to be ‘of inferior race’, namely Raxanweyn, Gabaweyn (from 
present-day Gedo) and Garre Marre (from the Dawa River area). These people 
were predominantly agriculturalists, and therefore looked down upon by 
pastoralist Somalis and regarded as ‘un-pugnacious’ and ‘un-fit for war’ by the 
Italians.270 Subsequent events were to prove this assumption wrong, as these 
‘elements from inferior tribes’ were quickly seen to rival the ‘noble’ Somalis in 
bravery and pride – the commander of the 1st Gruppo Bande, Lt.-Col. Giuseppe 
Settanni, observed. By the end of October 1935, the Gruppo consisted of five sub-
groups.271 
On 3 October 1935, Italy invaded Abyssinia. From Dooloow, the frontier 
bands were deployed across the boundary and participated in the assault on the 
Ganana and Dawa rivers. In February 1936, two sub-groups of dubat bands were 
sent to Malka Murri and Malka Rie, along the border with Kenya. In March, the 
dubat bands of Oltre Giuba were placed under the commandment of the 1st 
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Gruppo Mobile Bande Armate, forming the sixth sub-group.272 On 4 May 1936, 
the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie left Djibouti aboard a British vessel en route 
for Geneva via Palestine and England. The following day, Benito Mussolini 
declared: ‘Ethiopia is Italian’.273 On 9 May, the dictator announced that Italy, at 
last, had her Empire. The Ethiopian Somali areas, with the exception of Jijiga, 
were incorporated into Italian Somalia; Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea formed 
Italian East Africa (Africa Orientale Italiana). 
At the end of June 1936, the Gruppo Mobile Bande Armate occupied the 
Ethiopian town of Moyale, on the frontier with Kenya, opposite British Moyale. 
Although Kenya was not directly involved in the war, the British improvised 
airfields and landing grounds and improved communication services in the 
Northern Frontier Province in response to the Italian action. However, the most 
significant effect of the Italo-Ethiopian war on the NFP was the creation of an 
enlarged market for livestock, with the trade between Kenya and Italian Somalia 
booming as the war got underway. Kenya’s exports and re-exports to Somalia, 
valued at £81,027 in 1934, rose to £432,695 in 1935, largely to the benefit of the 
European agricultural industries.274 Other aspects of overland trade fared less 
well, as the Italian government imposed duty on goods entering Somalia in transit, 
and prohibited exports from the Italian colony. Traders from Mandera who boldly 
entered the Italian territory in February 1935 were held at Luuq for three weeks, 
before finally being compelled to leave their goods there, ‘unsold, and apparently 
unsalable’.275 As imports through Kismaayo collapsed with the war, most of 
Wajir’s trade shifted to Lamu port. Customs revenues in Wajir consequently 
dropped from £2,200 in 1932, to £1,066 in 1936.  However, as livestock was 
required for war mobilisation, 1,500 head of cattle from Wajir were sold in Italian 
Somaliland in December 1935.276 Between 1934 and 1936, livestock exports from 
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the district trebled, making some Wajir tribesmen ‘fabulously rich’: in 1936 alone, 
livestock exports resulted in an influx of about 2.5 million liras into the district, 
producing an income of £300,000.277 Wajir township doubled in size, ‘a new 
street of superior shops’ being added to the previously sleepy trading centre.278 
The wave of relative prosperity proved to be short-lived. Italy’s military 
advance in Abyssinia reduced the Italian troops’ dependence on livestock 
imported from the NFP, as captured herds were confiscated. Moreover, as Italy’s 
currency reserves became depleted by the costs of war, the lira sharply 
devaluated. In February 1936, these currency problems led the Italian Government 
to suspend payment of its debts to Somali livestock suppliers, most of whom were 
normally resident in Kenya. British subjects who had entered Italian Somaliland 
to sell livestock were forced to hand over their Italian currency, and to accept in 
its place pass books or paper receipts that could be encashed through the Royal 
Italian Consulate in Nairobi. (The money was deposited by the Italian authorities 
in the local Post Office Savings Bank).279 The export of liras from Italian Somalia 
was forbidden, but the Italian currency was extensively smuggled across the 
border into Kenya. To cite an emblematic example, Lalji Magalji, an Indian 
merchant based in Wajir who had extensive trading interests across the NFP, often 
moving goods between Lamu, Nairobi, and Mega (in Ethiopia), was reported to 
have  concentrated great quantities of the Italian currency in Wajir before sending 
them to Mombasa.280 At the end of July 1936, all traders from Kenya who were 
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holding cattle at Baardheere were given a five-day notice to leave Somalia and 
were turned away by native troops. By the end of the year, it was estimated that 
‘the Italian Government owed some 100,000,000 lire to the residents of Moyale 
and Mandera Districts alone’.281 The debts owed by the Italians for livestock 
which had been supplied to them in 1936 subsequently became a matter of 
negotiation between the British and the Italian governments.  Some debt claims 
remained outstanding in 1951.282 
Besides the infamous use of bombs and poison gas, Italian methods of 
warfare and ‘pacification’ in Abyssinia involved the mobilisation of local levies 
among the peoples through whose territory Italian forces were passing.  
According to one British account of this, these local militia ‘were never paid, but 
it was apparently understood that they should make what they could by 
looting.’283 The occupation of Ethiopian Moyale, on the frontier with Kenya, in 
June 1936, offers a good example to illustrate the adverse effects of Italian 
military tactics. To capture Moyale, the Italians used a force of about two 
thousand men, including about two or three hundred armed ‘tribal levies’. The 
Ethiopians were taken by surprise and most of them fled to the north-west. Gerald 
Reece, who was District Commissioner in (British) Moyale at the time, vividly 
described the dynamics of the attack by the Italian forces: 
 
On entering the village, machine guns were fired through the mud walls 
of the houses, in case anyone remained inside, and the soldiers then 
occupied themselves with looting. This was done with the evident 
consent, and in the presence, of the officers. The worst incident of the 
expedition took place soon after dark, when some of the Gurreh levies 
proceeded to steal cattle, rape, and murder some of the tribesmen, who 
were living a few hundred yards from the village. Three old men were 
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shot in cold blood, and for several minutes rifles were fired at random. 
This happened between the Abyssinian and the British villages of 
Moyale, and only a few hundred yards from the commanding officer’s 
tent; but such was the discipline of the force that, so far as is known, no 
action was taken about it, either at the time or subsequently.’284 
 
As soon as Moyale was occupied, a Residente was appointed to the town.  
In the following weeks, Reece tells us, many complaints were reportedly made 
about crimes that had been committed by youths armed with Italian rifles, but the 
Italian authorities took no action.  The Gharri irregulars were allowed to keep the 
cattle they had looted from the Boran during the military operations, along with a 
large number of camels they had stolen from the Gabbra.  Although orders were 
issued that ‘all rifles in the possession of the tribesmen were to be handed over to 
the Government within ten days’, no steps were taken to enforce this directive.285  
At the same time, the Italians decided to arm their allies around Moyale with new 
Italian weapons, in order to protect them from Abyssinian attacks. Banda posts, 
commanded by untrained and undisciplined native non-commissioned officers, 
were established along the Anglo-Ethiopian frontier to control the local 
populations now under Italian rule. Moyale’s British officer-in-charge, Reece, 
lamented that these banda posts were ‘very seldom visited by a white officer’.286 
The word of the native non-commissioned officer was ‘accepted in all disputes 
without question by the Italian officer in charge of the district’, Reece asserted, 
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which caused ‘much corruption and injustices to the tribesmen’ as well as 
provoking frontier disputes.287 
Among the cross-border effects of the Italian occupation of Abyssinia was 
the influx of 6,200 Ethiopian refugees into northern Kenya between March and 
October 1937.288 With the exception of a dozen sick individuals who were 
hospitalized, the refugees were accommodated at Isiolo, where a camp was 
established to host them. Speaking at the opening of Legislative Council on 29 
October 1937, the Governor of Kenya, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, exalted the 
‘good work done in the care of the Abyssinian refugees’ as a ‘contribution to 
civilisation’, which stood out ‘like a ray of sunshine in a murky haze of cloud’.289 
At the same time, though, the Governor made it clear that the refugees would not 
be allowed to settle permanently in Kenya.  Before the end of the year, a second 
camp had been established at Isiolo, this time to host 549 Eritreans refugees, who 
had deserted from the Italian army during the occupation of Abyssinia.  The two 
refugee camps provided a valued outlet for slaughter livestock, and so brought 
some benefit to the local economy, yet they also raised security concerns for the 
British.290  The Governor’s praise for the Colony’s ‘contribution to civilisation’ in 
1937 was more widely being described as ‘Kenya’s refugee problem’ two years 
later, when a report in the London Daily Telegraph of June 1939 gave an adverse 
account of the camps, accusing the Ethiopian refugees of having ‘no desire for 
work’, indulging in a ‘life of ease’, and profiting from ‘free hospitality by 
Britain’.291 Within the next few weeks the Isiolo camps were closed down, their 
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occupants transferred to a less comfortable camp site in an isolated area near Voi, 
where some of them were given employment in road construction.292 
Amidst mounting tensions between the British and the Italian governments 
from 1938, the Ethiopian refugees and the Eritrean internees had in fact become 
political pawns in the game of rhetoric and allegations which culminated in 
vehement war propaganda.293 In the summer of 1938, rumours circulated among 
the Italians that the Eritrean deserters in Isiolo were paid 16 shillings a month and 
were receiving military training so that they might be eventually recruited into the 
King’s African Rifles.294 Suspicions between the two colonial powers deepened in 
1940 when repatriation of the refugees to Ethiopia began.  The British complained 
to their Italian counterparts that the first of the refugees to be repatriated had not 
been allowed to return to their home areas but were instead being held in what 
they described as Italian ‘concentration camps’. Receiving no satisfactory 
explanation for this, the British suspended the repatriations, amid Italian protests 
that the British authorities were merely looking for a pretext to halt the 
repatriations.  Italian propaganda accused the British of making use of the ‘rebels 
for the purpose of spying and fomenting revolts in the very territories of Italian 
East Africa’.295 This was the prelude to open conflict between the British and the 
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2.2 The East African Campaign, 1940-41 
During 1939, Britain was preparing for war in the Northern Frontier Province: 
internal security schemes were prepared, manpower was reviewed, ‘aliens’ were 
formally registered, and the collection of military intelligence intensified. 
Evacuation schemes were prepared for Mandera, Moyale and Wajir, should there 
be an Italian invasion.  Meanwhile, the Italians reinforced dubat outposts all along 
the frontier. Another five hundred dubat were recruited at Ceel Waaq, and a new 
road was cut through to Baardheere; the police post in Malka Rie, near Mandera, 
was transformed into a dubat camp; around four hundred dubat were stationed in 
Luuq, and five hundred in Dooloow.296 A band composed of two hundred and 
fifty dubat, mostly Xarti and a few Ogaadeen/Maqaabul and Shiikhaal, was raised 
in Kismaayo district and entrusted with security and intelligence tasks in the area 
between the Indian Ocean, the Jubba River, and the border with Kenya. Until 
December 1940, however, this banda was mainly busy with poaching and 
collecting elephant tusks, some of which were sent as gifts to Italian generals and 
colonels.297 
The Italians finally declared war on Great Britain on 10 June 1940. During 
the following weeks, air attacks were made on Garissa and Wajir, but, according 
to British reports, these were largely ineffective.298 The bombardment of Wajir 
took the heaviest toll, with five civilians killed according to British sources 
(thirteen, according to oral testimonies), and many more injured, including 
women and children.299 Shops in the township were heavily damaged, and when 
the shopkeepers fled to the bush to escape the attack their properties were 
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looted.300  Bombing and machine-gun attacks were also mounted along the Tana 
River, while Habaswein, Buna (both in Wajir District), Mandera, Rhamu, and 
Derkale were all bombed.301 At the beginning of July, the British were forced to 
retreat from Moyale and they also abandoned Buna. The Italians used their local 
levies to insert ‘a large screen of irregulars into the Northern half of NFD to gain 
information’ and made efforts to gain control of Somali herders in the border area, 
‘moving them back from the Wajir area’.302 
Aware of the Italian use of local levies, the British military authorities 
ordered pastoralists to vacate the Wajir wells and move south-westward toward 
the British-controlled Uaso Nyiro River. As a result of these pressures, large 
numbers of Somalis in the Wajir area crossed the border into Italian Somaliland, 
‘where there were fewer restrictions’ on their movements.303 But these herders 
found that the Italian administration was intensifying military recruitment. In 
Luuq district, the Alto Giuba Provincial Commissioner Gualtiero Benardelli raised 
a militia mainly composed of Mareexaan and Ogaadeen Somalis, who – according 
to British reports – had been persuaded to support the Italian side in the hope of 
gaining access to water and grazing.304 This banda, which Benardelli later 
commanded in the field at Ceel Waaq, came to be referred to as the 
‘Commissario’s Men’ and, according to oral testimonies, contained Wajir Somalis 
who had migrated into Italian Somaliland.305 Heavily armed by the Italians, these 
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banda forces drew British troops into guerrilla warfare along the border in the 
Buna and El Katulo areas during the summer of 1940.306 
In September 1940, the British began to adopt similar tactics to counter the 
Italian banda forces: Capt. H. M. Grant was seconded from the Administration for 
the purpose of raising a company of irregulars, ‘lightly armed, and with speed and 
mobility in the bush’.307 By November, local irregular forces had been formed by 
the British in Wajir and Garissa. According to Italian sources, these two militias, 
each about two hundred and fifty men strong, were composed of Cawlyahan and 
Maxamed Subeer, and Cabudwaaq respectively.308 These ‘happy-go-lucky 
adventurers’, as a British officer described them, played an important role during 
the British counter-offensive from December 1940 to February 1941.309 
In December 1940, the 1st South African brigade and the 24th Gold Coast 
brigade captured Ceel Waaq, and burned the settlement to the ground – ‘not four 
walls were standing in any part of El Wak or its adjoining villages’, according to a 
British account.310 Italian forces subsequently retreated across the Jubba, leaving 
only a thin line of dubat bands on the western side of the river.311 The main 
British attack on the Jubba valley was launched from Garissa, with the 1st South 
African brigade and the 11th African division moving along the route which led 
from Bura to Kolbio, on the Kenya-Somalia border, and from there toward 
Kismaayo. At the same time, the 12th African division advanced from Garissa to 
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Liboi, then to Afmadoow via Bilis Qooqaani. After the fall of Afmadoow, British 
and Italian forces engaged in intense fighting in Jilib, Yoontoy, and Jamaame.  
Once the Italians evacuated Kismaayo and British troops crossed the Jubba River, 
the valley lay open.312 The 12th African division quickly occupied the various 
Italian stations along the Jubba, eventually reaching Negelli in Ethiopia. British 
forces had reconquered their former territory of Jubaland by 14 February 1941, 




2.3 The politics of security in British occupied Somalia, 1941-45 
After the Italian defeat, former Italian Somalia was placed under British 
Military Administration (BMA). The disbandment of the Somali irregular forces 
that had fought in the East African Campaign provoked far-reaching social 
consequences and was certainly the most important legacy of the Second World 
War in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands. The irregulars the British had recruited in 
the Northern Frontier Province ‘were employed most usefully keeping order in 
occupied territory’ during the first phase of the Military Administration.314  When 
they were eventually discharged, a few years later, they returned to their home 
areas in the NFP.315 Those who had fought in the banda on the Italian side had a 
very different experience.  Scattered and dispersed by the British defeat, only few 
of these fighters surrendered, whereas most of them kept their guns. Some formed 
into raiding parties, periodically attacking British police and military forces on the 
Kenyan frontier, as well as harrying local Borana herders. Livestock rustling 
 
312 KNA, DC/MDA 4/6, DC Mandera, ‘Mandera in the Italian War, 1940-1941’, 20 
November 1941, pp. 11–2; OBL, MSS. Afr. s. 1715 (7), John Desmond Bannister, 
ff. 44–54; Ugo Pini, Sotto le ceneri, pp. 81–93. 
313 For an account of the British troops’ advance on Mogadishu, see Sylvia E. Pankhurst, 
Ex-Italian Somaliland (London: Watts, 1951), pp. 118–32. 
314 OBL, Micr. Afr. 515, PC/NFD 1/5/3, Wajir District Annual Report for 1941, p. 7. 
315 Interviews with Cabdullaahi Cali Maxamed ‘Suufi’, Wajir, 23 March 2016; and 
Ibraahim Cali Xuseen ‘Sirr’, Wajir, 22 March 2016. 
116 
 
around Wajir, Buna and Moyale increased markedly as a consequence of these 
activities, while in the ex-Italian territory the British found local Somalis in 
possession of very considerable quantities of Italian arms and ammunition.316 
In an effort to tackle these problems and pacify the borderlands, the British 
Military Administration formed the Somalia Gendarmerie.  This new force played 
a key role in the British attempt to assert a form of hegemony in ex-Italian 
Somalia. The kind of political order which emerged from this experiment, 
however, was fraught with problems. Other scholars, such as Alphonso Castagno 
and Annalisa Urbano, have documented the close relationship between the British 
Military Administration, the Gendarmerie, and the emergence of the main Somali 
nationalist party, the Somali Youth League (SYL).317  These studies, however, 
concentrate on events around the capital of Mogadishu, whereas the formation of 
the Gendarmerie in the rural areas and its modus operandi outside Mogadishu has 
been largely overlooked. 
Established in March 1941, the Somalia Gendarmerie was intended to 
restore security, particularly in the outlying districts of the ex-colony. In April, 
this force already numbered 1,300 rank and file, led by only fifteen British 
officers, but by the end of 1942 the force was nearly 3,000 strong.318 As ‘the 
Administration had neither the time nor the means to create a fully trained police 
such as existed in neighbouring British territories’, the Gendarmerie first relied on 
a hundred Tanganyika police who ‘formed the nucleus of the urban division of the 
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new force’ alongside ‘the 1st and 2nd Irregular Companies of Somalis who had 
participated in the war’.319 The arrival of five hundred and forty policemen – five 
hundred from Nyasaland and forty from Uganda – gave the Gendarmerie a further 
boost. Locally, the newly established force recruited whomever they could find. 
Gandar Dower, a British officer involved in the running of the Gendarmerie, 
claimed that all the local recruits needed was an esprit de corps, fighting 
efficiency, and some ‘knowledge of the methods of Somali looting’.320 Although 
the officers of the BMA boasted about the Gendarmerie, the presence of African 
policemen who did not know the language of the population – and whom most 
Somalis regarded as invaders –, lack of ‘training, and scanty supervision by 
experienced officers created difficulties and abuses’.321 
The Gendarmerie was sent out to disarm the population. By the end of 
1941, some 7,000 rifles and hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition had 
been collected in the south-western region alone. In 1942, the Gendarmerie was 
divided into two wings: a police force charged with tackling ordinary crime and a 
field force tasked with ‘restraining the lawlessness of the tribes’.322 In the outlying 
districts, the officers of the gendarmerie also had political and magisterial 
responsibilities and dealt with a variety of issues, from collecting customs duties 
to barrack-building, prison administration, locust control and agricultural work.323 
By the end of 1943, the Gendarmerie numbered 2,530 Somali and 540 (non-
Somali) African ranks, and 120 British Officers.324 While the number of Somali 
recruits increased, local antagonisms undermined the Gendarmerie. Although the 
British initially sought to recruit from all Somali clans, the Daarood became 
increasingly predominant within the force, raising antagonism by other groups. At 
the same time, those who had served for the Italians in the banda or other native 
forces were excluded from the Gendarmerie and left to fend for themselves. This 
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fuelled resentment against the gendarmes, who were frequently accused of 
abusing their powers to settle old scores. Italian sources claim that the poorly paid 
gendarmes sought to extort money from their former enemies.325 
Discontent with the Gendarmerie was given a louder voice when political 
parties began to emerge among the Somalis, encouraged by the British Military 
Administration. The first Somali clubs had appeared before the Second World 
War in Italian Somaliland, but they remained small-scale organizations.326 
However, ‘the social and economic experience of the expanded Italian empire’, 
the war, and the promise of a new political order under British Military 
Administration stimulated Somali political activity.327 As a result, the first Somali 
nationalist organization, the Somali Youth Club (SYC), was founded in 
Mogadishu on 15 May 1943. At its origins, the SYC was an urban self-help 
organization, mostly limited to Mogadishu. Established against a background of 
uncertainties, ‘especially high food prices in urban markets dominated by non-
Somali Arabs and Indian traders’, and a rapidly growing population ‘due to large 
numbers of demobilized soldiery’, the SYC restricted its membership to Somalis 
between the ages of 18 and 32.328 The Club’s members largely belonged to what a 
British report described as the emerging Somali ‘middle class’, composed of 
‘small merchants and traders, artisans, the literate elements, and a few educated 
religious leaders’, but it also found strong support among the young Somalis who 
had joined the Gendarmerie.329 The SYC became increasingly politicized in the 
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2.4 The Cold War, Somali nationalism, and the ‘pro-Italia’ 
movement, 1946-50 
In June 1946, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin proposed the unification of 
British Somaliland, former Italian Somalia, and the Ogaden region in one UN 
trusteeship under British administration. However, as Sarah Vaughan as pointed 
out, Bevin’s plan was controversial for two reasons.330 First, it contradicted the 
1942 and 1944 British-Ethiopian agreements which explicitly recognized 
Ethiopia’s sovereignty over the Ogaden and the Reserved Areas. Second, the Four 
Powers Commission of Investigation, whose creation was first envisaged by the 
Council of Foreign Ministers of the four Allied Powers in April 1946, was 
expected only to consider the disposal of the former Italian colonies (Italian 
Somalia, Eritrea, and Libya). The other three of the Four Powers were suspicious 
of British imperial interests in the Horn. Furthermore, Emperor Haile Selassie 
‘played on Allied guilt feelings over the League of Nations’ failure to prevent 
Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia’.331 As a result, the US, the Soviet Union, and 
France opposed Bevin’s plan in the UN. Nevertheless, British administrators in 
the region continued to endorse the Greater Somalia idea, which galvanized the 
Somali Youth Club (SYC), ‘driving its popularity, politicization, and 
expansion’.332 SYC membership grew from about 1,000, primarily in Mogadishu, 
to more than 25,000 across the region.333 
As the Club expanded in membership, ‘its initial social welfare role 
developed into a more ambitious programme for the unification and progress of 
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the Somali people’.334 Besides promoting education and social improvement 
programmes, the SYC was determined to break down clan barriers among the 
Somalis. Although this represented a point of friction with the British, who 
exploited clan politics to rule the Somali-speaking territories, the BMA regarded 
the SYC as a useful auxiliary and, therefore, supported it. The relationship 
between the British and the Club became even closer after the latter was renamed 
as the Somali Youth League (SYL) in 1947. The SYL took a stand on four 
principal issues.335 First, they advocated the union of the ex-Italian colony with 
the other Somali territories – British Somaliland, the NFD of Kenya, French 
Somaliland and Ethiopian Somaliland – to form one political administrative, 
social and economic unit.  This they considered ‘absolutely essential for the true 
welfare of all the inhabitants’ of these territories.336 In order to achieve this aim, 
the SYL rejected ‘old-fashioned habits’, such as tribal distinctions, clannism, and 
Sufi orders. Second, the SYL gave paramountcy to Somali interests, and pledged 
to reject any settlement that was prejudicial to those interests. Third, they 
demanded the modern education of Somali youth through schools and weekly 
informational sessions. Fourth, they promoted the teaching of the Somali language 
based on the Osmaniya script.337 
The British Military Administration nurtured and encouraged the SYL not 
because they necessarily approved its programme, but because they deemed it 
useful to have an emerging Somali nationalist party with a progressive and 
modern outlook. Within the capital city of Mogadishu, where it was estimated that 
about seventy-five percent of the gendarmes were also members of the SYL, the 
Gendarmerie and the League were seen to be linked.338 
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The debate within the General Assembly of the United Nations concerning 
the future disposition of the former Italian colonies led to renewed Italian 
interference in Somalia and to the formation of other (smaller) Somali political 
parties, usually classified as clannist or ‘tribalist’. These parties emerged largely 
in reaction to the rise of the SYL, which they saw as ‘pro-British’ and dominated 
by Samaale groups, especially Daarood. Anti-SYL and coincidentally anti-British, 
the so-called ‘tribalist’ parties were supported, politically and financially, by 
Rome.339 As East-West tensions deepened during 1947, political calculations and 
financial considerations as well induced the British Government to consider 
giving an ‘encouragement to Italy’, for this had ‘to be retained on the right side of 
the iron curtain’, as the Head of the East Africa Department of the British 
Colonial Office Andrew Cohen put it.340 Giving Italy international responsibility 
for its former colony was envisaged by Britain and the USA as a means to 
securely tie it to Western interests. In November 1947, the Four Powers 
Commission of Investigation for the former Italian Colonies, consisting of 
representatives of Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union, was 
eventually established in accordance with Annex XI to the Treaty of Peace with 
Italy. It was announced that the Commission would visit Somalia from 6 January 
to 3 March 1948 to ascertain the views of the local population regarding the 
political future of the ex-colony.341 In preparation for the arrival of the 
Commission, new political organisations were formed, and existing parties 
intensified their activities. Some of the so-called ‘tribalist’ parties regrouped into a 
‘pro-Italian’ coalition, the Somalia Conference (Conferenza della Somalia). The 
Ministry of Italian Africa paid ex-Fascist officials such as Vincenzo Calzia, who 
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had been appointed Chief Secretary of Mogadishu’s Municipal Administration in 
1946, to gather information and channel funds to ‘loyal’ Somalis to encourage 
them to support the return of the Italians.342 
Some eleven Somali political parties presented the Commission with their 
views about the future of the former Italian colony, ‘along with Italian 
organizations and two minority communities’.343 The Four Powers Commission 
gave local representatives only two choices: international trusteeship under either 
Britain or Italy. The demands of the Somali Youth League, though, went much 
further than this. The SYL asked the General Assembly of the United Nations to 
proclaim the immediate independence of Somalia. If, instead, it was considered 
best to place the former colony under the International Trusteeship system, the 
SYL would not raise objection on such decision ‘provided that the restoration of 
Italian administration in any form or guise and even as Trustee under the 
supervision of the United Nations be completely excluded’.344 In such case, the 
SYL preference was a direct United Nations Administration for a ‘short period’, 
leading the Somalis to complete independence. The League, however, left the 
door open for a ‘short period’ of collective administration or, alternatively, a 
single administration under UN supervision, provided that Italy be excluded. The 
SYL made it clear that they preferred ‘complete extermination than return again 
under Italian domination’.345 This notwithstanding, on 21 November 1949 the UN 
General Assembly voted for the establishment of the Italian Trusteeship 
Administration of Somalia, Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia 
(AFIS). Even the Arab states, which had shown strong support for the emerging 
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2.5 Farming schemes, Italian interests, and political allegiances in the 
Jubba Valley, 1942-50 
Despite its efforts to modernize Somali political life, notably through the abolition 
of the colour bar in the civil service, the British Military Administration proved to 
be a rather inadequate agent of liberal reform. When Somalia was returned to 
Italian administration in April 1950, old conflicts concerning land issues, 
territorial ownership, and social status quickly revived. The lower Jubba Valley 
offers a good vantage point to explore how British policies and Italian interests 
influenced these conflicts during the 1940s. 
The primary aim of the British Military Administration was to render 
Somalia as self-sufficient as possible in order to limit the financial burden on the 
British coffers in a time of war. Pressured by the severe shortage of grains which 
affected the whole East Africa in the early 1940s, the BMA directed a programme 
of staple crop production in which the lower Jubba Valley played a central role. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the Italians had developed plantation agriculture in the 
Jubba Valley relying on a forced-labour scheme, locally known as colonya. The 
British officers who occupied Lower Jubba were horrified by the workings of this 
scheme, which they regarded as ‘indistinguishable from slavery’.347 However, the 
Gosha agricultural labourers who welcomed the British as liberators would soon 
discover that the reform of their circumstances would prove a difficult and 
protracted process. The BMA’s determination to render Somalia self-sufficient in 
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grain meant that a productive agricultural system had to be maintained in 
operation, and to do this they found themselves dependent upon the existing 
Italian concessionaires who relied on drawing compulsory labour from local 
communities to sustain grain output.348 
Following the British offensive in early 1941, most of the Italian 
concessionaires had retreated back to Mogadishu, leaving the plantations to be 
looted.  The crops were raided by the Gosha labourers, who then returned to their 
own villages along the Jubba River. By 1942, the only plantations still functioning 
under Italian management were at Afgooye and Jowhaar, in the Shabelle valley.  
Both these plantations were producing sugar cane, fruits and vegetables for 
Mogadishu’s market.  The British therefore directed their developmental efforts 
towards the Lower Jubba, and during 1942 and 1943 they channelled financial 
and administrative support to a series of agricultural schemes along the river 
valley which came to be known as the Juba Farmers Schemes.349 
However, in order to manage the reorientation of the former banana 
plantations towards grain production, the British needed the Italian 
concessionaires who had fled during the war to return to their farms. The most 
experienced of the Italian farmers, administrators, and mechanics among the 
lower Jubba concessionaires had been interned as prisoners of war in Kenya.  
After some debate, the release of a small number of ‘essential’ workers for the 
Juba Scheme was agreed.  Between the end of 1942 and May 1943, around a 
dozen Italian prisoners were released, to be returned to the Juba plantations and 
used on the British agricultural scheme. All those released were considered to be 
Fascists, and they included Lieutenant Celestino Gandolfi, Captain Moscatelli, 
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and the former capo colonya Alfredo Calligaris, all of whom had been interned on 
account of their ‘undesirable activities’.350 
Some 30 former Italian plantations had been incorporated into the British 
scheme on the Jubba by 1943, receiving financial assistance in the form of 
advances for a total amount of £11,000 for the period May 1942-August 1943.351 
During the month of May 1943 alone, approximately 1,800 labourers were 
employed on these farms in the lower Jubba, including 150 children.352 The BMA 
continued to provide loans to the concessionaires until the end of 1946, and 
bought the grains produced at the artificially high prices set by the wartime 
economy in East Africa.353 Like British settlers in Kenya, the Italian 
concessionaires in the Lower Jubba region were therefore able to benefit from 
wartime conditions to improve their own economic position.354 Owner of a big 
farm in Kismaayo, Lt. Col. Alberto Mazzi was among the beneficiaries of the 
BMA’s agricultural schemes. A former member of Marshal Rodolfo Graziani’s 
staff, Mazzi spent time as a Prisoner-of-War in Kenya before returning to the 
Jubba Valley in December 1944. Within a few years, he had become ‘popular 
with the British’, although it was known that he ‘distributed money in Jubaland 
for Italian propaganda’.355 In 1946, Mazzi became the chairman of the Jubba 
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farmers association, Società Agricoltori Giuba (SAG). In the 1950s, he further 
expanded his economic interests under the Italian Trusteeship Administration, 
establishing the Jubba wood factory and revamping a banana processing plant in 
Marka.356 Alberto Mazzi was also among the ex-Fascists who were paid by the 
Ministry of Italian Africa to support ‘pro-Italian’ political parties in Somalia.  
In the post-war years, the Italian government advanced their own political 
and economic goals in Somalia through direct interference in local politics. One 
example was the Xisbiya Digil iyo Mirifle (HDM), the most important anti-SYL 
and (initially) pro-Italian party in the Jubba valley. Despite the Xisbiya’s open 
reference to the Digil and Mirifle (Saab) clan family, this party also included 
Arabs, Bantu groups, Barawaan and Baajuun from the coast, individuals of mixed 
descent, and a few Italian patrons.357 This uneven alliance represented a reaction 
to the mobilisation by the Somali Youth League of Somali ethnicity, generally 
identified with the pastoralist Samaale, as Kenneth Menkhaus has rightly 
observed.358 The Digil and Mirifle, who dominated the Xisbiya, claimed that the 
Samaale, who had always regarded the Saab as inferiors because of their 
involvement in agricultural labour, would ‘invade’ and occupy the land of the 
Saab.359 The Gosha initially supported the Xisbiya, although they had long-
standing grievances against all the main groups who were behind this party: first, 
the Digil and Mirifle, who had harassed the Gosha with raids and kidnappings to 
provide the Italian concessionaires with free labour for their plantations; second, 
the Arab merchants, who had thrown the Gosha into chronic debt; and, finally, the 
Italians, who had forced the Gosha into what was tantamount to slavery.  
Although the British East Africa Command reported that the SYL had only five 
hundred members in Kismaayo in 1947, support for the nationalist party in Lower 
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Jubba steadily grew in the following years, as unresolved socio-economic issues 
and the lived experience of violence played an increasingly important role in 
defining political alignment, as we will see in the next chapter.360 
While the Somali Youth League aimed to remove the significance of clan 
affiliations in politics, the ‘pro-Italian’ parties claimed to represent the interests of 
the clans, as expressed by their chiefs, sheiks, and notables. The seven parties, 
including the Xisbiya, that regrouped into the Somalia Conference (Conferenza) 
claimed to represent ‘almost two thirds of the whole Somali population’ and 
identified themselves with ‘the principal tribes’ of the Hawiye and Digil.361 
Attached to this group, was the Majeerteen Progressive League (Lega 
Progressista Migiurtina). This included ‘a large part’ of the Daarood/Majeerteen, 
who represented ‘the remaining third of the entire population’ – or so the 
Conferenza claimed.362 The Majeerteen Progressive League managed to secure a 
political constituency in Kismaayo.  
In May 1949, Islaan Mahad Alle Maxamed (Islao Mahadalle in Italian 
sources), President of the Conferenza, and Yasiin Cali Sharmarke, leader of the 
Majeerteen Progressive League, were flown by the Italians to New York to 
deliver an anti-SYL and ‘pro-Italia’ speech at the UN.  Yasiin Cali Sharmarke 
(Majeerteen/Cismaan Maxamuud), a former employee of the government’s motor 
pool in Mogadishu, claimed to represent several Daarood clans, not only 
Majeerteen, from the Lower and Upper Jubba regions, namely: the Cawlyahan of 
Baardheere, the Maxamed Subeer of Afmadoow, the Xarti of Kismaayo, the 
Ogaadeen of Jamaame, and the Mareexaan of Luuq.363 In September 1949, ‘pro-
Italian’ political parties, chiefs, sheiks, and notables sent a series of telegrams to 
the UN, asking for a prompt decision concerning the future of ex-Italian Somalia 
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and requesting the establishment of an Italian Trusteeship Administration. Among 
the petitioners were chiefs, elders, and sheikhs from Luuq, Baardheere, Basso 
Giuba, and Kismaayo.364 They claimed to represent the dominant groups in each 
area and, therefore, to express the will of the majority. The petitioners from 
Kismaayo, for instance, included four Xarti chiefs, two Ogaadeen, and one 
Shiikhaal. 
The pro-Italian parties based their discourse on the notion that each area 
belonged to certain dominant clans, who ‘owned’ the territory over which their 
chiefs exercised their authority. This notion reflected the colonial practice of 
entrusting traditional clan chiefs with control over ‘their’ land and people within 
the territory assigned to their clan. During the international negotiations 
concerning the future of ex-Italian Somalia, the Italians relied on traditional 
authorities, including clan chiefs, ‘notables’ (notabili), and sheikhs, to advance 
their own interests, while these authorities used Italian support to assert their own 
status and strengthen the position of their clan vis-à-vis other groups. This 
provoked conflicts that later had profound effects on the politics of state formation 
in the Jubba valley, as we will discuss in the next chapter. Although the British 
and the Italians appeared to have conflicting visions of governance and political 
order in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands, the British policy of post-war 
development in the Northern Frontier Province also aimed to link ‘tribal’ identity 




2.6 Post-war development and Somali politics in north-eastern 
Kenya: the case of Wajir District 
In the Kenya Colony, the end of the Second World War ushered in what David 
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Low and John Lonsdale have termed ‘the second colonial occupation’.365 As new 
visions of governance now emphasised ‘the close interrelationship between 
economic and political development’, government activity greatly increased not 
only in Kenya but throughout British Africa in the late 1940s.366 In the Northern 
Frontier Province, the British administrators put forward a new ecological model, 
which was intended to ‘rationalise’ the behaviour of pastoralists. Overstocking 
and overgrazing were identified as the two main threats to an economically viable 
situation for the NFP. To tackle these issues, the Government set up a Grazing 
Control Scheme in 1945 and a pilot control scheme three years later. This was 
part of the Dixey Scheme, a major colonial development programme for water 
and grazing improvement which was implemented in the Northern Frontier 
Province between 1948 and 1958 as part of the African Land Development 
Programme (ALDEV).367 
Land degradation and the breakdown of tribal authority, due to the 
‘disturbed conditions’ which had prevailed on the frontier for many years, were 
connected in the eyes of many British administrators.368 The Dixey Scheme aimed 
to tackle this and to improve the pastoral sector in the NFP by demarcating ‘inter-
tribal boundaries’ to allow for the formation of tribal grazing reserves. This new 
policy had a profound impact on the Somalis, particularly in Wajir District. Here, 
government plans for grazing control had three main components: first, the 
division of the District into three ‘tribal areas’ – one for each of the principal clans 
in the area, Ajuuraan, Digoodiya, and Ogaadeen – among which trespassing 
would not be allowed; second, the creation of an exclusion area around the Wajir 
wells, access to which could be controlled by regulation; and third, the 
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improvement of water supplies in dry-weather grazing zones by the provision of 
bore-holes. Pastoralists of the Ajuuraan, Digoodiya, and Ogaadeen clans were 
thereby compelled to stay within their newly-demarcated tribal areas, and to use 
only the wells assigned to them by the British authorities. A new police force, the 
Grazing Guards, was created to encourage Somali ‘cooperation’ and monitor 
compliance with the regulations under the Dixey Scheme. 
The introduction of the inter-tribal grazing boundaries elicited different 
responses among those Somalis affected, reflecting their self-interest. The 
Digoodiya, who the British colonial authorities acknowledged ‘were the losers 
when these boundaries were promulgated’, vehemently opposed the Grazing 
Control Scheme.369 The introduction of the tribal grazing boundaries undoubtedly 
resulted in a ‘diminution of the country over which the Degodia had previously 
roamed’, while the area the clan was assigned lacked the salt bush which they 
needed to feed their camels.370 
Most of the Ogaadeen, on the other hand, made significant gains through 
the Dixey reforms. The removal of the Digoodiya sheegad, whom they had 
‘hosted’ for many years past, gave the Ogaadeen herders a larger area of grazing.  
These changes, however, brought conflicts to the fore.  This became evident at the 
end of 1945, when the Reer Maxamuud/Dakatch, who were former sheegad to the 
Ogaadeen/Maxamed Subeer (although they were genealogically connected to the 
Digoodiya clan), were ordered to vacate the Ogaadeen area because of their 
genealogical connection with the Digoodiya. The Reer Maxamuud/Dakatch 
contested this expulsion, and from 1946 they resorted to legal action against the 
Government, sending various appeals to the Governor of Kenya, the Colony’s 
Supreme Court, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies.371 Although British 
sources acknowledge that the Reer Maxamuud/Dakatch had been registered as a 
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section of the Maxamed Subeer since the early 1920s, these appeals were formally 
rejected.372 
Oral testimonies on the dispute between the Reer Maxamuud/Dakatch and 
the Government suggest that the conflict was heightened by a power struggle 
amongst the headman of the Reer Maxamuud/Dakatch, Cabdi Guleed, the chief of 
the Maxamed Subeer, Cabdi Oogle, and the chief of the Digoodiya, Axmed 
Liban.373 Cabdi Guleed had only been accepted as headman for the Reer 
Maxamuud/Dakatch in the early 1940s, this section having previously been 
administered as part of the Maxamed Subeer/Ugaas Guleed. Cabdi Guleed’s 
appointment came as a result of Cabdi Oogle’s designation as chief of the 
Maxamed Subeer, the two clan leaders challenging each other’s authority.374 
Cabdi Oogle had been recruited into the King’s African Rifles in 1939 and 
worked in British intelligence during the war.  He was considered a loyal subject 
and, in many ways, an obvious choice as chief of the Ogaadeen/Maxamed Subeer 
when the post became vacant in 1942.375 However, two rivals had come forward 
for the post, Gasar Cunshur (also Maxamed Subeer/Ugaas Guleed) and Cabdi 
Guleed. Cabdi Oogle’s appointment was viewed with resentment by these men, 
who saw his elevation as being thanks to ‘his long association with the 
Europeans’.376 Cabdi Guleed, however, refused to accept defeat and began 
campaigning for the Reer Maxamuud/Dakatch to have their own headman – a 
position he wished for himself. These simmering conflicts were further fuelled by 
the implementation of the grazing control scheme, which gave opportunities for 
political rivalries to be played out.377 
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Then, in 1946, Cabdi Guleed was dismissed for disobedience of 
Government orders, being accused of encouraging the Reer Maxamuud/Dakatch 
to trespass into the Ogaadeen area.378 This marked the beginning of a bitter and 
long-lasting confrontation between the Reer Maxamuud/Dakatch and the 
Government which continued into the 1950s. The presence of the Reer 
Maxamuud sheegad in the Ogaadeen area, which had ensured social assimilation 
and peaceful coexistence for decades, was now considered to represent ‘a menace 
to internal security’.379 The Government did not succeed in preventing trespass, 
but the continuation of the dispute divided the sub-sections of the Reer 
Maxamuud, increasing tensions between government-appointed and unofficially-
recognised chiefs.380 
The dispute over the introduction of the tribal grazing areas marked a 
political turning point in Wajir District, as the attempt to negotiate the identity of 
the Reer Maxamuud/Dakatch through judicial means intermingled with 
transformations of chiefship and the emergence of the Somali Youth League. 
According to the manifesto adopted by the League in 1947, the unification of all 
the Somalis should entail ‘free movement, grazing and watering between all the 
tribal, district and international boundaries’.381 As a result, a large proportion of 
the Reer Maxamuud in Wajir joined the SYL in response to the implementation of 
the Dixey Scheme.382 
British influence over the chiefs, however, generally hampered the growth 
of the League’s membership. Although, as we have seen, the British initially 
encouraged the development of the Somali Youth League in Somalia, as the party 
gained strength within Kenya’s borders British officials in the NFP vigorously 
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opposed it. To these colonial officials on the Kenyan side of the border, the SYL 
was undermining the authority of colonial chiefs at a time when government was 
seeking to impose increasingly ambitious and interventionist development 
projects.383 As a consequence, many chiefs, headmen and clan elders in the NFP 
turned against the SYL, fearing that the policies of the party would undermine 
their authority and status.  In August 1947, the main chiefs of the Ajuuraan tried 
to ban their people from joining the SYL.384 The Ogaadeen chief Cabdi Oogle 
followed suit in April 1948, declaring: 
 
I do not want the Somali Youth League in my country. It does not bring 
any benefit to my people. On the contrary, since the Youth League 
commenced its activities in 1946, my work as Government headman 
has been hindered, and my authority has been undermined. Several of 
the young men of my section have joined the Somali Youth League and 
no longer accord proper respect to the authority of the lawful 
government. They do not pay tax as they should, because their money is 
paid to the League, and they regard the League as the only authority 
which they will obey.385 
 
The League subsequently accused several clan chiefs, including Cabdi 
Oogle, Cunshur Maxamed (both Ogaadeen/Maxamed Subeer), Xuseen Ido 
(Ajuuraan), and Maxamed Liban (Digoodiya) of being ‘government stooges’, who 
worked against the best interests of their people. The growing friction between the 
chiefs and the SYL led the British to proscribe the party in July 1948, its Wajir 
headquarters being closed down.386 
The introduction of the grazing control schemes sought to fix the 
boundaries of the ‘tribal areas’ over which the chiefs held sway, strengthening the 
linkage between political authority and control over land. Chiefs became 
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instrumental in identifying ‘intruders’ (trespassers) in these tribal areas, but also in 
policing the colonial boundary with Somalia. Border controls became stronger, 
and Somali youths were now prevented from crossing Kenya’s Somali border, for 
fear that they would join the SYL and engage in anti-British activities.  Under 
Kenyan law, those who wished to leave Wajir District needed a government pass, 
issued only by the District Commissioner, and this was now enforced with 
increasing rigour. A convincing reason for leaving the District had to be provided 
if a pass was to be issued, and, in practice, only those who had family or other 
strong connections were now allowed to legally cross into Somalia.387 In an effort 
to verify the claims made by those applying for a pass, the British sought 
guidance from the local chiefs, but this opened the door to clientelistic practices 
and abuse of authority by government-paid chiefs. 
Following the closure of the SYL branches in the NFD, the chiefs 
reasserted their power. They interceded with government officials to obtain jobs 
and permits for their people, and to release detainees from prison. Somali nomads 
needed their chiefs’ ‘blessing’ in order to be allowed to enter the townships and to 
interact with the colonial administration. The nomads were forbidden from 
encamping in the townships and confined beyond a three-mile radius around 
inhabited centres.388 They were not allowed to construct buildings nor to acquire 
commercial licenses; unmarried or divorced women were forbidden from staying 
in the townships.389 The following anecdote, related by Somali informants in 
Wajir, effectively illustrates the nomads’ frustration at being segregated and 
marginalised and the chiefs’ complex role in negotiating the relationship between 
their own people and the colonial administration. In the late 1940s, the Provincial 
Commissioner, on a visit to Wajir District, called on the chiefs and asked them to 
voice their needs. A Digoodiya chief stated that he wanted forty men of his clan to 
be imprisoned. When asked by the other chiefs why he had made such a request, 
the Digoodiya chief replied: ‘We don’t speak English nor Swahili. We are 
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nomads. If these men go to prison, they will be able to speak English and Swahili 
by the time they are released, and, in the future, they may be able to help us in 
town’.390 The chiefs often found themselves in a tricky, ambivalent position. They 
were expected to collect tax and to bring people for recruitment into the colonial 
troops and the tribal police. Consequently, tax collectors and tribal policemen 
were usually selected from among the chiefs’ relatives. Various informants 
portrayed the chiefs and their acolytes as ‘legalised gangs’, several chiefs going as 
far as to humiliate and beat their own people if these attempted to resist 
government orders.391 Cooperation with the colonial Government, therefore, gave 
‘tribal’ chiefs greater power, but it was also likely to undermine their popularity 
and legitimacy amongst the local population. Nowhere was this tension more 
apparent than in the requirement for chiefs to regulate and restrict mobility. 
Post-war development policies in the NFP were supposed to remedy the 
break-down of tribal authority, eliminating the ‘state of flux’ which had prevailed 
on the frontier for many years. These policies, however, fuelled simmering 
struggles over pastureland and political supremacy, further eroding the social 
basis of traditional authority. Moreover, clan identities hardened as a result of the 
enforcement of grazing boundaries, creating new fractures in the social and 
political fabric of the NFP. These fractures helped the Kenya administration 
prevent the development of the Somali Youth League but did not give the colonial 




The Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the East African Campaign marked a 
watershed in the history of the Somalia-Kenya borderlands. Ethiopia’s defeat, the 
creation of Italian East Africa, the collapse of the Italian Empire, and the 
temporary unification of the Somali-lands (except Djibouti) under British 
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administration reconfigured the borderlands’s social and political geography, and 
stimulated the emergence of new political imaginaries. As this chapter has shown, 
the Second World War represented a critical juncture which produced local dis-
junctures as a result of the intersection of global transformations and local 
histories. 
For some borderlanders, war was a positive experience: cross-border 
livestock trade temporarily boomed as an unintended consequence of the war 
economy, and military service provided both material advantages and recognition. 
This contributed to the appearance of a new kind of government-paid chiefs, as 
the case of Cabdi Oogle attests. However, war also produced new fault-lines of 
violence in the borderlands, as it was mainly fought on the ground by clan militias 
recruited by the Italians and the British, and created the problem of disbanded 
irregulars. This caused increasing insecurity and aggravated inter-communal 
tensions in the frontier. 
In the post-war period, the politics of stabilisation and the imperatives of 
colonial ‘development’ became intertwined with the emergence of Somali 
nationalism. In former Italian Somalia, the British encouraged modernisation and, 
therefore, the creation of modern political parties. Had the Somali Youth League 
presented itself as a ‘traditionalist’ party, the British would have probably crushed 
it. They were not fully aware, however, of how Somali nationalism would 
rebound in the Northern Frontier District. There, Britain’s post-war modernising 
project provoked tensions between the promotion of ‘development’ and British 
sovereignty. Moreover, British policies aimed at stabilising the frontier allowed 
‘tribal’ chiefs to reassert their power in the NFD but also challenged traditional 
authority, undermining the chiefs’ legitimacy and popularity among the 
borderlanders. In the late 1940s, contradictory British agendas intersected with 
Somali political aspirations, Italian interests, and the Cold War, defining the 











3 AFIS, CLAN CONFLICT AND POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE, 1950-53 
 
3.1 The Italian Trusteeship Administration of Somalia 
The Italian Trusteeship Administration of Somalia, Amministrazione Fiduciaria 
Italiana della Somalia (AFIS), replaced the British Military Administration on 1 
April 1950. This brought the Italians back into the governance of Somalia, but it 
did not (formally) restore Italian colonial authority. AFIS operated under the 
authority of a United Nations mandate, and the Italian administration was subject 
to the oversight of the United Nations Advisory Council for the Trust Territory of 
Somaliland (UNACS).  The initial members of this Council were Egypt, 
Colombia and the Philippines, whose representatives were charged with advising 
the Italian Administration in Mogadishu.  The United Nations determined that 
Somalia should be given its independence within ten years of the commencement 
of the trusteeship, and so the prime purpose of the Italian Administration was to 
prepare Somalia for that transition, under the supervision of UNACS.  The first 
step toward this goal was taken in April 1950, with the establishment of a national 
consultative body, the Territorial Council, giving Somalis a voice in the planning 
of their own future. 
 Despite the clarity of this UN brief, Italian policy throughout the 
Trusteeship years followed an ambiguous agenda.  While the Administration 
granted new rights and increasing administrative autonomy to the Somalis, it also 
promoted economic and development policies that kept the country closely linked 
to its former Italian colonial metropole. This was complicated by the presence of 
Italian concessionaires, who reasserted their political and economic influence 
towards the end of the 1940s, and even gained new powers and authority under 
the Trusteeship Administration after 1950.   
The early years of the Trusteeship, between 1950 and 1953, were 
characterised by riots of SYL supporters against the Administration, armed 
clashes in which clan issues merged with the struggle between nationalists and 
‘pro-Italians’, and the Administration’s violent repression of popular unrest. The 
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tumult of these years only gave way to a more settled politics after the 1954 
municipal elections, in which the SYL clearly emerged as the major Somali 
political party. The SYL’s status was then consolidated as the principal partner of 
the Trusteeship Administration in taking the country toward independence with 
the first general elections of May 1956.  This saw the transformation of the 
Territorial Council into a seventy-member elected legislature with full statutory 
powers – essentially a ‘government-in-waiting’ – though still presided over by the 
Italian Administrator who retained the right of absolute veto.  In these final years 
of Trusteeship, the elected legislature had to work closely with the Italian 
administration, a political reality that was often difficult for both parties.  
This chapter will focus on the troubled early years of the Trusteeship 
administration, between 1950 and 1954, giving an account of the emergence of 
nationalist politics and how this impacted upon the Somalia-Kenya borderlands.  
We will begin with a discussion of the manner in which the Italian administration 
attempted to control and channel Somali politics through the rewarding of clients.  
The second section of the chapter will then describe how clan conflicts emerged 
in the frontier region in these years, setting the scene for rivalries that would 
reverberate into the next decade.  The final section of the chapter will focus upon 
events in the Kismaayo area over 1952 and 1953, as local groups competed over 




3.2 Rewarding political clients: veterans, recruits, and chiefs 
In the late 1940s, the political capture of the periphery by the SYL largely 
happened through the infiltration of the British-created Somalia Gendarmerie into 
the borderlands. Following the transfer of military powers from the British to the 
Italians, which occurred between 20 February and 1 April 1950, the security 
sector now became a principal bone of contention between Somali nationalists 
and Italy’s Somali clients. Political competition between members of the British-
inherited Somalia Police Corps (Corpo di Polizia della Somalia) and recruits of 
the newly-established Somalia Security Corps (Corpo di Sicurezza della Somalia) 
thus marked the first years of the Italian Trusteeship Administration. The Somalia 
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Security Corps was placed under the orders of General Arturo Ferrara, who chose 
Casa del Fascio (the former office of the Fascist party in Mogadishu) as the 
Command’s headquarters. The Somalia Security Corps was in charge of 
guaranteeing law and order during the transition from AFIS to the future Somali 
administration. As of 1 April 1950, the Security Corps was composed of more 
than 5000 Italian soldiers, whose number decreased to 3230 by the end of the 
same year.392 Italian officers were tasked with training the Somali personnel of the 
armed forces and of the police.  By 31 December 1951, the Security Corps 
comprised 1,108 Italian officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, and 
3,220 Somali non-commissioned officers and soldiers, divided into four 
battalions.393 
The Somalia Police Corps was also responsible for maintaining law and 
order, and was composed of 2000 Somalis by the end of 1951; these men were 
trained and supervised by some 521 officers and agents of the Italian Carabinieri 
Corps.394 In addition, a special corps of Ilaloes – a force that was similar to the 
British-created tribal police in Kenya – was established and placed under the 
direct authority of District Commissioners (Residenti).  These Ilaloes were 
responsible for the maintenance of law and order in rural areas and along inland 
roads and caravan routes, and controlled the movement of nomadic groups, 
including, crucially, their access to water points, wells, and pastures.395 
The Trusteeship Administration received thousands of volunteers for 
enlistment in the Somali battalions. Government-paid clan chiefs (capi-qabiila) 
readily involved themselves in this process, in an effort to gain some preferment 
for their own clients and to ensure that local matters would be in the hands of their 
own people. At the same time, ex-members of the defunct dubat bands were also 
keen to be reenlisted and reassigned to their old tasks with regard to frontier 
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security.396 Former members of the zaptié corps, a locally-raised constabulary 
force modelled on the Italian Carabinieri, and of the dubat bands were indeed 
readily re-enlisted into the companies of the new Somali battalions stationed in 
the Upper and Lower Jubba provinces, or assigned as interpreters to military posts 
in the Somalia-Kenya and Somalia-Ethiopia borderlands. To cite but a few of the 
more significant examples, Axmed Cali Yaxyaa (Arab), a former dubat 
commander, who had always supported the so-called ‘pro-Italian’ factions and 
had worked as a street cleaner in Luuq during the BMA period, offered his 
services to the Italians as an unpaid interpreter and was re-enlisted; former 
Maresciallo Xasan Xirsi (Hawiye/Habargidir) was assigned as an interpreter to 
the military garrison in Dooloow; former Iusbasci (commander) of the zaptié 
corps, Maxamed Cali (Arab), was assigned as an interpreter to the Carabinieri 
post in Kismaayo; former Iusbasci Xaaji Yuusuf Cabdi (Ogaadeen/Cawlyahan) 
was sent to Dooloow, while former Bulukbasci (deputy-commander) Maxamed 
Shire (Raxanweyn/Mirifle/Hadame) was sent to Luuq; and former Iusbasci Faarax 
Kulmiye (Hawiye/Habargidir/Sacad), who had served in the 1st Dubat Garrison in 
the Galla-Sidamo Governorate and had later moved to Moyale, and then to 
Ceelwaaq with his family and livestock, was re-enlisted as an interpreter with the 
military garrison stationed in Baardheere.397 Former members of the defunct 
Italian Africa Police (Polizia Africa Italiana), most of whom were 
Hawiye/Abgaal, Hawiye/Murusade, and Raxanweyn were also reenlisted into the 
Somali Rifles (1st battalion) in Kismaayo.398 As a result of such recruitment, the 
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majority of the re-enlisted veterans assigned to the Upper and Lower Jubba 
regions were men who had been recruited by the Italians to fight against the 
Ethiopians, mostly from clans other than the locally-dominant Daarood 
(Ogaadeen, Majeerteen and Mareexaan). 
Italian reports from this period tend to link political allegiance among the 
Somalis to clan membership. The genealogical division between the Daarood and 
the Hawiye clan families is generally assumed as the main political cleavage 
separating ‘pro-British’ (Daarood) from ‘pro-Italians’ (Hawiye), and 
distinguishing ‘radicals’ and ‘moderates’ within the SYL.  However, these 
political cleavages based on lineage were the result of colonial policies, rather 
than being purely shaped by long-standing genealogical determinations; inter-clan 
rivalry was the result of government practice, not of primordial ethnicity. The 
Italian policy of clan-based military recruitment dated back to the ‘pacification’ 
campaigns of the 1920s and had been successively employed during the Italo-
Ethiopian war in the 1930s.  In their recruitment efforts, the Italians determinedly 
kept men from the Daarood and the Hawiye clans apart. The Trusteeship 
Administration largely relied on Italy’s long-standing clients to assert control over 
territory and quell subversive forces, especially so in Somalia’s frontier areas. 
Clans such as the Hawiye/Xawaadle and the Hawiye/Habargidir had long 
provided more soldiers to the former Italian colonial forces than had other groups, 
and so they were accordingly given preference with the enlistment of veterans.399 
By May 1950, this was clearly reflected by the clan affiliations of the Somalis 
who had been recruited: the Dir constituted only 3 per cent of the recruits, the 
Saab (Digil iyo Mirifle) 10 per cent, and the Daarood (led by the 
Majeerteen/Cumar Maxamuud and the Majeerteen/Cismaan Maxamuud, followed 
by the Mareexaan) 27 per cent; the Hawiye (led by the Abgaal and the Habargidir, 
followed by the Xawaadle) accounted for 60 per cent of all recruits.400 As of 1 
August 1950, the Somali soldiers enlisted included 342 Daarood, 50 Dir, 957 
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Hawiye, 251 Saab, 117 Arabs and 4 Eritreans.401 One month later, the number of 
Daarood increased to 374, while Hawiye and Saab totalled 1,048 and 406 
respectively.402 
Kismaayo provides an emblematic example of the political intricacies of 
the new security forces and the role that the Italians’ most prominent allies would 
play in the ‘capture’ of the periphery; it also reveals the obsession of Italian 
officers with the supposed equation between clan identity and party politics.  By 
1950, there was a strong branch of the SYL in Kismaayo, mainly supported by 
Majeerteen clansmen who had migrated to the town. As there were twenty-six 
Majeerteen among the recruits of the Somali Rifles stationed in the town, the 
Italian captain of the company set up a surveillance and intelligence service, 
composed of external elements, to control them. The spies hired by the captain 
reported that a few Majeerteen soldiers had found some friends and relatives 
among the League’s members in Kismaayo, and that some SYL activists were 
campaigning amongst the young recruits. Their propaganda, however, was 
essentially limited to protecting SYL supporters – whom the Italian captain 
portrayed as ‘bourgeois troublemakers’ – from a possible reaction of the security 
forces in the event of a political incident.403 The League’s members instructed the 
recruits not to shoot them, but to fire shots into the air. Despite Italian 
apprehensions, only seven men among the Somali soldiers stationed in Kismaayo 
were believed to have participated in a clandestine meeting of the SYL.404 
Clan dynamics alone failed to determine political alignment within the 
security forces. According to Italian military reports, the most active supporters of 
the League in Kismaayo were members of the local Somalia Police; by contrast, 
several well-known Majeerteen and Mareexaan notables whose loyalty to the 
Italians could hardly be questioned figured among the soldiers who were stationed 
there. Most of these soldiers had been selected by the District authorities and had 
 
401 AUSSME, I-2, b. 37, f. 402, Comando del Corpo di Sicurezza della Somalia, ‘Forza 
arruolata alla data del I°-8-1950 divisa per gruppo gentilizio e cabila’, n.d. 
402 AUSSME, I-2, b. 37, f. 402, Fornari to Comando Corpo di Sicurezza della Somalia, 14 
September 1950.  




been compelled to fight with local members of the SYL who were opposed to 
their recruitment. In this way, Italian officers contributed to fuelling divisions 
between the Somalia Police and the Security Corps. They complained that the 
members of the Somalia Police received a better salary than the Somali soldiers 
who had supported the return of the Italians, although the Somalia Police – 
according to some Italian officers – were ‘notoriously treacherous, adherents of 
the SYL, anti-Italian’; the Police were accused of having extorted, black-mailed, 
stolen, killed, and perpetrated the worst acts of abuse under the British Military 
Administration.405 
What we have discussed so far points to the fact that local political 
tensions, usually interpreted through the lens of genealogy, may be better 
explained by looking at the trail of hatred and resentment that the return of the 
Italians generated: a deep rift emerged between those who had opposed the Fascist 
colonial administration and those who had sided with it. Although the transfer of 
power from British to Italian hands happened relatively smoothly, the picture 
which emerges from archival sources, as soon as one shifts from the diplomatic to 
the local level, is that of a fractured society, enveloped in a climate of post-war 
retaliation. Between 1950 and 1952, the Italians dismissed most of the Somali 
employees who had worked for the British Military Administration, and attempted 
to suppress nationalist resistance in all major settlements across the country, using 
unwarranted violence against SYL supporters.406 Inter-clan and inter-tribal 
tensions overlapped with political violence instigated by Italian officials, leading 
to deadly clashes in Baydhabo, Mogadishu, Afgooye, Caluula, Golweyn, Marka, 
Janaale, Jilib, Jamaame, and Kismaayo.407 Both Italian and British sources tend to 
portray these conflicts as centuries-old manifestations of clan violence provoked 
by struggles over access to water and pastures. These interpretations, however, 
ignore two key aspects, namely the role of government-paid chiefs, and the 
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aggressive attempts of certain groups to acquire territory through the exploitation 
of their colonial connections. 
The Italian Trusteeship Administration used the appointment of 
government-paid chiefs to reassert the long-standing policy of identifying 
administrative divisions with specific ‘tribal areas’. Continuing the colonial 
tradition, the Italian Administration saw these territorial units as the ‘homelands’ 
of the dominant (usually the most visible, often the most useful) clans in these 
areas, and registered chiefs and headmen for each of these clans, putting them on 
government payroll. This policy contributed to creating conflicts over the 
definition of tribal ‘homelands’ and the appropriation of territory, especially in 
those districts where different clans lived on each side of the Jubba river, such as 
in Luuq and Baardheere. The list of the senior chiefs who were registered by the 
Italian Administration in 1950 is revealing of the logic that the Italians used to 
extend political control in the Jubba valley. In Luuq and Baardheere, the top 
chiefs on the Administration’s payroll belonged to the ‘tribes’ that were 
predominant on the left bank of the Jubba river: Macalin Weyn (Raxanweyn), Dir, 
Gasaargude, and Gabaweyn (a Somali-Bantu sub-clan of the Raxanweyn) in 
Luuq; and Dabarre (Raxanweyn), Cawlyahan, Eelaay (Raxanweyn) in 
Baardheere.408 For the most part, these groups supported the Xisbiya Digil iyo 
Mirifle, which had benefited from the financial backing of the Italians and had 
sided with the Trusteeship Administration. In the Lower Jubba Province, the most 
senior chiefs on the Administration’s payroll belonged to tribes the Italians 
regarded as allies: Shiikhaal, Ogaadeen/Maqaabul, Xarti/Dhulbahante, and 
Baajuun in Kismaayo; Gosha, Majindo, Mushunguli, Hawiye/Habargidir in 
Margherita (present-day Jamaame); Maay, Mushunguli, and Majindo in Jilib; and 
Ogaadeen/Maxamed Subeer and Jidwaaq/Bartiire in Afmadoow.409 Governmental 
practices thereby became entangled in the complex web of clan and territorial 
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rivalries that they contributed to create. These rivalries led to identity and political 
polarization among clans, particularly in Kismaayo and Luuq, as we shall see.    
Although competition for the control of key grazing areas or strategic 
wells was clearly a cause of conflict, many clashes were instigated by Italian-
appointed chiefs who often acted out of self-interest. Writing to the Chairman of 
the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 1953, the SYL 
leader, Cabdulaahi Ciise, openly accused Somali chiefs of fomenting ‘tribal’ 
conflicts through the rivalries their colonial affiliations promoted:  
 
The aim of these ignorant elements, who receive a meagre pay from 
government, is to see that their tribes be involved in disturbances and, 
as a consequence, be fined heavily. […] When the government 
imposes fines to the tribes who participated in the disturbances, the 
chiefs are instructed to collect the same. To enforce the tribal chiefs’ 
authority, some armed ilaloes (district police units) are placed at the 
disposal of the chiefs who also receive firearms and ammunitions if 
they so desire. With the assistance of the armed ilaloes, the chiefs 
collect from their tribesmen herds of camels, cattle, sheep and goats 
the value of which usually exceeds at least twice the amount of fine 
imposed by the government.410 
 
Somali informants from the Afmadoow area have stressed the connivance 
of Italian-paid chiefs and ilaloes, who were recruited through the capi-qabiila 
from among the members of their own clan.411 The appointment of government-
paid chiefs and headmen who had Italian-armed ilaloes at their disposal created 
tensions within clans, as these newly appointed chiefs sometimes challenged the 
authority of the ‘traditional’ suldaans, as we shall see in the next chapter. Oral 
testimonies suggest that the ilaloes in Afmadoow treated ‘those who were not 
family’ – that is to say, those who did not belong to the dominant clan in that area 
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– ‘very badly’.412 During the rains, groups of Ogaadeen from across the Kenyan 
border moved their animals to the Dhasheeg Waamo. The ilaloes in Afmadoow 
District, however, barred non-Ogaadeen clans from moving into this area.  Only if 
the herders were from sheegad groups who abided by the conditions imposed by 
the Maxamed Subeer Suldaan were ‘trespassers’ left unmolested.  Those 
individuals or groups who belonged to clans who were only marginally present in 
Somalia, such as the Digoodiya and the Murule, were regarded as trespassers by 
the ilaloes and were liable to expulsion or prosecution.413 
Although the Italians did not demarcate tribal areas, unlike the British in 
north-eastern Kenya (see Chapter 2), the system of political control and state-
sanctioned authority which emerged from the alliance between clan chiefs and 
ilaloes paid by the Italian Administration caused similar issues of inter-communal 
friction over territorial appropriation. This fostered stronger connections between 
kinship and territory which somehow embodied the rationale behind the colonial 
mapping of tribal identities. Rather than ancestral antipathy, colonial policies were 
the most significant factor in shaping conflicts over access to land and resources 
in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands.  
 
 
3.3 Territorial appropriation and clan clashes on the frontier 
Between 1950 and 1953, clan clashes erupted on the Somalia-Kenya and Somalia-
Ethiopia frontiers. These conflicts were entangled amidst the retaliatory violence 
provoked by vengeance against Italy’s ‘traitors’ and attempts to suppress 
‘subversive’ emergent nationalist forces.  Violence broke out in June 1950, 
following several arrests of SYL activists.  At Dooloow, nine members of the 
SYL, including the party’s secretary, were imprisoned by the Italians, while 
fifteen prominent League members were detained at Luuq, and no less than eighty 
were incarcerated in Baydhabo.414 According to a report by Faarax Kulmiye 
 
412 Interview with Maxamed Aamiin, Nairobi, Islii, 25 May 2015. 
413 Ibid. 




(Hawiye/Habargidir) – one of the former dubat who had been recently re-enlisted 
–, the SYL secretary in Baardheere wrote three telegrams (one to the Italian 
Administrator, one to the Mogadishu SYL, and one to the UN Advisory Council), 
complaining that the District Commissioner and the local police sergeant were 
deliberately hostile to his party.415 The League’s leaders in Baardheere reportedly 
accused the Italian authorities of supplying the Xisbiya Digil iyo Mirifle with 
hand-grenades and of sending the Digil-Mirifle to fight against the SYL.  Faarax 
Kulmiye vigorously refuted these allegations, the ex-dubat reporting instead that 
everybody on the right bank of the Jubba River was against the Italian 
Administration.  These people, mainly Mareexaan and Cawlyahan clansmen, had 
bought about thirty rifles in Ethiopia – he claimed –, and were waiting for the 
river level to decrease in order to raid all the livestock of the Digil-Mirifle on the 
other bank. It was also rumoured that the people on the west bank of the river 
were planning to burn down Baardheere, and then to flee to Ethiopia and 
Kenya.416 
As tensions around the arrests of SYL members mounted in the Italian 
territory, on the Kenyan side of the border a series of raids and counter-raids 
occurred in April 1950 between the Mareexaan and the Murule.  The Mareexaan 
crossed the border into Kenya and raided 160 Murule camels, the Murule then 
responding with a retaliatory raid at Ceelwaaq, capturing over 100 camels.  
Herders were wounded on both sides, but no deaths were reported.417 In the 
following months, clashes erupted between Mareexaan and Gharri in which the 
casualties became more serious. In a major Mareexaan raid in July, a considerable 
number of deaths were reported on both sides. Then an armed contingent of 
Kenyan police intercepted the Mareexaan raiders as they fled toward the frontier; 
the police inflicted heavy casualties on the Mareexaan and successfully prevented 
large numbers of Gharri cattle from being driven into Somalia. Tacitly 
acknowledging the possible complicity of ilaloes in this raid, the Italian 
Administration subsequently reinforced the border post at Buur Hache with 
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twenty Somalia police, and withdrew the ilaloes.418 This change, however, did not 
prove effective in calming the border region.  Violent raiding continued into 1951, 
with further skirmishes between the Buur Hache Gharri and the Mareexaan.  This 
time the violence was provoked by the Mareexaan making use of the Gharri wells 
in the area, allegedly with the consent and support of the police at Buur Hache.419 
Towards the end of 1952, tensions intensified further between the Mareexaan and 
the Gharri, who were struggling to gain control over a contested area along the 
border between Ceelwaaq and Mandera. According to Italian sources, though this 
area had once ‘belonged’ to the Gharri, they had been hard pressed by the 
Mareexaan, and eventually compelled to abandon the territory.  The Gharri, 
determined to recover the grazing, then sought the support of their kin in 
Ethiopia’s Borana region to evict the Mareexaan interlopers, precipitating further 
bloody clashes.420 As these events indicate, clan conflict over access to pasture 
and water was intimately linked to questions of territorial appropriation and 
sovereignty, government forces being all too often implicated in such conflicts as 
participants, either defending one side against another, or enforcing one claim 
against another. 
Against this background, between 1950 and 1952, Dooloow became the 
focal point of a simmering frontier dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia. 
Significantly, this dispute revolved around the section of the border where the 
Somalia-Ethiopia frontier ceased to follow the Jubba River and diverted across 
open terrain toward the border with British Kenya. With no boundary line visible 
on the ground, there was far greater scope for dispute over territorial claims and 
counter-claims. Ambiguities in this particular area were all the greater because the 
southern section of the Somali-Ethiopian frontier had not been demarcated in 
1950, when AFIS took over from the British Military Administration. Although 
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the UN General Assembly had recommended that the governments of Ethiopia 
and Italy expedite direct negotiations so that the frontier question could be settled, 
this had not, in fact, taken place. According to Italian reports, between 1950 and 
1952, the Ethiopian authorities sought to exploit the uncertainty over the exact 
location of the border by committing several ‘acts of provocation’ in the Dooloow 
area.421 Ethiopian presence there was strengthened through the establishment of a 
new police post, in 1951, near the bend of the Jubba River and close to the ferry 
port the Italians had established in the 1920s.  The Ethiopian police at Dooloow 
periodically interfered with border trade; in September 1951, they apprehended 
Somali traders who were leaving Ethiopia and confiscated their livestock.422 In 
1953, a series of clashes occurred near Dooloow in which Ogaadeen/Cawlyahan 
from Ethiopia crossed into Italian-administered territory to raid groups of 
Raxanweyn.  It is highly significant that Italian reports on these raids persistently 
refer to the Raxanweyn as ‘our [italic is mine] Rahanuin people’.423 
Negotiations between Ethiopia and Italy to settle these disputes finally 
began in 1955 but had reached no satisfactory conclusion two years later, when 
the matter was referred to international arbitration.  While these discussions were 
under way, the frontier represented by the ‘Provisional Administrative Line’, 
agreed upon by the British and the Ethiopians in 1950, was officially closed. This 
border problem remained unresolved and continued to affect Somali-Ethiopian 
relations even after Somalia reached independence in 1960. 
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3.4 Struggling for control of Kismaayo, 1952-53 
The years of the Italian Trusteeship Administration have generally been regarded 
as a period of peaceful transition, during which UN oversight restrained any 
temptation toward colonial excesses on the part of Italian officials.  For a long 
time in Italy the post-war years in Somalia were portrayed as redemptive for 
Italian colonialism. This contributed to promote the self-absolving stereotype of 
‘Italians, good people’ (Italiani, brava gente) which functioned as a kind of 
‘ideological laundry’ to set aside ‘disquieting moments of national shame’ in post-
Fascist Italy.424 Viewing the AFIS years in the longer run of Somalia’s troubled 
modern history, Kenneth Menkhaus has described them as ‘the calm before the 
storms’.425 While, in a relative sense, there is some truth in the contrast Menkhaus 
draws between these years and what was to come, especially after 1969, this 
contrast should not be allowed to mask the often turbulent events of the Italian 
Administration. Nowhere did the conflicts of the early 1950s reach a sharper pitch 
than in Kismaayo, where the politics of nationalism and territorial claim-making 
clashed with Italian attempts to ‘manage’ the transition.  The next section will 
briefly discuss Kismaayo’s political troubles in 1952-53.    
In the Lower Jubba Province, the Italian Administration encouraged the 
growth of a ‘pro-Italian’ political party, the Somali Progressive League. This 
party, strongly supported by members of the Daarood/Majeerteen/Cismaan 
Maxamuud sub-clan, began to extend its influence in the Jubba valley in January 
1952, opening local branches in Luuq first, then in Baardheere, and finally in 
Kismaayo, which was by then a stronghold of the Somali Youth League.426 In 
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Kismaayo, the SYL immediately began organising and vigorously campaigning 
against the Somali Progressive League. According to Italian sources, this 
mobilisation quickly spilled over into manifestations of political intolerance, 
including threats and acts of violence.  SYL activities allegedly ‘forced the local 
authorities to take vigorous measures against the perpetrators’.427 As a result, five 
SYL members were arrested in Kismaayo in March 1952, including the Secretary 
of the party’s local section.  Feeling that it had the backing and protection of the 
Italian Administration, the Somali Progressive League continued its expansion, 
despite mounting tensions, opening further new branches in Afmadoow and 
Yoontoy during April. That same month, further SYL actions were again 
suspected, when a well-known Arab in Kismaayo, Shariif Saalax bin Cumar, who 
had served as a member of the Mogadishu-based Territorial Council since 1951, 
was seriously wounded in a knife attack. Consequently, suspected SYL members 
were rounded-up by the Italian authorities, including three activists who had been 
sent by the League’s central committee to Kismaayo only a few days earlier to 
assist the newly-appointed local party secretary.428 
Tensions escalated further in Kismaayo when a Somali Muslim cleric 
(sheikh) who, according to Italian reports, ‘belonged to the SYL’, allegedly 
preached a sermon advocating jihad against the Christians.429 As a result, the 
police arrested the sheikh accusing him of incitement to crime. Four more SYL 
members were arrested when they broke into the office of the District Judge 
declaring that they would appeal against the arrests of SYL supporters that had 
followed the attack against Shariif Saalax bin Cumar. As the news of these further 
arrests reached the SYL headquarters in Mogadishu, three delegates were sent to 
Kismaayo to discreetly inquire into the actions of the Italian Commissario 
(Provincial Commissioner), Signor Wagner, whom they now suspected was using 
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his position to run a stern and oppressive campaign against the SYL in the port 
city.430 
Over the following months, the Somali Progressive League attempted to 
consolidate its successes, co-opting local chiefs to rally support and 
instrumentalizing social cleavages, as well as clan identity, to foment opposition 
against the SYL. A second Italian-sponsored party, the African Union, also joined 
the political fray in the Jubba region, chipping away further at the SYL’s position.  
Two leaders of the Somali Progressive League, Xaaji Muuse Samatar and 
Maxamed Warsame, led the political attacks on the SYL.  The propaganda 
promoted by these two leaders claimed that the SYL had badly mishandled its 
relations with the Italian Administration, and that the Somali Progressive League 
was much better placed to build a strong and constructive relationship with the 
Italians.  This message was reiterated to local chiefs, in an effort to persuade them 
to affiliate with the Somali Progressive League and cut their ties with the SYL.  
However, the message of Xaaji Muuse and Maxamed Warsame was not always 
well received: chiefs at Afmadoow declared that they did not recognize the 
Somali Progressive League and that they were capable of representing their own 
interests to the Italian Administration.431  In search of a more recipient audience, 
the two SPL leaders exhorted the Italian concessionaires in the lower Jubba valley 
to expel those among their labourers who were known members of the SYL and to 
replace them with supporters of the Somali Progressive League.432 
In this rather dirty campaign, clan politics was brought into play.  During a 
meeting with all the Majeerteen chiefs of Lower Jubba, Maxamed Warsame 
suggested that they should make complaints against all the Hawiye who held 
official positions, with a view to having them dismissed from office.  The SPL 
leader suggested that the chiefs should notify the Italian authorities that the 
Majeerteen did not want Hawiye people to live in ‘their’ territory. The Italian 
army officer in Kismaayo who reported these events described them as being 
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typical of the old issue of ‘racial politics pitting Hawiye against Daarood’.433 In 
this case, however, Warsame’s efforts to stir up clan antipathy did not succeed, as 
the Majeerteen chiefs, particularly Xaaji Xuseen Boqor and Xaaji Maxamed 
Cilmi, rejected the assumption that the Hawiye were enemy to the Majeerteen. 
Instead, the chiefs acknowledged that Kismaayo was part of a wider Trans-Jubba 
region, which was greater than the Majeerteen area and was home to many 
different clans. Kismaayo was ‘not Gaalkacyo’, the Majeerteen chiefs added.434 
These dynamics reveal the significance of xeer, the name given to a 
specific and highly important form of Somali political contract (see Introduction). 
As Jama Mohamed has pointed out, xeer contracts did much more than reaffirm 
clan relationships: ‘agnates functioned as corporate political groups because they 
negotiated a social contract that defined the terms of their collective unity’.435  
Thus, ‘the blood relation was not sufficient to establish a political system’.436  
Drawing on Ioan Lewis’s description of xeer, it seems appropriate to regard ‘the 
Somali political and jural contract as a mechanism for… knotting the diffuse ties 
of agnation, as political unity is specifically required at different levels of 
segmentation’.437 In other words, political and jural units were defined by contract 
within agnation, but contract could also override agnation. This could be seen in 
the case of the Xeer Eji in Lower Jubba.  Gufu Oba has referred to ‘Eji’ as the 
name by which the Daarood Somalis in Jubaland were known to the Boran.438 
However, Khaliif Santuur, a son of Santuur Gooloo, who was the chief of the 
Ogaadeen/Maxamed Subeer in Kismaayo in the 1950s, has offered a strikingly 
different definition.439 According to him, the Eji represented a variegated unity 
composed of different kinship groups who inhabited the Dhasheeg Waamo and 
the Kismaayo area, and coexisted peacefully under their own ‘law’, the Xeer Eji. 
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and brought together all the peoples who lived in the district, including the 
dominant Daarood clans and their various sheegad: Ogaadeen, Ashraaf, Shiikhaal, 
Gaaljecel, Cawrmale, Dir/Biimaal (Biyomaal), Xarti, Baajuun, Bantus, and 
Warday. Over time, however, the term ‘Eji’ became synonymous with 
‘indigenous people’, as opposed to ‘newcomers’ (gaalti in Somali) from north-
central Somalia and Ethiopia. As political struggle and competition over territory 
increasingly reinforced each other during the 1950s, the Eji’s cohesion began to 
crumble, opening the way to new divisions and tensions.  This was particularly 
apparent in the aftermath of the violent crisis that erupted in Kismaayo during the 
summer of 1952 as a consequence of the rivalry between the SYL and the Somali 
Progressive League.    
The crisis loomed in June 1952, when the SYL publicly accused Xaaji 
Muuse Samatar and Maxamed Warsama of having attempted to plot the murder of 
the secretary of the Kismaayo SYL branch. The plot was allegedly hatched as a 
means to prevent the SYL from campaigning among the Baajuun to convince 
them not to join the Somali Progressive League.440 Although the SYL had made 
repeated complaints against the Italian Provincial Commissioner in Kismaayo, 
Signor Wagner, whom they accused of supporting and directing the actions of the 
Somali Progressive League, they were unable to get the Administration to take 
their complaint of a murder plot seriously. Therefore, they eventually decided to 
reinforce their campaign with a public demonstration.441 This protest was timed to 
coincide with the planned visit of high-level AFIS representatives to Kismaayo 
later in the summer.  
On 1 August 1952, Kismaayo’s apparent calm was shattered by an 
outburst of political violence that had far-reaching effects on political 
developments not only in the lower Jubba Valley, but in Somalia as a whole. The 
target of the SYL protests was Signor Wagner, the Italian Provincial 
Commissioner of Lower Jubba. Wagner was a prominent veteran of the Italian 
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colonial administration and an ardent Fascist, well known for his ‘harsh 
administrative methods’, which – according to British sources – had made him 
‘deservedly unpopular’ among Somalis.442 Serious disorders had occurred in 
Gaalkacyo, Wagner’s previous posting, during 1951.443 The Kismaayo SYL 
arranged their protest to coincide with the arrival of the Italian Acting 
Administrator, Signor Canino, in the coastal town on 1 August 1952.  Some 300 
protestors gathered at the SYL headquarters in Kismaayo, demanding justice.444 
An SYL delegation asked to be received by the Acting Administrator, but the 
request was refused by Wagner.  Three unarmed Italian carabinieri and an Arab 
police inspector then attempted to disperse the demonstration, but this only 
resulted in further inflaming the already angry crowd. When one of the 
carabinieri forcefully attempted to size a banner from a group of women, fighting 
broke out.  In the skirmish that rapidly ensued, the Italian lieutenant of the 
carabinieri was seriously wounded and three of his men stoned and stabbed to 
death.445 
Antonio Morone has briefly mentioned this episode in his history of the 
Italian Trusteeship Administration, mainly focusing on the political consequences 
of the Kismaayo disturbances for the Administration’s strategy towards the 
Somali Youth League.446 However, the dramatic crackdown which followed the 
disturbances was not mentioned by Morone, nor has it featured in other studies of 
the Trusteeship period. Nevertheless, the account of the Italian response contained 
in the archival record leaves no doubt as to the heavy-handed and sweeping 
character of the Italian reaction. According to one British report, the Italian 
Administration ‘behaved with considerable hysteria and undertook mass arrests 
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all over the country, locking up anyone who […] expressed sympathy with the 
demonstrators’ – which, in fact, meant anyone with known sympathies for the 
SYL.447 Round-ups and military operations to hunt down the culprits began 
immediately in the Kismaayo area.448  Wagner requested military assistance, and a 
company of the 3rd Somali Battalion stationed in Kismaayo was brought onto the 
streets. Shortly after the attack, police squads were called in from the 
neighbouring areas and the following day two more platoons of military police 
were flown to Kismaayo from Mogadishu, and a further armoured platoon was 
also sent.449 Within twenty-four hours after the incident, several raids had been 
carried out on SYL suspects, and a curfew had been imposed across the city.  
While some of those who were allegedly responsible for the killings succeeded in 
escaping across the border into Kenya, hundreds of SYL supporters, including 
women, were arrested and thrown in prison without trial.450 
Police operations lasted for a further six weeks, through to 14 September 
1952. According to the official Italian reports, 672 people were taken into custody 
in the first days of the crack-down.  Of these, 427 were proven not guilty and 
released between 3 and 7 August, while the remaining 245 people arrested were 
kept in custody pending further investigations.451 The real number of arrests, 
however, may have been considerably higher. Numerous oral accounts from 
Somalis who lived in Kismaayo at that time confirm that house raids continued 
for several weeks after the riot of 1 August. Young men and women were the 
principal targets in these round-ups, many being taken away from their families 
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and imprisoned.452 In a speech to the UN General Assembly in December 1952, 
the SYL representative Cabdulaahi Ciise stated that ‘over 2000 Somalis including 
several hundred women were jailed’ in Kismaayo during the first week of August 
1952.453 The true number of people who were imprisoned may never be known.  
At the peak of the arrests, on 22 August 1952, Maxamed Jaamac, a 
member of the SYL local branch, was shot dead by an Italian Carabinieri inside 
the main Kismaayo police station.454  The shooting plunged the city into further 
turmoil; in the prevailing climate of fear and suspicion, divisions emerged among 
the local population. Oral testimonies recount that the Italian Administration 
exploited these fissures, putting supporters of the Somali Progressive League in 
charge of the informal investigation into the disturbances, and then offering to pay 
informants who came forward with information about the assaults and the 
organisation of the protest.455 During the month following the attack, the African 
Union was able to take advantage of the troubles confronting both the other 
parties in Kismaayo, finding substantial support among the Ogaadeen and the 
Baajuun. According to Italian military reports, clan politics were again being 
ruthlessly exploited: the African Union aimed to promote the interests of the 
Ogaadeen and the Baajuun by seeking to oust the Majeerteen from what the two 
communities regarded as ‘their own’ territories, at a time when the Majeerteen 
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were weakened by the Kismaayo crisis.456 This was indicative of the pressure that 
was being put on the supporters of the SYL, some of whom deserted the party. 
Kismaayo’s Xarti/Dhulbahante, for example, formerly staunch supporters of the 
SYL, shifted their allegiance to the African Union and expressed their willingness 
to cooperate with the Italian authorities. The Italian records also reveal that 
individuals from the Xarti/Dhulbahante clan were prominent among those who 
provided information about the perpetrators of the Kismaayo disturbances of 1 
August.457 
At the end of September, the Italian authorities had completed their 
investigations.  Charges were filed against 170 people, accused of various crimes 
connected with the Kismaayo riot. Of these people, 159, including 32 women, 
were incarcerated without trial.458 The SYL claimed that dozens among the 
accused were tortured during their incarceration, and that some of them were 
forced to drink seawater by the Italian carabinieri in Kismaayo’s central prison.459 
Several young women, who were pregnant at the time of the arrest, were reported 
to have given birth whilst in prison; according to oral testimonies, one of these 
women named her new-born girl Agosto (August), in honour of the riot.460 
The Italian authorities in Kismaayo were keen to take the most strident 
action against the SYL, but the Administration in Mogadishu would not allow the 
 
456 AUSSME, I-2, b. 96, f. 777, Joviero to Comando Corpo di Sicurezza della Somalia, 
‘Bollettino Informazioni relativo al mese di settembre 1952’, 29 September 1952, p. 
2. 
457 AUSSME, I-2, b. 96, f. 777, Joviero to Sezione Operazioni-Addestramento-
Ordinamento del Comando Corpo di Sicurezza della Somalia, ‘Bollettino 
Informazioni relativo al mese di ottobre 1952’, 31 October 1952, p. 1. 
458 ASUSCC, s. 1167.19, Comando Generale dell’Arma dei Carabinieri, Ufficio 
Situazione, ‘Rapporto’, 7 October 1952, 7; ASMSCC, FAA, f. 709, a. 1, Ripa di 
Meana to the Administrator of Somalia, 25 September 1952, p. 10. 
459 ASMAE, Dir. Gen. AA.PP., Uff. III, I vers., b. 3, f. 14, ‘Copy of the statement of 
Abdullahi Issa, Representative of the SYL, to the United Nations General 
Assembly, New York, 21 Dec. 1952’, p. 2. 
460 Interviews with Cabdalla Maxamed Cabdi, Nairobi, 28 April2016, and Cabdi Caziiz 
Maaxamed Maxamuud, Nairobi, 26 April 2016. 
160 
 
banning of the party, which they considered would have been counterproductive. 
Nevertheless, this did not prevent local Italian administrators in Lower Jubba from 
punishing the SYL in every means under their power. The League’s larger 
branches in Kismaayo, Jamaame, Afmadoow, and Jilib, along with several other 
centres in Lower Jubba were closed down under local orders. Even in Mogadishu, 
the SYL were expelled from their headquarters by the Italian Administration.461  
Although the Acting Secretary of UNACS offered to mediate following the riots, 
the offer was declined by the Italian Administrator, Giovanni Fornari, who 
refused to liaise with the leaders of the SYL until near the end of 1952. Although 
Fornari ‘admitted privately that the Administration had perhaps acted with 
unnecessary severity’, he declined to take any steps to remedy the situation, 
leaving Italian officials in Kismaayo to take their revenge.462 The trial for the 
Kismaayo massacre only began in the spring of 1953 and ended the following 
August. Fifty people, including eight women, were eventually sentenced to 
prison; fifty-five people, who had already served over one year in jail, were 
acquitted.463 
The Kismaayo crisis had far-reaching consequences, not only locally but 
also in Mogadishu. The Italian Administration used the crisis to co-opt the 
‘moderates’ and isolate the ‘extremists’ within the Somali Youth League – 
moderation and extremism being measured depending on the degree of 
willingness to cooperate with the Italians.464  Antonio Morone has argued that this 
strategy marked a turning point in the ‘adjustment path’ toward cooperation 
between the SYL and the Italian Administration, ultimately smoothing the way 
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toward the handover, in 1960, to an SYL leadership that was more moderate, and 
hence more compliant.465 At the local level, the Kismaayo crisis revived and 
deepened the conflict between the Ogaadeen and the Xarti/Majeerteen. Further 
tensions over the respective zones of territorial influence arose between the two 
clans in the area north of Kismaayo in March 1953, leading to more clashes.466 
Over the following months, the Ogaadeen attempted to pressure the Italian 
authorities to ‘punish’ the Majeerteen – whom the Italians saw as staunch SYL 
supporters – by confining them to their ‘original area’ and thus halting their 
‘persistent expansion’ north of Kismaayo.467 By the end of the summer, though, 
the situation had normalized, after the Ogaadeen gave a ‘convincing 
demonstration’ of their ‘weight and rights’ in Kismaayo – as the Italian officer in 
charge of the local military post put it.468 It was agreed by the Italian authorities 
that the Ogaadeen would exercise the function of ‘undisputed arbiters’ in the 
relationships between ‘local races’ in Lower Jubba, and that, from then on, there 
was to be only one Suldaan in Kismaayo: Cali Axmed Magan of the 
Ogaadeen/Maxamed Subeer.  This example is emblematic of how the Italian 
Administration sought to assert its authority over the Trans-Jubba periphery by 
acknowledging, and thereby strengthening, the position of those groups who were 
powerful enough to control territory and people and, therefore, useful to the 
Italian Administration. The link between clanship and territory became stronger as 
a result. 
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3.5 The question of ‘deegaan’ 
In this chapter we have examined the dynamics of domination and repression 
which characterised the first phase of the Italian Trusteeship Administration, and 
especially their effects in the Jubba Valley. In conclusion, we now need to 
consider how individuals and groups among the Somalis gradually appropriated 
the relationships of dependence within which they operated in these years, and 
how they began to use these relationships to acquire resources and authority. This 
involves the exercise of what John Lonsdale has termed ‘agency in tight 
corners’.469 
The Ogaadeen/Majeerteen dispute which raised tensions in Kismaayo 
District in 1953 was eventually overcome in the lead-up to the first municipal 
elections in 1954, when a group of SYL leaders were sent from Mogadishu to 
Lower Jubba to campaign amongst the Xarti and the Ogaadeen. According to an 
Italian military report, the SYL delegates made a strong appeal for ‘racial 
solidarity’ among the Somalis, calling on all Daarood to finally impose 
themselves and become the arbiters of political and administrative action in the 
region.470 Italian officers thought that the SYL delegation was successful in 
achieving its aim, as ‘Daaroodism’ – the term used in Italian sources to designate 
inter-clan solidarity among the members of the Daarood clan family – appeared to 
be deeply felt and highly effective in mobilizing political action. It is safe to 
argue, however, that the emergence of a Daarood front in Kismaayo was more a 
product of the practices of the Italian Trusteeship Administration and of the 
competition between political parties, rather than the direct consequence of any 
genealogical solidarity. 
As the Jubba Valley became a hotspot of political struggle and violence in 
the early 1950s, crystallising the Hawiye/Daarood cleavage, tensions between 
these two clan families in Lower Jubba reverberated in Mogadishu, re-inflaming 
 
469 John Lonsdale, ‘Agency in Tight Corners: Narrative and Initiative in African History’, 
Journal of African Cultural Studies, 13, No.1 (2000), pp. 5–16. 
470 AUSSME, I-2, b. 150, f. 1122, Joviero to Sezione Operazioni-Addestramento-
Ordinamento del Comando Corpo di Sicurezza della Somalia, ‘Bollettino 




the long-standing competition between Hawiye/Abgaal and Daarood over the 
control of the Banaadir region.  For instance, renewed tensions emerged between 
these two groups in October 1953, when about seventy Hawiye, who had been 
hired by a private company to work in the Lower Jubba Province, were sent back 
to Mogadishu by the authorities in Kismaayo following strong opposition from 
the local labour force, largely composed of Daarood. This incited Abgaal 
representatives in Mogadishu to take reprisals by campaigning against the 
Daarood who worked and lived in what they regarded as ‘Hawiye territory’.471 
Although it was very infrequent for whole clan families to be in conflict 
with one another, when members of a clan family resided as sheegad in the area 
of another clan family, tensions between entire clans could arise. This 
undoubtedly happened in the case of Hawiye and Daarood in Lower Jubba, as 
Alphonso Castagno has rightly observed.472 Political competition during 
successive elections fuelled these tensions between entire clan families both in the 
Lower and Upper Jubba Provinces, as we will see in the next chapter. As political 
struggle in the Jubba valley centred on the competition between the SYL and the 
Xisbiya Digil iyo Mirifle (HDM), the League’s strategy in Upper Jubba was to 
‘free’ the most recent Daarood sheegads within the Raxanweyn and Dir clans 
from the HDM’s political tutelage, as Federico Battera has noted.473 Conversely, 
the HDM sought to attract the Hawiye sheegads within the Daarood clans in the 
Lower Jubba Province. In this way, the sheegad issue acquired a new political 
dimension in the 1950s in connection with the competition over land and the 
definition of ‘tribal territories’, especially during elections.  
 The Somali term deegaan is crucial for understanding these dynamics. 
Often translated as ‘land tenure’, deegaan is, in fact, a concept that encompasses 
the intertwined notions of livelihood security, group identity, and political 
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strength.474 Deegaan ‘connotes exclusive control by a group sharing similar 
language, identity or clan affiliation of a land area and the natural resources found 
there. […] Deegaan is synonymous with entitlement, security, usage and 
identity.’475 The sheegad relationship was a means through which access to 
deegaan could be socially negotiated without resorting to violence. However, as 
competition over deegaan increased, so did tensions between ‘patrons’ and 
sheegad. Not only was ownership and control of deegaan at the core of local 
tensions and conflicts in the Somalia-Kenya borderland, but, through control of 
deegaan, clans had more political power and could claim greater representation at 
the state’s centre. As we shall see in the next chapter, competition over deegaan 




This chapter has explored the complex ways in which the Somalia-Kenya 
borderland became a hotspot of dissent and violence during the first years of the 
Italian Trusteeship Administration, as the margins of the Trust Territory were 
being actively constructed as margins. The problems of sovereignty, entangled 
territorialities, and political dissent were particularly acute in the borderland, 
therefore the Italian Administration sought to make its power more heavily felt 
there than elsewhere in the Trust Territory. As a result of the combination of 
governmental practices and local agency, genealogical and territorial polarisation 
became intertwined phenomena, affecting political fault-lines and allegiances 
during the Trusteeship period. This was especially apparent near the junction of 
the Somalia-Kenya and Somalia-Ethiopia frontiers and in Kismaayo. In these 
areas, political allegiances were far from being simplistically determined by 
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genealogical fault-lines; rather, they were shaped by long-standing governmental 
practices and, most importantly, by the lived experience of violence.   
In its early years, the Italian Administration attempted to assert its power 
and authority by rewarding Italy’s clients amongst clan chiefs, former soldiers and 
irregulars, and by supporting ‘pro-Italian’ political parties, while crushing the 
nationalist movement. Then, following the Kismaayo riot of August 1952 and its 
violent aftermath, the Italian Administration gradually began to co-opt 
‘moderates’ from within the Somali Youth League to make them useful allies. 
Meanwhile, the Italian officials in the Jubba Valley exploited and fomented inter-
communal rivalries for the purpose of manipulating Somali politics to their own 
advantage. They adopted the strategy of empowering those groups who were 
visible and powerful enough to appropriate territory as a means for asserting the 
Administration’s authority and advancing Italian interests in the borderland.    
This modus operandi was to play a crucial role in defining the modes of 
political participation in the second phase of the Italian Trusteeship 
Administration, after 1953, when outright repression gave way to political co-
optation. As we shall see in the next chapter, electoral procedures further 
strengthened the interplay of struggles related to deegaan, clanship, and political 
allegiances, closing down space for political mobilisation and radical social 
change in the process of nation building. This generated new tensions, ultimately 
undermining the legitimacy of the emerging nation state in the Somalia-Kenya 
borderland. In this troubled context, however, new possibilities for agency also 
emerged, especially for those Somalis who could exploit the local affordances of 






4 ELECTORAL POLITICS AND THE BORDER, 
1954-1960 
 
4.1 Cold War politics and the SYL 
In the midst of Somalia’s political tumult of the early 1950s, the global Cold War 
had a significant impact on the Italian Trusteeship Administration, as it prompted 
the reconfiguration of political order across north-eastern Africa and the Middle 
East. This began in May 1953, with the signing of the first of two defence 
agreements between the Ethiopian and the US governments, giving Ethiopia 
access to armaments while the USA were able to use bases in the Horn of 
Africa.476 In 1954, Britain then transferred the Somali-inhabited Haud and 
Reserved Area to Ethiopian control, an act that effectively recognised the Addis 
Ababa government as the West’s guarantor of the stability of the Horn. At the 
same time, the creation of the Baghdad Pact, continuing tensions between Israel 
and Egypt, and the American refusal to provide the Egyptian government with 
arms on Gamal Abd el-Nasser’s terms, led to a serious deterioration in 
Washington’s relations with Cairo.  In consequence, Egypt moved toward the 
Soviet bloc, signing an arms deal with the Czechoslovaks in the autumn of 1955.  
Earlier that same year, in April 1955, twenty-nine African and Asian countries 
met at the first Afro-Asian Non-Aligned Conference, in Bandung, to discuss the 
possible futures of the postcolonial world.  
News of all of these developments was now broadcast to the eastern Africa 
region by Sawt al-‘Arab, the ‘Voice of the Arabs’ – a Cairo-based Arabic-
language radio service that was launched on the first anniversary of the Egyptian 
revolution, in July 1953.  From the very beginning, as James Brennan has noted, 
broadcasts from the ‘Voice of the Arabs’ were widely listened to across East 
Africa, helping to collectively popularize a new political vocabulary of anti-
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colonialism and pan-Islamism.477  This had considerable influence on the 
emerging nationalisms of the region, not least in Mogadishu and throughout 
Somalia.  From 1952 onwards, ties to Nasser’s Egypt, in particular, were 
strengthened, first with the establishment of an Egyptian mission composed of 
teachers from al-Azhar University in Mogadishu, and then with Egyptian 
assistance being given to the development of numerous private schools in Somalia 
and scholarships being awarded to hundreds of young Somalis to travel to Egypt 
for education in schools and universities.478 In all of this, Cairo exploited its 
position inside UNACS to enhance its influence over Somalia’s politics.479 
These shifts in power balance at the regional and global levels 
reverberated on Somali politics, progressively augmenting the influence of 
external powers and creating divisions within the nationalist party. As Somalia 
passed the half-way mark under the Trusteeship toward its planned independence, 
the SYL leadership increasingly sought to align itself with the Italian 
Administration in order to win elections and more readily access positions of 
political responsibility. In the first general elections, completed in February 1956, 
the SYL won a decisive victory, securing 43 of the 60 Somali seats (a further 10 
seats being allotted to the European and Asian communities).  Of the remaining 
17 Somali seats, the Xisbiya Digil iyo Mirifle (HDM) took 13, while the Somali 
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Democratic Party (born out of the merger of six Samaale parties) secured 3 seats, 
and the Mareexaan Union one (in the border constituency of Luuq).480 
Although these elections were officially heralded as a great success, the 
voting procedure was one of indirect elections based on the traditional local clan 
assembly, the shir: no voters’ roll had been compiled, and so there was no register 
of voters.481 This opened the door to a range of irregularities and undemocratic 
practices, including the pre-emptive negotiation between parties in certain 
constituencies to ‘settle’ the outcome prior to the polls. The first all-Somali 
Cabinet formed by the SYL leader, Cabdulaahi Ciise Maxamuud, in May 1956 
was more the product of political deal-making than it was the outcome of electoral 
politics. In the meanwhile, Somalis were progressively promoted to posts of 
responsibility within the governmental system, the ‘Somalisation’ of the 
administrative service being completed in 1955 and that of the police in 1956. 
As the target date for independence approached, the Italian Administration 
adopted an increasingly conciliatory stance toward the SYL, while the League 
retreated from its anti-Italian attitude. This marriage of convenience, however, 
created further tensions within the nationalist party. These internal difficulties 
were greatly aggravated by growing popular discontent with the performance of 
the SYL government: the SYL had made too many promises in the elections of 
1956 that it now found difficult to deliver.482 A severe economic slump, which 
followed the 1956 Suez crisis, made matters far worse, as did the mounting 
uncertainty around the international politics of the region in the context of the 
Cold War. This already grim situation further deteriorated on 16 April 1957, with 
the murder in Mogadishu of the Egyptian representative to the Advisory Council, 
Muhammad Kamal al-Din Salah. A Somali student and former scholarship-holder 
in Cairo was later found guilty of the murder. Although the youngster claimed that 
he had acted out of personal vengeance, allegations were spread that the murder 
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had been politically motivated, and both the Italian Administration and the SYL 
government were publicly accused of having been involved in what many saw as 
a political assassination.483 
The SYL’s annual congress, held in May 1957, reflected the climate of 
disaffection and discord then enveloping the government and the majority party. 
Widespread discontent with the ruling elite within the SYL, whom many rank-
and-file supporters considered to be too subservient to the wider needs of the 
Italian administration and too complicit in the daily workings of the Government, 
provoked sweeping changes in the hierarchy of the party. Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen 
was now elected as President of the League.  Though he had formerly led the 
party, Xaaji Maxamed had left Somalia in 1952 to take up a scholarship in Cairo, 
where he had remained for five years.  During his time in Cairo, Xaaji Maxamed 
was a constant thorn in the side of both the Italian Administration and the SYL 
government in Mogadishu, publishing numerous critical press articles and making 
regular broadcasts on Sawt al-‘Arab.484 Perplexed by the complications this 
dramatic change in the party leadership created, the senior Italian Administrator of 
Somalia, Enrico Anzilotti, described the SYL as simultaneously comprising two 
quite different parties – the first a ‘moderate’ ruling party, and the second an 
agitating opposition party which espoused a revolutionary rhetoric.485 The 
confrontation within the League reflected different viewpoints on Somalia’s 
position in regional politics and in relation to the East-West rivalry of the Cold 
War, all of which was further fuelled by a variety of clan-based grievances. In his 
first speech in Mogadishu as the new SYL President, Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen 
caught the mood of these disputes but tried to unite his supporters behind a clearly 
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articulated position, declaring that ‘he intended to try to eliminate capitalistic 
influence in the Government’ and proclaiming Greater Somalia to be the central 
policy of the SYL.486 Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen stressed the importance of Muslim 
unity, and then, to the great alarm of observers from the West, he championed 
Somalia’s participation in the Bandung movement for Afro-Asian solidarity as an 
alternative to the relationship with Italy and her Cold War allies. 
To the Somali Government and the principal Western powers (Italy, 
Britain, France, and the United States), Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen’s promotion 
within the SYL was highly problematic, all the more so because he could not 
simply be dismissed as a hot-headed agitator or an Egyptian pawn. As the British 
Consul in Mogadishu wrote in March 1958, the SYL President was ‘no empty 
demagogue or rabble-rouser’, but ‘a man with a mission; a strong personality and 
a gifted orator’, who appealed both to the intellectual and to the crowd.487 Xaaji 
Maxamed Xuseen’s influence was such that the Government was on the verge of 
collapse and an open split in the League seemed imminent. This, however, was 
narrowly avoided, as in May 1958 the SYL Central Committee voted for the 
expulsion of Xaaji Maxamed from the party.488 According to British sources, 
former Fascist official Gualtiero Benardelli (see Chapter 2) was ultimately 
‘responsible for the rough and ready tactics used to throw the President of the 
SYL out of office’.489 In June, the SYL Congress elected Aadan Cabdule 
president of the League, by a bare majority of 44 to 42 votes.  Shortly after his 
expulsion, Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen created a new party, the Great Somalia League 
(GSL).  
The 1959 general elections were of paramount importance, as the term of 
office for the members of the new Legislative Assembly was established at five 
years, carrying Somalia into independence. The opposition parties vehemently 
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protested against this provision and against the new electoral law, which 
sanctioned the distribution of seats before the vote in the absence of a population 
census and an electoral roll. The Greater Somalia League and the Somali National 
Union (SNU), formerly the Banaadir Youth Union, formed an alliance with other 
opposition parties to boycott the elections. A few days before the poll, street 
fighting occurred in Mogadishu between the police and supporters of the Great 
Somalia League and the National Somali Union. The police carried out mass 
arrests of GSL and SNU members (281 people in total), including the presidents 
of both parties. This provoked further clashes, during which two people were 
killed and more than twenty were injured by the police.490 
The elections themselves were little more than a formality. Voting took 
place in only twelve out of the thirty districts of the Trust Territory: in the 
remaining eighteen districts, the SYL had been the only party to present a list – 
meaning that the SYL secured an absolute majority in the Assembly (57 seats out 
of 90) before the elections took place. The opposition, with the exception of seven 
members of the Xisbiya – which had meanwhile changed its name to Xisbiya 
Dastuur Mustaqiil Somaaliya (HDMS) – and two Liberal Party leaders, did not 
participate in the elections. The SYL took 83 seats, while two of the seven HDMS 
candidates were elected, along with two Liberal Party candidates.491 The SYL’s 
huge majority was strengthened further when, in the weeks following the 
elections, one HDMS deputy and the two Liberal Party deputies left the 
opposition to join the SYL ranks.492 
Following a heated debate among high-ranking officials, Italy chose not to 
unreservedly endorse the 1959 general elections as a complete success nor to 
adopt a ‘purely negative’ stance toward the Somali Government, especially 
because the official report on the elections compiled by the Ministry of Internal 
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Affairs had identified circumstances for which the Administration itself could be 
blamed.493 Although Italian diplomats unofficially admitted that voting had been 
marred by intrigues, pressures, abstentions, and conflicts, they chose to ascribe the 
‘mistakes’ and the ‘excesses’ that had taken place during the elections to ‘the 
relative inexperience of the Government and the Somali people’ with 
democracy.494 Denying any responsibility and blaming the supposed African 
unfamiliarity with democracy – no matter how limited the democratic exercise 
had been in Somalia – was the easy way out.  
The 1959 general elections signified the closure of Somalia’s political 
space, as SYL dominance now displaced the tumultuous multi-partyism of the 
previous years. The opposition parties petitioned various UN bodies to demand 
that the election be rerun before independence, which was planned for 1 July 
1960.  However, despite their unease with the processes of the election, the Italian 
Administration were now hemmed in by Cold War politics. Fearing that 
destabilizing (Egyptian and Communist) forces could make in-roads in Somalia 
and threaten Western interests in the region if a second poll was allowed, Italy, 
Britain, France, and the United States, with the tacit endorsement of the UN, all 
adopted a pragmatic and utilitarian stance. In deciding to bolster the position of 
the SYL, the Western allies brought Somalia to its independence knowing that its 




4.2 The 1956 elections in the Lower Jubba Province 
The year 1955 marked a turning point in the political trajectory of the Italian 
Trusteeship Administration. Following an unflattering report by the 1954 UN 
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Visiting Mission – ‘a bad-tempered and patronising document, but which 
contained too much truth to be ignored’, according to the British Consul in 
Mogadishu – a new team was appointed at the head of the Administration.495 The 
new Administrator, Enrico Anzilotti, was a career diplomat and had no colonial 
experience. Concerned only with performing a task that, apparently, was ‘not to 
his liking’, his policy was one of withdrawal, ‘with a view to putting on to the 
Somalis as much responsibility as rapidly as possible’.496 Towards the end of 
1955, Mr Anzilotti declared that by June 1956 the whole of the administration of 
the interior of the territory would be in Somali hands and that the new Territorial 
Council due to be elected in February 1956 would begin life as a fully-fledged 
Legislative Assembly. 
Although the Trusteeship Administration’s policy shifted from repression 
to selective co-optation, promoting the gradual opening of senior posts in all 
branches of the civil service to Somali officials, Italian settlers kept a firm grip on 
agricultural land and Somalia’s economy. In 1954, AFIS launched a seven-year 
development plan; this provided for a total expenditure of some 4 million US 
dollars, over half of which was meant for agricultural and livestock 
development.497 The principal export asset, however, remained the banana 
industry. This was controlled by the Italians, who had been running it as an Italian 
state monopoly since the 1930s.498 A 1953 technical report commissioned by the 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the Italian government was 
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aggravating the precarious state of Somalia’s economy by exclusively prioritizing 
the cultivation of bananas destined for export to Italy for ‘political reasons’.499 A 
draft bill for the abolition of the Royal Banana Monopoly Company, Regia 
Azienda Monopolio Banane (RAMB), created in 1935, was therefore presented to 
the Italian Finance Minister in July 1954.500 However, the ministerial apparatus 
managed to block the bill. RAMB only lost the ‘r’ for ‘royal’ (the Italian 
monarchy had been replaced with a Republic in 1946) and became AMB (Azienda 
Monopolio Banane). In 1955, the Banana Monopoly Company, under the 
protection of the Ministry of Finance, stipulated a new agreement with three 
associations of farmers in southern Somalia, including the Jubba Agriculturalists 
Association, Società Agricoltori Giuba (SAG); the Banana Monopoly Company 
undertook to purchase increasing quantities of bananas each year until 1960 at 
prices fixed by the agreement.501 The Company’s managing director, Edoardo 
Bottini, visited Somalia in the autumn of 1956.502 Bottini, former principal private 
secretary to Giulio Andreotti, then Minister of Finance, had a reputation for 
wheeling and dealing; he was later accused of taking a bribe for each kilogram of 
bananas imported from Lower Jubba to Italy.503 During his visit to Somalia, 
Bottini made a tour of the Italian farms in Lower Jubba and assured SAG 
members in Kismaayo that his visit, which had been ‘encouraged by the Italian 
government and particularly by Minister Andreotti’, was the best demonstration 
of Rome’s willingness to support Italian banana producers.504 
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The Banana Monopoly Company had a twofold purpose. On the one hand, 
the weaker Somalia’s economy became as the result of unsustainable one-crop 
farming, the more easily Italian settlers would obtain the support of the future 
Somali government to perpetuate their privilege after the end of the Italian 
Administration. If banana exports had suddenly stopped, several thousand Somali 
workers, already suffering from very poor working conditions, would have lost 
their jobs, and Somalia would have been deprived of its main source of revenue, 
which was indispensable for paying for the industrial imports (mainly from Italy) 
the nascent country desperately needed. On the other hand, the banana economy 
could be used as a playing card in the Cold-War context to prevent communist 
countries from penetrating the Horn of Africa.505 
By 1957, about half of the Trust Territory’s revenue came from direct 
grants from Italy and most of the rest from Italian-subsidised exports of 
bananas.506 Although ‘this was an arrangement which […] satisfied for the time 
being many different interests’ – as Ioan Lewis put it –, this was also a deliberate 
policy of underdevelopment and economic dependence.507 Moreover, with the 
revival of the banana export industry in the 1950s, land disputes became 
increasingly frequent, particularly in Jamaame District, where multiple incidents 
occurred in the spring of 1955.508 In this area, about four thousand people had 
been allegedly ‘deprived of their own land in favour of Italian individuals or 
Italian private companies’ since the beginning of the Italian Trusteeship 
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Administration, according to an official statement by Cabdulaahi Ciise.509 
Recently declassified documents from the Historical-Diplomatic Archives of the 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirm the veracity of the land grabbing 
accusation, although they do not provide exact figures on the number of people 
who were dispossessed.510 These factors, linked to Lower Jubba’s political 
economy, influenced the conduct of the first Somali general elections in 1956 and, 
more generally, the way of doing politics in the Province.511 
Lower Jubba provides a good case study to investigate how the political 
economy of decolonisation conditioned access to the political arena during the 
1956 elections, and to examine the key role that the issue of deegaan played in the 
electoral process. The Province was divided into three electoral districts: 
Kismaayo, Margherita-Gelib (Jamaame-Jilib), and Afmadoow. This region was – 
and still is – characterised by the interlocking of different socio-economic, 
ecological and cultural systems encompassing nomadic pastoralism (from beyond 
Kismaayo’s sand dunes up to Afmadoow), agro-pastoralism, sedentary and 
plantation agriculture (along the Jubba River), and the coastal economy 
gravitating around Kismaayo.  This economic geography corresponded to an 
equally composite social setting, as we saw in Chapter 1.  
Throughout the summer and autumn of 1955, indirect elections, which 
took the form of shirarka (plural of shir, the traditional clan assembly), were held 
outside municipal districts. People in rural areas simultaneously voted for the 
renewal of their customary leaders, who would sit in the local District Council, 
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and to appoint the electoral representatives (‘great electors’) who would vote, 
together with people in municipal districts, in the election of the Legislative 
Assembly on 29 February 1956. As sheegad people had no political voice in the 
shir, they had no choice but to abide by the will of their patrons, who collectively 
selected the clan’s representatives in the District Council and the district’s 
electoral representatives. Moreover, the territorial demarcation of constituencies 
as well as the recognition of the groups entitled to vote in each shir – and, 
consequently, the territorial distribution of seats – were based roughly on the 
‘Italian map’ of ‘tribes’, that is to say on the mapping of the territorial distribution 
of clans – ‘tribes’ in most Italian sources – that the Italian colonial administration 
had created.512 
The 1956 elections, therefore, muddled up party politics with clan politics. 
In the electoral districts of Kismaayo and Jamaame-Jilib, characterised by a 
composite social environment, political parties competed for territorial control. 
Three parties presented candidate lists in Kismaayo, namely the Somali Youth 
League, the Xisbiya Digil iyo Mirifle, and the Bajuni Youth Fikirini party; two 
parties ran candidates in Jamaame-Jilib, the Xisbiya and the SYL. In Afmadoow, 
dominated by the Daarood/Ogaadeen clan, only one list of SYL candidates was 
presented.513 The Trusteeship Administration’s decision to adjust the stipend of 
the customary chiefs elected in each shir proportionally to the number of people 
participating in the election induced widespread irregularities.514 Most of the 
shirarka held in Kismaayo and Afmadoow in September 1955 were annulled, 
because of the inflated number of registered participants.515 Only a few 
assemblies, however, were re-held. In the great majority of cases, the 
Administration reached an agreement with local clan groups based on low 
estimates of the number of participants in each shir, thereby distorting the 
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numerical weight of the vote each electoral representative would cast, and, 
consequently, the number of seats assigned to each constituency.516 
In various ways, the selection process for the 1956 elections was rigged. In 
Lower Jubba, the SYL limited its involvement in the designation of the District 
Council members, while making every effort to secure the highest possible 
number of electoral representatives voting for the party. The SYL reached a 
compromise with the chiefs, who were so keen to be re-appointed (and stay on the 
Administration’s payroll), that they would willingly abstain from interfering in the 
selection of electoral representatives.517 In the district of Jamaame-Jilib, the SYL 
and the HDM struck a deal: the Xisbiya would get the District Council members, 
while the electoral representatives would go to the League.518 Once the shirarka 
had been concluded and the electoral representatives designated, both parties 
sought to consolidate their positions. In December 1955, prominent SYL leaders, 
including Xaaji Muuse Boqor (Daarood/Majeerteen), toured the Lower Jubba 
Province. Having been reassured by the electoral representatives that Kismaayo 
district’s votes would go to the SYL, the visiting delegation managed to secure the 
nomination of a member of the League from Mogadishu, a Daarood/Majeerteen, 
as one of the two candidates at the top of the party list who would take the two 
seats assigned to Kismaayo in the Legislative Assembly.519 
In some cases, those who were identified by party committees, due to 
political calculations, as suitable candidates were unwilling to sit in the 
Legislative Assembly.520 For instance, Salaad Cabdi Maxamuud 
(Daarood/Majeerteen/Cismaan Maxamuud), the first candidate on the SYL list in 
Kismaayo, was initially very reluctant to accept nomination.521 Salaad had 
previously served in the BMA’s police force and had been convicted of 
misappropriation of funds. He had later become a trader, following the return of 
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the Italians, and had been eventually employed by the Italian shipping company 
Dogliani.522 According to a well-informed source from Kismaayo, Salaad Cabdi 
initially thought that his job as a Dogliani employee was better than becoming a 
member of the Legislative Assembly. Unsure of his future as a political 
representative, Salaad Cabdi was afraid of losing his job. However, his employer, 
Dogliani, who was a member of the electoral committee of the Italian Community 
in Kismaayo for the election of the representatives of minority communities in the 
Assembly, pushed Salaad to accept the nomination.523 The rationale was simple: if 
Salaad Cabdi Maxamuud was elected, Dogliani would have a backer in the 
Legislative Assembly.524 Salaad Cabdi was subsequently elected as a Member of 
the Assembly, and appointed Minister of Financial Affairs in Cabdulaahi Ciise’s 
first government in May 1956. Three years later, following the 1959 general 
elections, he became Assembly Member for Qardho (Bari region).525 
The designation of Xuseen Cumar Xasan ‘Jiis’ (Ogaadeen/Bahgari) as the 
second candidate on the SYL list in Jamaame-Jilib, also reveals the set of criteria 
adopted for the selection of candidates.526 Xuseen Cumar Xasan was a trader. He 
started his business with a small farm producing grains, and then acquired a big 
farm in Kamsuuma. All shops and guesthouses in the village belonged to him and 
the local people worked for him – ‘he owned the place’, according to a Somali 
informant.527 He used to assist Sheekh Nuur, a ‘holy man’ who lived in Beled 
Kariim, a small village on the Jubba River’s right bank, opposite Jilib. According 
to a Somali source from Kismaayo, Sheekh Nuur exercised dominating influence 
over the Bantu people in the area; Xuseen ‘Jiis’, on his part, arranged and paid for 
everything the sheikh needed.528 Xuseen’s farms were on Bantu land, which he 
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had bought – or, rather, grabbed – using violence. He used to threaten the Gosha – 
he allegedly killed one of them on his farm – but would also help them with 
money.529 According to oral testimonies, clanship did not matter to Xuseen ‘Jiis’: 
‘I’m not Ogaadeen, I’m Jareer’ [the Somali pejorative term for Gosha] – he 
would say sarcastically.530 He wanted the Gosha people, who represented the 
numerically largest community in the area, to back him, and used his power to this 
effect. Moreover, he was well known amongst the Italian concessionaires. He 
worked for them as an agent, looking after their farms in the Jilib area.531 
The Italian settlers, who feared they would have to leave Somalia after 
independence and wanted to protect their interests, used their money and 
influence locally to convince the Somalis to support the candidates who were 
most likely to ‘work for the Italians’ in the Assembly in Mogadishu. Xuseen ‘Jiis’ 
was elected as a member of the Legislative Assembly in the electoral district of 
Jamaame-Jilib in 1956 and was re-elected (rather, re-appointed as there was only 
one list of candidates) in Jilib in 1959.532 He was one of the first Somalis to 
register a farm with the Jubba Agriculturalists Association (SAG) in 1957 and to 
be assigned a banana export quota (2,400 quintals).533 The first candidate on the 
SYL list in Jamaame-Jilib, Sheekh Cabdi ‘Faghi’ Cadow (Dir/Biimaal), was also 
involved in the local plantation economy.534 In the Jamaame-Jilib area, the Italians 
had been relying on the Dir/Biimaal for the provision of labour power since the 
1920s and numerous Biimaal worked for the Italians as gangers, ‘caporali’. As 
Sheekh Cabdi’s nephew pointed out, ‘the Italians didn’t touch the Biimaal’, as 
‘the Jareer worked for the Biimaal. We owned them. When the Italians needed 
people to work, the Biimaal sent the Jareer’.535 
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It may be argued that this was the rationale behind the selection of 
candidates: on the one hand, traditional authorities stood behind those party 
candidates who were well-connected and could act as power-brokers both locally 
and at the state’s centre; on the other hand, those who were identified as suitable 
candidates, and therefore needed money to buy the chiefs’ support, relied on the 
backing of Italian corporate groups in exchange for protecting Italian interests.536 
Thanks to this tactic, the SYL won all the seats that were allocated to the three 
electoral districts of Kismaayo, Jamaame-Jilib, and Afmadoow.537 
 
 
4.3 The 1958 municipal elections 
Cold War politics drew foreign actors into Somali affairs further during the late 
1950s, as east-west competition for influence in the Horn intensified.  Far from 
being a purely a local affair, the municipal elections of October 1958 attracted a 
great deal of foreign interference. The polls followed months of covert 
negotiations between Italy, Great Britain, France and the United States regarding 
the extent of future foreign assistance to Somalia. Between February and May 
1958, London and Rome came to an agreement on a joint strategy on Western aid 
to the Somali Government during the first years after independence. This strategy, 
which was intended to put pressure on the SYL to renounce radical aspirations 
and to stay within the Western camp, was then endorsed by France and the USA. 
Washington, in particular, stressed the need for some form of Western 
coordination in the public announcement of foreign aid offers, ‘to ensure 
maximum impact on Somali voters’ ahead of the municipal elections.538 Between 
July and the end of September 1958, the Somali Government thus received formal 
offers of economic and technical assistance and of support to the cultural sector 
from the United States and Britain. However, on 12 October, a few days before 
the municipal elections, the Italian Administrator notified the Somali Prime 
Minister that Italian aid to Somalia for the first years after independence would 
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amount to two million US dollars in total.539 Administrator Di Stefano also 
reassured the Somali Prime Minister about Italy’s intention to continue to absorb 
Somalia’s banana production after 1960.      
In the run-up to the municipal elections, political competition between the 
SYL, the newly created Great Somalia League (GSL), and the Xisbiya, which had 
changed its name to Xisbiya Dastuur Mustaqiil Somaaliya (HDMS), ‘Somali 
Independent Constitutional Party’, was particularly intense in the Lower Jubba 
Province. The Great Somalia League received significant support in Jamaame and 
Kismaayo, as a lot of jobseekers had drifted into these towns, particularly 
Kismaayo, from the surrounding rural areas but had quickly become disillusioned 
when no employment materialised. According to British intelligence sources, 
these people readily turned against the SYL government.540 However, Xaaji 
Maxamed Xuseen claimed that the Ethiopian Consul-General, during a visit to the 
Lower and Upper Jubba Provinces, had given large sums of money to Daarood 
chiefs and had promised them that Addis Ababa would allow the SYL to reopen 
its branches in the Ogaadeen region, provided that they would continue to oppose 
the Great Somalia League.541 Very large sums of money were indeed spent on the 
municipal elections. According to a confidential report by the British Consul in 
Mogadishu, the Italians were said to have spent a lot on the SYL, with smaller 
contributions from the Americans; the Ethiopians were reported to have given the 
anti-SYL Liberal Party generous financial aid; while the Americans had allegedly 
given substantially to the HDMS.542 
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Election results showed a relative swing away from the SYL, which won 
416 seats out of 663 in forty-five municipalities, towards the HDMS and the GSL. 
This marked a gain of 36 seats in nine municipalities where it ran candidates. 
Both the Somali Prime Minister and the new Italian Administrator, Ambassador 
Mario Di Stefano, who had arrived in Mogadishu only in the autumn, were 
concerned about these results; they agreed that ‘there was no time to lose’, as the 
general elections were due to take place in March 1959.543 The Ambassador knew 
that unless the upcoming elections produced a Government ‘prepared to wind up 
the mandatory period in friendly collaboration with the Italian Administration, the 
outlook for Italian interests in post-independence Somalia looked grim indeed’.544 
Therefore, against the advice of his predecessor’s councillors, Di Stefano chose to 
back the incumbent Somali Government whatever the cost. Cabdulaahi Ciise, 
realising that ‘he stood no chance of obtaining a working majority in the 




4.4 The 1959 general election in the Jubba Valley 
The 1959 general elections are perhaps best described as a sad farce. In the Lower 
Jubba Province, voting took place only in Jamaame and Kismaayo, where the 
SYL won all but one of the seats.546 In Afmadoow and Jilib, the SYL candidates 
automatically became deputies, as no other party stood against the Somali Youth 
League. 
All the Assembly members for Afmadoow were Daarood/Ogaadeen. Two 
of them, Sheekh Maxamuud Maxamed Faarax (Ogaadeen/Maxamed Subeer/Reer 
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Cabdulle/Malingur), an AFIS employee, and Cusmaan Maxamuud Ibraahim 
(Ogaadeen/Maxamed Subeer/Reer Cabdulle/Reer Caamir), a trader, had 
previously been elected in 1956.547 Cusmaan Maxamuud was also well known as 
a participant in local smuggling networks, as he sold wild animal skins acquired 
from poachers who came in from Kenya.548 Informants recall that candidates in 
Afmadoow had been chosen in such a way that each of the powerful sections 
within the Ogaadeen/Maxamed Subeer sub-clan, which was dominant in the area, 
was allocated a seat in the Assembly.549 In Jilib, Xuseen Cumar Xasan ‘Jiis’ 
(Daarood/Ogaadeen/Bahgari) was returned unopposed, together with Cali Gaal 
Afrax (Hawiye/Abgaal), a government employee. Cali Gaal, like most Abgaal 
who lived in Lower Jubba, had arrived in Kismaayo in the late 1920s with the 
Italian colonial administration. At that time, he worked as a driver for the Italian 
colonial troops. Under the Trusteeship Administration, he managed the 
government’s transport fleet in Kismaayo together with his twin brother.550 With 
the money he had earned from this job, Cali Gaal bought land and established a 
farm in Jilib, but he was not involved in the banana trade. Like Xuseen ‘Jiis’, Cali 
Gaal had powerful influence on the local Bantu people.551 His family also owned 
a vast plot of land in Garas Balley (Lower Shabelle region).552 Of the three 
Assembly Members for Jamaame, Cali Ciise Cali (Hawiye/Habargidir) and Xaaji 
Aadan ‘Caashir’ Samatar (Daarood/Majeerteen/Cumar Maxamuud) were traders, 
while Sheekh Ibraahim Cumar (Dir/Biimaal) was a district judge (qaadi).553 Both 
Cali Ciise Cali and Xaaji Aadan ‘Caashir’ had started as foremen on the cotton 
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plantations of a powerful Italian company, Società Romana.554 In Kismaayo, the 
SYL won two seats, while the Xisbiya Dastuur Mustaqiil as-Soomaal (HDMS) 
obtained one seat.555 The two SYL seats in Kismaayo went to Ibraahim Cusmaan 
Abuukar ‘Unlaaye’, a big trader, and Ibraahim Xaaji Muuse, a government 
employee, both Daarood/Majeerteen. The Xisbiya candidate, Maxamed Aadan 
‘Shaacir’ (Hawiye/Gaaljecel) was a trader and a former SYL supporter. The SYL, 
though, had discouraged him from standing as a candidate in Kismaayo in the 
1959 elections, essentially because he was not Majeerteen, although his mother 
was.556 Nevertheless, Maxamed ‘Shaacir’ ‘won, despite the odds against him’, as 
Cabdi Ismaaciil Samatar has remarked.557 
‘Shaacir’’s victory constitutes an interesting case. In Kismaayo, the SYL 
had always designated Daarood/Majeerteen candidates (sometimes from other 
regions), as they constituted the dominant group, in terms of wealth and political 
power, in the district. This did not automatically imply, though, that they 
represented the numerical majority. The Majeerteen were the most ‘visible’ 
people in Kismaayo, due to their social connections and economic clout. 
However, Hawiye (or Hawiye-affiliated) groups, mainly Gaaljecel, Cawrmale, 
and Shiikhaal, and ‘fragments’ of the Digil/Dabarre and the Mirifle/Gelidle, who 
were sheegad to the Majeerteen and the Ogaadeen, largely contributed to the 
Daarood’s demographic weight in Kismaayo District.558 Nonetheless, these 
groups had no political visibility, as being sheegad meant being represented by 
someone else. In 1957, tensions erupted in the Xarti ‘tribal area’ adjoining the 
southern stretch of the Kenya-Somalia border, in connection with the 
announcement of a pre-electoral census. The sheegad groups in the area insisted 
on their right to ‘retain their tribal authority’, independent of the Xarti elders.559 
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The Provincial Commissioner, Nuur Axmed Cabdulle ‘Kastelli’, tried to settle the 
dispute by imposing the SYL line of Somali citizenship as opposed to clan-based 
allegiances. This seriously annoyed the Xarti and the situation became so tense 
that the PC arrested fourteen elders, seven from each side, and called in the riot 
squads from Mogadishu to disarm the tribal police. The President of the 
Legislative Assembly intervened to restore law and order. The Gaaljecel and other 
sheegad groups in Kismaayo District were SYL supporters, but only Majeerteen 
candidates could make it to the top of the party’s list. This explains why in the 
1959 elections the Hawiye, along with some Bantus and Warday, plus a few 
Ogaadeen who were disgruntled with the Majeerteen, regrouped behind Maxamed 
‘Shaacir’ and the Xisbiya.560 By exploiting the tensions between sheegad and their 
patrons, the Xisbiya managed to win a seat in Kismaayo. 
The political geography emerging from the 1959 elections in Lower Jubba 
reflected socio-economic cleavages and the social division of labour in the region. 
The clan affiliation of the newly elected Assembly members was revealing in this 
respect. The Daarood/Majeerteen, who got two seats in Kismaayo and one in 
Jamaame, were mostly government employees and traders representing the 
Somali business elite in Kismaayo District. The Daarood/Ogaadeen, who got all 
the seats in Afmadoow and one in Jilib, were mostly pastoralists, sometimes agro-
pastoralists, middlemen and traders who lived in the area comprised between the 
Jubba River and the border with Kenya. Ogaadeen traders and middlemen acted 
as intermediaries between rural areas in the interior and Xarti traders on the coast. 
Xarti and Ogaadeen were also those who benefited the most from the cross-border 
economy in Lower Jubba. In the late 1940s, a limited number of 
Ogaadeen/Maxamed Subeer and Xarti traders had been granted licenses by the 
British government in Kenya to bring a yearly quota of cattle into Lamu 
District.561 Also, traders from north-eastern Kenya, especially Garissa, regularly 
sold ivory to Xarti traders in Kismaayo.562 Majeerteen men often married 
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Ogaadeen women to strengthen the connections between the two clans and buy 
livestock from the Ogaadeen more easily. As for the Hawiye/Abgaal, 
Hawiye/Habargidir and Dir/Biimaal elected in Jamaame and Jilib, they 
represented an emerging class of government employees, businessmen, and farm 
owners. Abgaal and Habargidir (Hiraab Hawiye) were the only clans in the 
Hawiye family who were not sheegad in Lower Jubba.  
The political economy of the Province also played an important role in 
another respect. Although no major disturbances took place outside Mogadishu 
during the elections, some incidents occurred in Lower Jubba. On 6 March 1959, 
a man identified as a Great Somalia League (GSL) ‘extremist’, who admitted 
possessing a supply of four home-made bombs that were later recovered by the 
police, was arrested in Jamaame. He confessed that he had planned to carry out 
terrorist attacks during the elections. He had allegedly been instructed to blow up 
the fuel storage sites of the nearby Italian plantations, and to launch acts of 
sabotage against Società Romana and the American Protestant Mission in 
Tografa.563 The suspected ‘terrorist’, as the Italian authorities labelled him, also 
confessed that other individuals, allegedly all supporters of the Great Somalia 
League, had received similar instructions. Twenty-one people were then arrested 
in Jamaame and sixteen hand-grenades were recovered in the area between 
Jamaame and Jilib on 6 and 7 March.564 The fact that this area had been chosen as 
a ‘terrorist target’ was no coincidence. Resentment against the Government and 
the Administration had festered in Jamaame, as this District, which was at the 
heart of the settler economy in Lower Jubba, had been plagued by land conflicts 
and labour exploitation since the 1930s.  
Luuq District also became a hotspot of political violence in the aftermath 
of the general elections. The combination of clan and territorial polarisation and 
of political factionalism was particularly problematic in the District, due to its 
complex social fabric and to trans-border movements. In April 1959, the Upper 
Jubba Regional Judge refused to validate election results in Luuq District. This 
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decision followed complaints by members of the local branch of the Xisbiya 
Dastuur Mustaqiil as-Soomaal about severe irregularities which had allegedly 
been committed to the advantage of the SYL during the elections. It was found 
that several people from Baardheere, an electoral constituency that was ‘totally 
different from Luuq’ in terms of clan composition – the Regional Judge remarked 
– had gone to vote in Serenleh (which was part of Luuq’s constituency) for the 
SYL.565 The Ogaadeen/Cawlyahan chief Bashiir Salad admitted that he had voted 
in Serenleh for the candidates of the Luuq branch of the SYL, instead of voting in 
Baardheere. Baardheere’s mayor, Shariif Cabdulaahi Shariif Cabdiraxmaan, who 
was also a member of the League’s local branch, confirmed that people from his 
town had voted for the SYL in Luuq, adding that this had followed an agreement 
between the local representatives of the SYL in Baardheere and Luuq. Cawlyahan 
members and sympathisers of the League in Baardheere had been publicly asked 
to vote for the party in Luuq – so that the votes of the Ogaadeen/Cawlyahan, who 
staked claims to territory in Serenleh, could outnumber the votes of other clans in 
the strategic Luuq constituency. Local SYL representatives later testified that 
many of them had voted more than once and that the same kind of irregularities, 
always to the advantage of the SYL, had occurred in Ceelwaaq.566 
The vote re-run was scheduled to take place from 11 to 15 January 1960. 
The central leadership of the HDMS, which claimed to be the legitimate 
representative of the Digil iyo Mirifle, clearly recommended abstention from the 
elections. This notwithstanding, on 18 November 1959, two lists of HDMS 
candidates were presented in Luuq, each group claiming to be the sole and 
legitimate representatives of the HDMS. The District Commissioner accepted the 
first list which had been presented and rejected the other one. The situation 
became even more confused when some representatives of the Somali Youth 
League attempted to interfere in the internal squabbles of the HDMS, favouring 
the acceptance of one of the two lists. As a result of local negotiations between the 
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two opposing factions, a single list of four HDMS candidates was eventually 
presented. The frontrunner was Macalin Cumar Maxamed (Digil iyo 
Mirifle/Raxanweyn), who had already stood for election in March 1959. A few 
days later, the SYL presented a list of four candidates as well. The first two names 
on the list were those of the candidates who had been elected in March but whose 
appointment had been invalidated, Yuusuf Shire Barre and Xaaji Jaamac 
Cabdulaahi (both Mareexaan).567 
On 5 January 1960, less than one week away from the election re-run, 
Macalin Cumar (Raxanweyn), the first candidate on the HDMS list, was stabbed 
to death. Faarax Xasan Maxamed, a 34-year-old unemployed Mareexaan from 
Dhuusamareeb (in the Galgaduud region in central Somalia) was identified as the 
perpetrator and immediately arrested. An after-dusk curfew was imposed in 
Luuq.568 The murder of the HDMS candidate generated a lot of rumours and 
speculation. The opposition claimed that the killer was a member of the majority 
party, while the SYL contended that he had been sent by the opposition parties 
which boycotted the elections.569 Macalin Cumar was a member of the faction led 
by the five HDMS candidates who had been elected to the Legislative Assembly 
in March 1959. This group was fiercely opposed by another faction within the 
HDMS that belonged to the so-called ‘Devil’s Pact’, which had boycotted the 
elections along with the GSL and the Somali National Union.570 The police 
swiftly arrested six people, suspected of having ordered the killing of Macalin 
Cumar. Among these, five allegedly belonged to the SYL (one of them was the 
secretary of Luuq’s town hall, three others were employees of the district 
administration, and one was a school teacher). The sixth person apprehended was 
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a member of the HDMS.571 Three more people were arrested a few days later. 
Among these was Xaaji Cabdi Jaamac ‘Fartaag’, second candidate on the SYL list 
and former member of the Legislative Assembly (he had been elected with the 
Mareexaan Union in 1956). Nearly all the people arrested belonged to the 
Mareexaan clan, the same of the alleged murderer’s. 
Italian officials formulated three main hypotheses. First, the killing had 
been ordered and planned from within the SYL branch in Luuq or within the 
League’s inner group led by the second candidate on the party list, Xaaji Cabdi 
Jaamac. Second, the murder had been organized by the Great Somalia League, 
which had then cleverly managed to convince several SYL supporters who had a 
vested interest in the election re-run to get involved in planning the assassination. 
Third, the murder had been conceived and organized by the Great Somalia 
League, which had ordered the perpetrator to identify, after his arrest, members of 
the SYL as the murder’s instigators. To complicate matters further, it was reported 
that the members of the GSL branch in Luuq, most of whom were Mareexaan, had 
recently joined the SYL. They allegedly participated in all the League’s political 
and electoral meetings due to inter-clan competition and with the purpose of 
counteracting the Luuq chapter of the HDMS, which was considered by the 
members of the ‘Devil’s Pact’ to be a dissident faction.572 
Although it has been impossible so far to determine which of the three 
Italian hypotheses was correct, the murder of the HDMS candidate is revealing of 
the dangerous tensions which resulted from the entanglement of inter-clan 
rivalries and competition between parties (and factions within parties) during and 
after the 1959 elections. These tensions emerged at the intersection of local 
struggles for control of deegaan – as a means of getting access to the negotiation 
of resources and power both in the borderland and the state’s centre – and of the 
on-going definition of the balance of power at the national level.  
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4.5 Negotiating political authority across the border 
As political parties depended on the support of clans, traditional authorities 
actively participated in negotiating the state, capitalising on shifting allegiances 
and trying to exploit the border’s affordances to advance their own political and 
economic goals. The following two stories, involving Suldaan Cali Axmed 
Magan ‘Sokor’ (Ogaadeen/Maxamed Subeer/Reer Cabdulle) and Chief Xaaji 
Xasan (Daarood/Mareexaan/Cali Dheere), are revealing in this regard. 
In December 1956, some representatives of the Ogaadeen clan who were 
living in Somalia crossed the border and went to Garissa and Wajir districts. 
Although according to the PC, Northern Frontier Province, none of them were 
important Ogaadeen tribal leaders, the delegation bore a letter from the Ogaadeen 
Suldaan Cali Axmed Magan ‘Sokor’.573 In that letter, the Suldaan imparted his 
view on the situation in Somalia and gave instructions to the Ogaadeen in the 
Northern Frontier Province regarding the stance they should adopt in dealing with 
politics in the Trust Territory. The letter pointed to the continuing competition 
between the Xarti and the Ogaadeen and announced that the delegation of 
Ogaadeen representatives would also visit Jamaame, Afmadoow, and Baardheere 
to shore up support for the clan. Suldaan Cali ‘Sokor’ warned the Kenya 
Ogaadeen, who were said to be willing to endorse the Somali Government, that 
the Xarti wished to ‘take over the Government’ and had sent a message to Gamal 
Abd el-Nasser ‘to say that we [the Somali people] are fully behind him’.574 Cali 
‘Sokor’ urged the Ogaadeen in the Northern Province, particularly those who 
owned livestock, to support him and Ogaadeen interests in former Jubaland. The 
letter then stated that one of the Suldaan’s sons had begun to send cattle to the 
Ogaadeen in Garissa and Wajir. The Suldaan’s orders were to sell the cattle, 
transfer the proceeds to him, and not to sell any livestock to either Arabs or ‘alien’ 
Somalis (especially Xarti) who would then take it down the livestock route 
managed by the government-controlled African Livestock Marketing 
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Organization (ALMO): ‘Do not let these traders come to your Bomas’ [livestock 
enclosures] – Cali ‘Sokor’ requested.575 
According to British sources, the Suldaan was ‘disgruntled with the 
Italians and had asked the British Consul in Mogadishu John Gethin ‘to help him 
engineer the transfer of his people and their land apparently to Kenya’.576 
Dissatisfied with Gethin’s dismissive response to his request, the Suldaan decided 
to visit friends in Nairobi to discuss his idea. In April 1957, he requested a visa for 
visiting Kenya, but his application was refused.577 By August, though, Cali 
‘Sokor’ had obtained a passport. He reportedly intended to travel to Kenya by sea, 
visit Nairobi, and then proceed to Garissa and Wajir to see the DCs as well as the 
leaders of the Ogaadeen sections in those districts. Special Branch officers 
presumed that the purpose of the Suldaan’s visit was ‘connected with his search 
for an ally against the Herti tribespeople’, who represented the largest part of the 
cadre of officials in south-western Somalia.578 
Since January 1957, the principal Ogaadeen chiefs in southern Somalia 
and the chiefs of Maxamed Subeer in the Northern Frontier Province had persisted 
in their wish to petition the Kenya Government on the subject of what Kennaway, 
Provincial Commissioner, NFP, termed ‘the movement for Ogaden unity’.579  This 
was not simply rooted in the age-long competition between the Ogaadeen and 
Xarti clans in Lower Jubba, as British officials assumed; it was, rather, the result 
of conflicts over the appropriation of territory and of the subsequent displacement 
of people in the Kenya-Somalia and Somalia-Ethiopia frontiers. Writing to the 
Secretary for Defence in April 1957, Mr Kennaway remarked: 
 
It would appear that the Ogaden leaders, particularly the Mohamed 
Zubeir, are interested in the unification of the Ogaden tribes in one area. 
 
575 Ibid. 
576 KNA, DC/WAJ5/5/2, Hampden-King to Neil, 13 April 1957. 
577 KNA, DC/WAJ 5/5/2, Neil to Hampden-King, 25 April 1957. 
578 KNA, DC/WAJ 5/5/2, Asst. Superintendent of Police, i/c Special Branch, NFP, to Ag. 
Senior Asst. Commissioner of Police, i/c Special Branch, 13 August 1957. 
579 KNA, DC/WAJ 5/5/2, Kennaway, PC Northern Frontier Province to Secretary for 
Defence, 9 April 1957. 
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The fact that they claim to want British protection is purely incidental to 
this primary aim. This aim has been the subject of clandestine 
negotiations between Chiefs in Garissa District and Chiefs in the Jubba 
Provinces, since January this year. Superimposed on this movement for 
Ogaden unity is the matter of the Beledwein Ogaden Somali expatriates 
from Ethiopia, who are endeavouring to obtain support for the excision 
of their grazing lands from Ethiopia. There is considerable animosity 
directed by the Ogaden against the Herti and Hawiya particularly over 
such matters as stock, trading, water supplies and the like. Such 
animosity is of little political significance.580 
 
In his remarks, the Provincial Commissioner overlooked some important 
factors, namely the local implications of ongoing political developments in 
Somalia, the way in which these were challenging the authority of some 
traditional chiefs, and conflicts linked to the control of deegaan. Oral testimonies 
suggest that tensions had emerged between Suldaan Cali ‘Sokor’ and other 
Ogaadeen chiefs in Lower Jubba following the return of the Italians. Cali ‘Sokor’ 
initially supported the SYL. He was a nationalist, though also a ‘nomadic 
conservative’, and did not like the Italian Trusteeship Administration.581 
Cabdisalaan Sheekh, a former soldier who had fought in the Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia and belonged to the same sub-clan (Maxamed Subeer/Reer Cabdulle) as 
Suldaan Cali ‘Sokor’, had been awarded honorary knighthood, with the title of 
‘cavaliere’.582 The Suldaan was younger than Cabdisalaan Sheekh, who was a 
member of the council of elders and the commander of the Ogaadeen clan’s 
militia in Afmadoow. The son of a ‘holy man’ and closely associated with the 
Italians, Cabdisalaan sought to challenge Cali Sokor’s authority, giving orders to 
the capi qabila and the Suldaan as well.583 
 
580 Ibid. 
581 Interview with Khaliif Santuur Gooloo (Ogaadeen/Maxamed Subeer), Garissa, 1 June 
2015. 
582 Ibid. 
583 Interviews with Xasan Xaaji Shafad, Nairobi, Islii, 23 May 2015, and Maxamed 
Aamiin, Nairobi, Islii, 25 May 2015. 
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The tension between the customary authority of the Suldaan and the 
authority of the clan heads who had been appointed by the Italian Trusteeship 
Administration was also noticeable in the relationship between Cali ‘Sokor’ and 
the Ogaadeen chief Santuur Gooloo. The latter (also Ogaadeen/Maxamed 
Suuber/Reer Cabdulle) represented the Ogaadeen Suldaan, who reportedly 
preferred to stay in rural areas, in Kismaayo; he therefore claimed authority over 
all the Ogaadeen groups in the town, taking positions that were sometimes in 
contrast with the Suldaan’s views – according to Santuur’s son Khaliif.584 
Determining precisely the scope of the authority of Cali ‘Sokor’ and Santuur 
Gooloo is problematic, as the current ‘revival’ of traditional authorities in 
Jubaland, in connection with the implementation of federalism, has made 
historical claims to chieftaincy a hot issue. What is clear, though, is that Santuur 
Gooloo, like Cabdisalaan Sheekh, had a privileged connection with the Italians. 
He was a former militia leader (‘capo banda’) who had fought in the Italo-
Ethiopian war. After Ethiopia’s defeat, he had been sent to Turin, in Italy, in his 
quality of representative of the banda fighters of Basso Giuba, as a token of the 
Italian Government’s appreciation for his service. After he returned to Kismaayo, 
Santuur Gooloo was elected ugaas (clan-head) by the Ogaadeen, ‘because he 
could speak Italian and had a good relationship with the Italians’, oral testimonies 
suggest.585 In the context of the difficult relationship between the Suldaan and the 
chiefs recognised by the Italians, the appeal for Ogaadeen unity across the 
Somalia-Kenya border gave Suldaan Cali ‘Sokor’ the opportunity to re-assert his 
own authority as the clan’s paramount chief, presenting himself as the champion 
of the Ogaadeen cause. 
As political turmoil following the appointment of the first Somali 
Government enveloped the Trust Territory in 1957, the Ogaadeen chiefs were not 
the only ones who approached the British Consul in Mogadishu and British 
officials in Kenya to discuss the possibility of placing their people under British 
authority. In March 1957, a delegation of Mareexaan chiefs visited the District 
Commissioner, Mandera, and declared that they wanted the British government to 
 




return to Jubaland. The deputation consisted of the ‘Senior Chief’ of the 
Mareexaan Xaaji Xasan (Daarood/Mareexaan/Cali Dheere), chief Hiri Jaamac, 
and an ex-member of the King’s African Rifles (KAR), Khaliif Shire. While 
openly discussing the possibility of alienating themselves from Somalia, the 
Mareexaan delegates explained the motivation behind their request as ‘distrust of 
the SYL government which was Egyptian controlled, bankrupt, dishonest and 
only gave jobs to their own boys’.586 As the DC Mandera reported, the Mareexaan 
chiefs stated that: 
 
They realized that for many years they would need outside assistance 
both financial and technical and that as they had had experience of 
British Governments since before 1914 they wanted their progress to be 
under British tutelage. They were ready to do whatever was required 
and were awaiting orders. […] Khalif Shire… said that all the HDM 
were with the Marehan in this affair.587 
 
Chief Xaaji Xasan visited Mandera several times during the year and 
reaffirmed his friendship with the Kenya Government.588 In 1958, though, he 
entered politics in Somalia, when the SYL, fearful that the Mareexaan would 
desert to the Great Somalia League, offered him (who was semi-illiterate) ‘an 
important post’ in the Somali Government, on condition that he prevented the 
Mareexaan in Luuq District from joining the GSL. ‘To earn this sinecure, he was 
last seen floating around in the PC Mogadishu’s jeep with a satisfied smirk 
canvassing for the SYL’ – the DC Mandera observed in his annual report for 
1958.589 Although he did not get a ministerial post, Xaaji Xasan managed to 
navigate political tensions across the Kenya-Somalia border juggling multiple 
allegiances.    
 
586 TNA, FO 371/125678, Hill, DC Mandera, to PC Isiolo, 20 March 1957, p. 1. 
587 Ibid. 
588 OBL, Micr. Afr. 515, Reel 44, PC/NFD 1/3/3, Mandera District Annual Report for 
1957, p. 6. 
589 OBL, Micr. Afr. 515, Reel 44, PC/NFD 1/3/3, Mandera District Annual Report for 
1958, p. 8. 
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The British position with regard to the delegations of the Mareexaan and 
the Jubaland Ogaadeen to the Northern Province was to dismiss the whole matter 
as ‘a commonplace of Somali intrigue’: 
 
They are a thorough and independent lot who think only in terms of the 
welfare of their stock and who have a poor opinion of the Somalia 
politicians; they realize that no amount of SYL pressure is going to 
secure them the entrée into Kenya, but feel that once they had placed 
themselves under our administration they could soon wheedle us into 
allowing them access to the waters and grazing they now covet.590 
 
The British administrators failed to grasp the political significance of the 
attempt by the Ogaadeen and Mareexaan chiefs to negotiate power and authority 
by juggling in a trans-border space. British officials also underestimated the key 
role of trade in the dynamics of political brokerage on the Kenya-Somalia frontier. 
Both chief Xaaji Xasan and Khaliif Shire were involved in cross-border trade, as 
we shall see in the next section.  
 
 
4.6 Cross-border trade and political allegiances among the Kenya 
Somalis 
In the 1950s, ‘informal’ cross-border trade expanded in the Somalia-Kenya 
borderlands. The ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ realms often overlapped, with the result 
that the so-called ‘second economy’ was not purely a subversive economy. 
‘Illegal’ cross-border trade used corridors opened by the state and depended on 
the collusion between agents who operated within both the formal and informal 
economies. Most of these agents were government-licensed traders or government 
employees who acted as middlemen, juggling multiple roles and allegiances. The 
districts of Mandera and Garissa provide good examples to illustrate these 
dynamics. 
 
590 TNA, FO 371/125678, Chief Secretary to Mathieson, 24 April 1957, p. 2. 
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In the early 1950s, when clashes between clans were frequent on the 
frontier, the British officials in Mandera used trade to keep an eye on Somali 
policemen across the border and obtain information. Officially, in 1950 there was 
no trade with either Somalia or Ethiopia, but policemen from the neighbouring 
frontier posts were permitted to make small weekly purchases. For instance, the 
Ilaloes (Italian-created tribal police) from Malka Re (an important crossing place 
on the Dawa River near the Kenyan border) were allowed to buy goods in small 
quantities in Mandera on Saturday mornings, but they had first to retail their ‘local 
gossip’ to the District Commissioner.591 In 1952, the DC discontinued the practice 
of allowing them to buy tea and sugar unless they had been ‘particularly helpful in 
returning lost, strayed, or stolen camels.’592 Similarly, the Somali policemen who 
were stationed at Buur Hachi (opposite Ceel Waaq) were permitted to make 
purchases in the Ceelwaaq dukas provided that they first reported to the officer in 
charge of the Kenya Police.593 
Up to 1955, the state of tension between Somali clans in Kenya and the 
Mareexaan ‘precluded anything save minor trade in milk, hides and skins, ghee, 
and millet’ in Mandera.594 The only imports from Somalia were salt from Luuq, in 
exchange for soda, and Mareexaan prostitutes, according to British reports. Then, 
from 1955 to 1959 some Mareexaan from Somalia were permitted to obtain eight 
bags of sugar and eight boxes of tea per month from Mandera, thanks to ‘a pro 
Somali [British] Consul in Mogadishu’ – the District Commissioner reported, 
with a tad of irritation, in 1959.595 The Mareexaan chief Xaaji Xasan had a weekly 
shopping concession for one bag of sugar and one box of tea. The same applied to 
ex-KAR Khaliif Shire, who was now in charge of the Luuq Ilaloes, although he 
 
591 OBL, Micr. Afr. 517, Reel 7, MDA/3, Mandera District Handing Over Report, 
November 1950, Baron to Gordon, p. 4; Micr. Afr. 515, Reel 4, PC/NFD 1/3/2, 
Mandera District Annual Report for 1950, p. 15. 
592 OBL, Micr. Afr. 517, Reel 7, MDA/5, Mandera District Handing Over Report, July 
1952, Shaw to Wilkinson, p. 6. 
593 Ibid. 
594 OBL, Micr. Afr. 517, Reel 8, MDA/8, Mandera District Handing Over Report, May 




was stationed at Malka Re near the Kenyan border.596 The two police outposts in 
Malka Re and Buur Hachi also had a concession of one bag of sugar per month. In 
1956, the weekly shopping day extended to barter trade by Luuq and Mandera 
traders. Trans-frontier trade increased in the following years, to the extent that the 
British administration worried that it was beginning to ‘get out of hand’. The DC 
in Mandera subsequently made arrangements with his Somali counterpart in Luuq 
for greater control.  The Somali DC apparently ‘was only too anxious to assist’, as 
most of the Trust Territory’s revenue was obtained from custom duties and other 
cesses, since there was no Poll Tax there.597 In 1959, ‘everything was done to 
discourage the trade administratively’, but with little success.598 
Most of the Mandera and Ceelwaaq traders were either members of 
influential Gharri families or ‘aliens’ (many of whom were former government 
employees) who had connections in Somalia. To cite but a few examples, 
Maxamed Sheekh Cali (Gharri/Darawa), brother of probably the most influential 
‘holy man’ in the NFP, Xaaji Cabaas Sheekh Cali, was ‘Mandera’s No. 1 
trader’.599 He had three plots in the township in his name and one in Xaaji 
Cabaas’s name, and was awarded the entire Government contract in 1959. 
Maxamed Sheekh Cali was also the leading buyer of hides and skins in Mandera 
District. His brother Xaaji Cabaas was the official collector of ziyāra (pilgrimage) 
donations for the whole Province. He also collected donations from the 
Mareexaan and in Ethiopia, although he was ‘probably of less qur’anic knowledge 
than the Wajir kathi’ – according to the Mandera DC.600 Maxamed Sheekh Cali 
had another half-brother, Abtidoon Wahab Sheekh Cali, who reportedly had the 
best-run and best-built duka in Ceelwaaq. A livestock trader, Abtidoon also had a 
‘flourishing hides and skins banda’ across the Somali border.601 Abtidoon Sheekh 
Ibraahim, the son and heir of a well-known sheikh from Baraawe (in southern 
 
596 OBL, Micr. Afr. 517, Reel 8, MDA/8, Mandera District Handing Over Report, May 
1959, Walter, p. 8.  
597 Ibid., p. 10. 
598 Ibid. 
599 Ibid., Appendix C, p. 2. 
600 Ibid., p. 27. 
601 Ibid., Appendix C, p. 4. 
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Somalia), had a hides and skins banda and was ‘fond of clandestine deals with the 
Marehan’.602 Cali Sigaara (Xarti/Warsangeli), a very successful businessman who 
lived in Moyale, had a shop in Mandera, which was run by one of his nephews 
from Somalia, and another shop at Malka Murri, which supplied the Kenya Police 
post there. Employed as a clerk in Cali Sigaara’s duka at Malka Murri was Xaaji 
Jaamac Maxamed, a Majeerteen who was allegedly involved in ‘all the Herti 
rackets and machinations’.603Another Xarti/Majeerteen, Warsame Saalax, ex-
police sergeant, had livestock with the Mareexaan and a relative with a duka 
across the Somali border. This shop was reportedly ‘filled with Kenya goods 
smuggled across by Warsame’.604 Sergeant Calasow Cali (Hawiye/Abgaal) 
worked as a night watchman for the Kenya Meat Commission in Nairobi and had 
a wife who occupied his plot in Mandera township. Every time she went to 
Nairobi to visit his husband, she returned with goods ‘for smuggling to Somalia’, 
according to the Mandera DC.605 
The Kenya Government did not allow the importation of any slaughter 
livestock into the Colony except for ‘a limited number of permits issued by the 
District Livestock Officer at Lamu’, these being granted only to certain long-
established traders from Somalia.606 Since the mid-1940s, large quantities of 
slaughter livestock had been brought into Kenya from across the Somali border 
below Kolbio (Garissa District) en route for the market at Mokowe, in Lamu’s 
hinterland. The fact that this trade was ‘officially encouraged by the Coast 
Province’ meant that there was a ‘continual stream of illegal immigrants’ to and 
from across Garissa District – the DC had lamented in 1950.607 This ‘formal’ trade 
corridor also provided an easy outlet for the smuggling of ivory, leopard skins, 
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606 KNA, CL/13/5, O’Hagan to British Consulate, Mogadishu, 9 January 1959. 
607 OBL, Micr. Afr. 515, Reel 46, PC/NFD 1/7/4, Garissa District Annual Report for 
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sugar and tea, which found a ready market in Somalia.608 Sometimes, in order to 
meet the demand for slaughter livestock from the Kenya Meat Commission 
(KMC) in Mombasa, the Government turned a blind eye to the fact that several 
Xarti and Ogaadeen traders who brought cattle for sale at Lamu had no passes. 
The livestock traders who returned from Lamu were reportedly assisted by groups 
of Ogaadeen/Cabdalla, Booni and Bantu ‘Riverines’ in getting contraband 
products back to Somalia through Kolbio and the Boni forest.609 British officials 
in Garissa recorded a ‘continuous stream of traffic across the Abdulla section of 
the Boundary’ and, consequently, considered the Cabdalla to be ‘much more open 
to subversive influences’ from Kismaayo than the other Ogaadeen in the 
District.610 
Trade corridors also functioned as networks of political exchange. Several 
‘alien’ traders in the NFP were known to be involved in political activity in 
support of the Somali Youth League. To cite but one among many examples, 
Yaasiin Maxamed Aadan (Xarti/Majeerteen), a police superintendent in Mandera, 
acted as a buyer for his father, who had a duka in the township, and allegedly 
carried miraa in his vehicle when travelling to Isiolo.611 Portrayed as a ‘leading 
light of the Young SYL’, Yasiin Maxamed attracted the interest of the British 
officials in Mandera: ‘he is known as a contact man and consideration is being 
given to use him on our side’ – the District Commissioner wrote in November 
 
608 OBL, Micr. Afr. 517, Reel 4, Section 3, Garissa District Handing Over Report, Mills 
to Browning, 11 March 1953, p. 3. 
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610 OBL, Micr. Afr. 515, Reel 46, PC/NFD 1/7/4, Garissa District Annual Report for 
1956, p. 4.  
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(2009), pp. 377–97. See also Paul Goldsmith, ‘The Production and Marketing of 
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1956.612 Yasiin Maxamed used to visit Isiolo to purchase goods along with 
another Majeerteen from Wajir, Cabdi Ciise. The DC in Isiolo suspected that the 
hidden purpose of these visits was making and keeping local contacts, collecting 
money, and carrying mail for the Somali Youth League.613 
Political events in Somalia were being watched with increasing interest in 
the Northern Frontier Province. Radio Cairo was listened to regularly in the 
townships. Most of the Xarti and Arab traders in Mandera and Ceelwaaq closely 
followed Somali politics.614 In 1958, it was reported that the Great Somalia 
League had made an entrance in Garissa.615 In Mandera, the Xarti, theretofore 
Somali Youth League supporters, shifted to the Great Somalia League, following 
the SYL’s loss of power as a result of the 1958 municipal elections. The Xarti’s 
political enthusiasm, though, was reportedly quelled by the arrest of Xaaji 
Maxamed Xuseen in December 1958 (see the opening section of this chapter).616 
Xarti and Arabs were not the only ones with an interest in Somali politics. 
In his annual Report for 1958, the Mandera District Commissioner reported the 
‘slight wooing’ of the Gharri by the SYL after the party’s mediocre results in the 
municipal elections.617 According to the DC, the Gharri, who were regarded as 
‘half Boran’, had theretofore been cold-shouldered by the SYL, which drew its 
support mainly from Samaale clans, and ‘consigned’ to the Xisbiya Digil iyo 
Mirifle. The Gharri responded to the League’s attempt to seduce them saying that 
they were not interested, unless they got a school, a hospital and more wells in 
Buur Hachi for their exclusive use. As this was most unlikely – the District 
Commissioner commented – the ‘policy’ of the Gharri, except a few people in 
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Ceelwaaq who were expected to ‘cross into Somalia in March [1959] to vote’, 
was to ‘wait and see’.618 
The so-called ‘corner tribes’ in Mandera District were also following 
politics in Somalia and taking sides. The ‘corner tribes’, classified as ‘minor 
tribes’ in British sources, were mostly composed of freed or runaway slaves who 
had once settled along the Jubba River and had lived by cultivating the fertile soil 
on the river’s banks. The majority of them had arrived in Mandera District with 
the Italians in 1940. After the Second World War, the British administration had 
allowed them to stay, on condition that they did not become livestock owners. The 
‘corner tribes’ included several groups: the Gurre Murre, at one time Gharri slaves 
who had then tried to be accepted as Gharri (they were cultivators and some of 
them worked as government labourers, but their main source of income was 
making palm wine ‘illegally’); the Gabaweyn, who came from a stretch of the 
Jubba river between Dooloow and Luuq (also palm wine brewers and cultivators); 
the Warabeya, metal workers who were permitted to live with other tribes as 
smiths and claimed a connection with the Xarti (they used to ‘illegally’ travel to 
Somalia by night and ‘smuggle hides and skins and anything else’ – according to 
the Mandera DC Mr Walter);619 the Sharmoge, who came from Somalia’s inter-
riverine region and were of Raxanweyn origin (they were cultivators, but 
preferred to own livestock); the Shabelle, so named because they had once lived 
on the Wabi Shabelle (former Ajuuraan slaves, they were allowed to cultivate 
shambas and were treated more favourably than the other ‘corner tribes’ owing to 
their longer residence in Mandera District); and the Shiikhaal, ‘holy men’ who 
used to ‘attach themselves to other tribes and become rich’.620 Increasingly 
involved in Somali politics, the ‘corner tribes’, who maintained strong 
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connections with the Luuq area, supported the HDM and were ‘exuberant’ at the 
results of the 1958 municipal elections, according to British sources.621 
This picture contrasts with the prevalent view, asserted in colonial reports 
and scholarly literature as well, that people in the Northern Frontier Province were 
isolated from political developments outside the Province’s boundaries and that 
politics was simply a matter of ‘alien’ traders.622 Somalis in the NFP became 
further interested in Somalia’s political life in connection with the 1959 general 
elections. This, however, did not translate into disruption of law and order, 
contrary to what British officials had expected. A paper by the Special Branch of 
the Kenya Police on SYL activity in the Colony between January and July 1959 
identified ‘relatively little Somali Youth League activity’, although a number of 
cells allegedly existed in parts of the Northern Frontier Province: ‘such activity as 
has occurred has had no visible effect upon security in the Colony and no serious 
attempt appears to have been made to re-establish the organization on a sound 
basis in defiance of Government policy’ – the document stated.623 
Political support and funds for the Somali Youth League went, rather, the 
other way around, from Kenya to Somalia. In Moyale, for instance, followers of 
the SYL were believed to have held clandestine meetings in February, March, and 
April 1959. These meetings were reported to have been attended by SYL 
members from Ethiopian Moyale; some Shs: 2,000/- had allegedly been collected 
and sent by courier to Somalia via southern Ethiopia. Reports of private meetings 
and collections of money by SYL followers in Isiolo could not be confirmed, 
despite extensive investigations. It was alleged, though, that money for the SYL 
had been collected under the guise that it would be used to set up a social club in 
Isiolo and that receipts bearing the facsimile of the SYL badge had been issued. In 
Muddo Gashi (Isiolo District), a number of local Somalis were believed to have 
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held a meeting to discuss the formation of a SYL cell. Money for the Somali 
Youth League was reportedly collected in this area and sent to Kismaayo in April 
and May 1959.624 During that year, several Somalis (most of whom were 
township dwellers) in Garissa District made moves towards affiliation with 
political parties in Somalia. However, ‘the rivalry between the SYL and the GSL 
left them rather at a loss’, the same people ‘being wooed one month by one party 
and the next by the other’ – the Garissa DC observed.625 Interestingly, there were 
fewer reports of political contacts across the border during 1960 than in the year 
before. The days when the GSL and the SYL were sending representatives into 
Garissa District were apparently over, as the Somali authorities had plenty to do to 
put their own house in order in the run-up to Somalia’s independence.626 
The political parties which were created in the Northern Frontier Province 
in 1960, once the Kenya Government lifted the ban on political activity, were not 
the offspring of parties based in Somalia. The emergence of political activism in 
the NFP was rooted in social and economic processes which were locally 




During the second half of the 1950s, policies aimed at gradual internal self-
government and eventual independence reinforced the linkage between clanship, 
territory, and political allegiance in the Trust Territory of Somalia. The effects of 
these policies were particularly acute in the Jubba Provinces, as the river valley 
had been marked by a long history of migrations, heterogeneous settlement, 
assimilation, and conflict. Electoral politics, in particular, aligned with the 
fundamental assumption in Somali clan politics that might is right, buttressing the 
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idea that ‘nobody can represent me better than my family’. As a result, the 
political game was ridden all along. Modernisers called for the liquidation of 
‘tribalism’ because otherwise the unity of the Somali people would never 
materialise. However, clan politics and the monetised system of patronage that 
characterised it was the way in which modern politics existed in the periphery of 
the state in-the-making. In consequence, the emerging nation state acquired a two-
faced character. The institutions and symbols of the nation state masked an 
underbrush of clientelism and patronage.  
If clan competition, issues over deegaan (clan ‘homelands’), and 
patronage ended up framing the national political space, this was not an atavistic 
residue of ‘tradition’ but the outcome of social and political settlements in which 
the state itself played a role. In the transition to independence, the Italian 
Trusteeship Administration empowered the Somali Youth League to crush 
dissent, while putting pressure on the nationalist party to protect Italian interests 
and keep the country in the Western camp. In the economic realm as well, the 
Administration’s policies undermined the foundations of the emerging nation 
state. In Lower Jubba, the Italian-controlled banana economy widened the 
regional differentiation characteristic of the colonial state, thereby discouraging 
the integration of a new national economy, and ensured the reproduction of a 
long-standing system of domination. In consequence, state-building became 
embedded in inequalities, exclusionary practices, and corruption. Interestingly, 
this history of marginalisation and violence still reverberates in the present: the 
Jubba Valley, with the exception of Kismaayo, is nowadays an al-Shabaab 
stronghold. 
In the Somalia-Kenya borderland, tensions emerged between what Philip 
Abrams has defined the ‘state-system’, ‘a palpable nexus of practice and 
institutional structure centered in government’, and the ‘state-idea’, an ideological 
project, an exercise in legitimizing ‘something which if seen directly and as itself 
would be illegitimate, an unacceptable domination’.627 In the final years of the 
Trusteeship Administration, divisive and undemocratic ways of doing politics 
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which somehow reproduced entrenched inequalities and colonial forms of 
domination created new divisions in the borderland’s social and political fabric. 
At the same time, state-building was framed in the idiom of nationalism, 
emphasizing the cultural and political unity of the Somalis across territorial 
boundaries and calling for the (re-)unification of the Somali territories. This 
resulted in an ambiguous definition of citizenship: Who is Somali? Who does 
belong to the political community of the Somali nation and who does not? These 
questions have remained unresolved up to the present time. 
The dynamic of differentiation that resulted from the colonial desire to 
know who was who and from the politics of state formation in Somalia produced 
unintended effects in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands. Instead of favouring social 
stability and political control, this dynamic of differentiation fostered political 
imagination and the formation of communities that straddled territorial 
boundaries. The borderlanders had their own ideas about what their future should 
look like. They juggled across the border to negotiate political authority and 
resource access, to trade or smuggle, and to attempt to influence the balance of 
power at the centre of the nascent Somali state. Against the background of 
entangled territorialities and multiple loyalties, ‘a plurality of communities of 
trust’ emerged in the process of decolonisation.628 It was practically impossible 
for the borderlanders to develop ‘a systemic trust in the state as impersonal arbiter 
of conflict or impartial redistributor of public resources’.629 In north-eastern 
Kenya, the Somalis and their allies saw secessionism as the solution to the lack of 
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5 DECOLONIZATION, TRADE, AND 
POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN THE NFD, c.1955-62 
 
 
5.1 British policy and the ‘Somalia threat’, 1955-60 
Historical narratives of Somali secessionism in north-eastern Kenya usually take 
1960 as their starting point. That was indeed an eventful year. It saw the formation 
of the Somali Republic and the holding of the first Lancaster House Constitutional 
Conference, which opened discussion on Kenya’s path to independence. 
Nevertheless, evidence suggests that transformations which occurred in the 1950s 
are central to understanding the emergence of political activism and insurgency in 
the Kenya-Somalia borderland. In order to grasp these transformations and their 
far-reaching repercussions we need to look beyond the boundaries of the Northern 
Frontier Province. 
The acceleration of the ‘Somalisation’ of the provincial and district 
administration in the Trust Territory of Somaliland at the end of 1955 raised fears 
of ‘a serious breakdown in law and order’ among British officials in the NFD, 
especially in Mandera District.630 The British administrators suggested that their 
Somali counterparts ‘might either be too weak to control acts of aggression by 
Somali tribes over the border into Kenya, or alternatively be actively 
sympathetic’.631 The Provincial Commissioner, Northern Frontier Province, 
anticipated that ‘raids by tribespeople… on a large scale’ were ‘the almost 
foregone conclusion’.632 These fears fed into a growing debate over which policy 
the Kenya administration should adopt towards the colony’s Somali neighbours 
and the SYL, given the role that this party was likely to play in Somalia’s future.  
 
630 KNA, DC/WAJ 5/5/2, Kennaway, ‘Brief memorandum for the Commander in Chief in 
connection with his proposed tour of the Northern Frontier District’, 27 February 
1956, p. 2. 
631 TNA, FCO 141/6717, Gethin to Watson, 7 February 1956, p. 2. 
632 KNA, DC/WAJ 5/5/2, Kennaway, ‘Brief memorandum for the Commander-in-Chief -
proposed tour of the Northern Frontier District’, 27 February 1956, p. 2. 
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Towards the end of 1955, British officials in Kenya began considering 
whether there was any way by which they could ‘come to terms with the 
League’.633 Nevertheless, they remained entrenched in their conviction that the 
SYL had not changed since 1948 and constituted a potential threat to peace and 
good government. The Chief Secretary, Richard Turnbull, former Provincial 
Commissioner, NFP, made his point clear in a response he wrote to the British 
Consul in Mogadishu, John Gethin, who was suggesting a revision of British 
policy towards the SYL: 
 
Politically speaking we cannot entirely ignore that in 1947 and 1948 the 
Youth League made a determined attempt to subvert the authority of the 
Government and to spread their campaign of disaffection not only in the 
Somali areas but also amongst the Galla, the Samburu, and the Turkana. 
The League from your point of view is a natural, and even admirable, 
expression of Somali nationalism; to us it represents a force which, if 
allowed free rein, might well cause serious disruption of the 
administration of our northern areas. We recognize that we shall have to 
sup with these people, but we are determined to go on using as long a 
spoon as possible.634 
 
In the eyes of the British Consul in Mogadishu, the interests of Kenya as 
Turnbull saw them were in contrast with other British interests:   
 
…I would submit […] that the more we can persuade them [the 
Somalis] that there is on their doorstep a large and effective country 
with many problems […] similar to their own, from whom they could 
learn something and even get assistance – and with whom they can play 
football – instead of turning northwards to Egypt, the greater advantage 
to us politically. […] The movement for political activity among 
Somalis in the Northern Frontier District will gradually gather 
momentum regardless of what you do – the SYL will find material for 
underground activity in the NFD if you oblige them to make use of it, in 
 




growing quantities. Up to the present they have been well inclined 
towards the British and prepared to overlook the hostile attitude of the 
Kenya Government; had they wished to be hostile in their turn they 
could have given support to Mau Mau activities and increased your 
problems quite considerably. Although there is always talk of SYL 
“activity” […] I have never been told of any serious organization or 
activity organized from this end. […] Please do not think that I am 
suggesting that you should allow SYL branches to be opened up in 
Kenya. All I ask is that you should treat the SYL of Somalia like 
anybody else and be reasonably forthcoming. I sincerely believe that 
this is in the interest of Kenya as well as in all our interests.635 
 
Although Gethin’s words may now sound far-sighted and somewhat 
prophetic, they remained unheard, as two bugbears influenced the perception of 
the SYL among British officials in Kenya: Mau Mau and communism. Writing to 
the Secretary for African Affairs in December 1955, the Provincial 
Commissioner, NFP, enclosed the translation of the content of an undated secret 
Italian document he had reportedly seen during a visit to Mogadishu in 1954, 
warning of supposed similarities between the SYL and Mau Mau:   
 
Secretariat of League is… composed of hard and fanatical elements. 
[…]  – 30% Hard Core extremists – rest content to follow (cf. Mau 
Mau). […] Power ambitions of leaders – supported by hooligan element 
– infiltration into all spheres of public life including Government 
offices – unscrupulous – resort to violence – danger to governing 
authority – dangerous source of spread of Communism. (all except last 
point very reminiscent of Mau Mau).636 
 
As we saw in Chapter 4, the SYL was being increasingly tamed under the 
Italian Trusteeship Administration. The assessment by British officials in Kenya 
of the party’s subversive character proved a gross exaggeration, as did 
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assumptions that the SYL was a breeding ground for communist infiltration in 
Somalia, which Italian administrators repeatedly excluded.637 
‘I hope it will be possible to persuade Kenya officialdom that the modern 
SYL is far from that of 1948’ – John Gethin wrote to the FCO’s African 
Department in February 1956.638 Mr. Gethin repeatedly attempted to convince the 
Colonial Office of the potential advantages of making ‘a greater effort to “sell” 
East Africa to the Somalis’.639 The British ambassador in Mogadishu suggested 
that the British Government should build momentum from the enthusiasm shown 
by many Somalis for the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity movement, strengthening 
the African side of the Afro-Asian block. Gethin’s suggestions, though, were 
rejected, as they clashed with the prevailing racial categories within the colonial 
administration. British officials in both Kenya and the Somaliland Protectorate 
considered that ‘the Somali’ could not and should not be drawn into a closer 
relationship with the people of East Africa because he was racially and culturally 
different.640 
The Kenya administration de facto endorsed and sustained racial 
essentialist beliefs among the Kenya Somalis, emphasising the divide between 
‘the Somali’ – regarded as a Muslim migrant of Arabic descent –, on the one 
hand, and the Bantu and the Nilotic, on the other hand. Writing to the Colonial 
Office in April 1957, the acting Chief Secretary in Nairobi recorded the prevailing 
perception among the Kenya Somalis that they were ‘inherently superior to any of 
 
637 ASDMAE, ASMAE, Dir. Gen. AA.PP., Uff. III, I vers., b. 220, f. 763, Directorate-
General for Somalia, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Italian Embassy, 
Washington, 26 January 1959; b. 221, f. 767, ‘Rapporto su alcune questioni 
riguardanti la Somalia e i rapport italo-somali (in relazione al viaggio del Ministro 
delle Finanze On.le Paolo Emilio Taviani – 2/12 agosto 1959)’, 4, enclosed with 
Directorate-General for Somalia to Directorate-General for Political Affairs, Italian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 September 1959. 
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the local chaps’, admitting: ‘I can’t help having a certain sympathy with them’.641 
Moreover, essentialist perceptions played a crucial role in defining political 
representation, as the 1955 report of the commissioner appointed to enquire into 
the best methods for the selection of African representatives to the Legislative 
Council shows. The commissioner, Walter Coutts, did not visit the NFP in view 
of the fact that ‘the tribesmen had expressed a wish that until such time as the 
Province could be represented by its own member their interests should continue 
to be cared for by the Government through the PC.’642 Mr. Coutts sympathised 
with the feelings of the ‘tribesmen’ who – he commented – ‘ethnographically are 
quite distinct from the Africans in the rest of Kenya.’643 British administrators 
actively participated in articulating concerns about political representation as a 
matter of ethnicity and race, hardening identity fault-lines between ‘northerners’ 
and down-country people.         
Although the prospect of a generalised breakdown of law and order 
following the Somalisation of the local administration in the Jubba provinces did 
not materialise, the Somali scare grew bigger among British officials with 
Somalia’s independence approaching. In 1957, the Kenya administration resolved 
to take ‘precautionary measures’ against ‘the threat of raids, mass infiltration, and 
internal disturbance’ along the Kenya-Somalia border.644 These measures 
included the permanent stationing of one Company of the KAR at Wajir; the 
improvement of frontier roads with two light maintenance units; the establishment 
of four new Kenya Police posts at Rhamu (Mandera district), Finno (between 
Ceelwaaq and Mandera), Diff (Wajir district), and Liboi (Garissa district); the 
building, reconstruction, and improvement of six airfields at Buna, Rhamu, Finno, 
Sololo, Liboi, and Diff; the revival of the Provincial and District Security 
Committees; and the surveying, demarcation, and clearing of the Kenya-Somalia 
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border.645 Further measures against the so-called ‘Somalia threat’ were taken the 
following year. More airstrips were completed at Kolbio (Garissa district), Khorof 
Harar and Habasween (Wajir district); another Police post was set up at Kolbio, 
while ‘the machinery for collection of intelligence was established by the posting 
of Special Branch officers at Garissa, Wajir, Mandera and Moyale, with 
headquarters at Isiolo’.646 By the end of 1958, the backbone of what would 
become the infrastructure of counterinsurgency in the lead-up to Kenya’s 
independence had been put in place.    
In the meanwhile, the Somalis in the NFP were watching political 
developments across the border with growing interest, anticipating that, thanks to 
the success of the SYL and the revitalization of the Greater Somalia idea, the 
former NFD would secede and unite with Somalia straight after the country’s 
independence. However, during a tour of the NFP in July 1958, the Governor of 
Kenya made it clear to the Somalis that ‘they were British citizens of Kenya’: 
their flag was the Union Jack and ‘they would remain under the protection of this 
flag’.647 The acting Provincial Commissioner, NFP, confirmed that ‘there would 
be no changes in the frontier’, adducing as evidence the fact that ‘the boundary 
had been redemarcated and new police posts, with roads and airfields, had been 
established.’648 
Having secured the frontier against the supposed threat of a soon-to-be 
independent Somalia, the Kenya administration eventually accepted the fact that 
they had to make a few political concessions if they wanted to avoid being 
compelled to do so by forthcoming developments across the border. After lengthy 
debate and insistent requests from the Somali Government, eight former leaders of 
the SYL, mostly from Garissa, who had been restricted at Lodwar since the Kenya 
administration had banned the League in July 1948 were released on bond in 
February 1959. They were allowed to return to specified areas of the Northern 
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Frontier Province, but their movement remained restricted.649 Early in 1960, 
political activity in the NFD was legalised and the proscription on the SYL was 
lifted, without provoking a revival of the League. Instead, home-grown political 
parties emerged, first among the Somalis in down-country Kenya then among the 
people of the NFP. This political awakening was linked to events and socio-
economic transformations which occurred in the 1950s. The rearrangement of 
group solidarities that accompanied these transformations played a crucial role in 
defining the positions that people later adopted in the secessionist struggle.  
 
 
5.2 Social relations, identities, and politics in the NFD, 1954-60 
Besides tingeing the lenses through which British officials looked at the SYL, the 
anti-Mau Mau campaign played a key role in shaping collective identities and 
crystallising group loyalties in the Kenya-Somalia borderland. Although a few 
scholars have acknowledged that the Kenya Somalis were not insulated from the 
Mau-Mau insurgency, their accounts have missed out on the Emergency’s most 
significant implications for the people of the NFP. Keren Weitzberg has 
mentioned the involvement of ‘Somalis living in Naivasha, Nyeri, Thika, and 
other towns’ in the Mau Mau movement to show the assimilation of Isxaaq and 
Xarti Somalis into Kenyan politics and challenge the perception that Mau Mau 
was ‘a purely “Kikuyu affair”’.650 Weitzberg has drawn, in part, on first-hand 
accounts cited by Saalax Cabdi Sheekh alleging that Somali traders supplied the 
Mau Mau insurgents with food, clothes, and ammunition thanks to their access to 
markets in Ethiopia.651 However, both British reports and oral testimonies show 
that the NFP, especially Isiolo District, was absorbed into counterinsurgency on 
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the ‘loyalist’ side through intensive recruitment campaigns and screening 
operations. 
The Mandera and Moyale police divisions provided men for ‘special effort 
duties’ in down-country Kenya in connection with the Emergency throughout 
1953.652 The following year, Mau Mau activities in Meru district resulted in Isiolo 
being brought into the anti-Mau Mau campaign. This required ‘the maximum 
effort by all security forces in Isiolo’.653 Twelve mounted dubas (tribal police) 
were also brought down from Moyale to deal with Mau Mau incursions.654 By the 
end of 1954, Isiolo district ‘had taken over control (for anti-Mau Mau purposes) 
of virtually the whole of the Meru Northern Grazing Area lying to the north-west 
of the Nyambeni Hills.’655 The Provincial Commissioner, Mr. Kennaway, 
reported that the people of the NFP, except a few Turkana employed on farms in 
Laikipia, continued to remain ‘aloof from Mau Mau’.656 While the Commissioner 
conceded that ‘the odd Rendille’ was probably ‘coerced into taking one or more 
Mau Mau oaths’ and that some of the Boran who had inter-married with Meru 
might also have taken the oath, he excluded that the people of the Province were 
actively involved in the insurgency: 
 
In spite of frequent rumours from Down-country that arms and 
ammunition were being obtained by the Mau Mau from the Northern 
Province, and even Ethiopia, not one single case has been brought to 
light, in spite of the utmost vigilance. […] As regards ammunition, it is 
more likely that supplies emanating from old Army and Italian camp 
sites have found their way to Mau Mau.657 
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In his Annual Report for 1954, Mr. Kennaway commended the loyalty of 
the Isiolo Somalis, who – despite ‘their fiery spirits’ – had ‘served with distinction 
in many Police and Military units engaged against Mau Mau.’658 The District 
Commissioner, Isiolo, also excluded that the Boran and the Somalis had been 
‘contaminated’ by the Mau Mau movement, although this had been ‘followed 
with a sympathetic interest by many Somalis’.659 When, in July 1955, the leader 
of the Xarti section, Maxamed Faarax Shaacur, was accused of harbouring a Mau 
Mau gang and sentenced to one year in prison, this provoked ‘considerable 
concern’ among the Isiolo Somalis, who ‘were at great pain to dissociate 
themselves’ from the incident and ‘to assert their loyalty to the Crown.’660 
The British recruited both Somalis and Boran from across the NFP to 
participate in the anti-Mau Mau campaign.661 According to Cabdulaahi Cali 
Maxamed ‘Suufi’, a Somali pastoralist from Wajir who was recruited in the KAR 
to fight against the Mau Mau in 1954, at least fifteen young men were recruited in 
Wajir district during the Emergency.662 Some Boran elders I interviewed in Isiolo 
cited their participation in the anti-Mau Mau campaign as evidence of their loyalty 
to the Crown, a loyalty that – in their eyes – the British administration betrayed a 
few years later, siding with their former enemies: ‘The British betrayed us. We 
fought with them against the Mau Mau… They liked us to be their devil’ – a 
Boran interviewee who was recruited during the Emergency stated.663 The anti-
Mau Mau campaign drew the loyalty line, separating those who had fought for the 
British from down-country ‘Africans’ and strengthening the alliance between 
Somalis and Boran in Isiolo District.  
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In 1955, the Boran initiated a movement to change their legal status. They 
no longer wished to be classified as Africans under the law and sought equal 
status with the Somalis. The movement started in Nairobi, where the few Boran 
urbanites resented the fact that they ‘were obliged to carry passes and forbidden to 
reside outside certain areas, and that in prison they could not enjoy the better food 
and privileges accorded to the Somali’.664 Subsequently, the Isiolo Boran took the 
matter up first with the District Commissioner, then, having failed to make any 
progress, with the Provincial Commissioner. Ex-headman Wako Hapi, who had 
been convicted for ‘subversive activities’ and exiled to Marsabit a few years 
earlier, was reportedly ‘in consultation with a political body in Nairobi’.665 Born 
in Garba Tulla to a former chief, Wako Hapi had moved first to Muddogashi, 
where he had learned to speak Somali, then to Sericho, becoming a trader and 
marrying a Somali lady.666 According to a Boran informant, Wako Hapi had been 
convicted following a power struggle with the newly appointed chief Xaaji Galma 
Dido, son of the late Boran paramount chief Dido Doyo.667 Xaaji Galma 
championed the movement for obtaining Somali status, thereby strengthening his 
influence over the Uwaso Boran.668 Both Wako Hapi and Xaaji Galma Dido were 
to become leading figures in the campaign for the secession of the NFP alongside 
the Somalis, as we shall see in the next section.      
Although the claim for equal status with the Somalis was eventually 
dropped, the District Commissioner, Isiolo, saw it as a sign that the Boran were 
‘becoming a little more conscious of the outside world’.669 The District 
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Commissioner, however, regarded the increasingly close relationship between the 
Boran and the Somalis as a scheme devised by the Ogaadeen, who – he believed – 
wanted the ‘Boran country’ for themselves and used ‘brotherhood’ to achieve 
their goal. Still, brotherhood was becoming real, no matter what: 
 
“We are brothers”, the Aulihan say to the Boran. “Our grazing is open 
to you and yours to us”. The Boran like this approach, for are they not 
trying to achieve equal status with Somalis? Here is a demonstration of 
true brotherhood.670 
 
This episode challenges the engrained perception that the ‘ingenuous’ 
Boran were drawn into politics in 1960 by a few hot-headed ‘alien’ Somalis. By 
the time the secessionist campaign began, the Somalis and the Uaso Boran had 
become brothers, with all the bonds, tensions, and conflicts that brotherhood 
entails.              
 The on-going definition of allegiances and group solidarities was linked 
to the gradual transformation of the material base of pastoral society in the Kenya-
Somalia borderland, a process in which livestock trade played a key role. The 
Emergency meant the temporary elimination of the Central Province market for 
livestock from the NFP and, for long periods, Emergency regulations were used 
by the British administration to justify a monopoly of exports from the Province 
by the African Livestock Marketing Organization (ALMO).671 This, established in 
1952, was the main instrument of a new policy intended to destock the colony’s 
arid lowlands and provide cheap meat for the agricultural areas around Mount 
Kenya and for a meat canning factory at Athi River.672 The people of the NFP 
were dissatisfied with the new marketing measures, as they considered the price 
offered by ALMO for slaughter livestock to be too low. Both Somalis and Boran 
saw in the existence of ALMO and the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) ‘a 
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scheme by Government to make them dispose of their stock at uneconomic 
prices.’673 
Nevertheless, after slowing down as a result of the Emergency, livestock 
trade sharply picked up in 1958. Livestock exports from the NFP increased by 30 
percent to a high record, from 46,019 total units in 1957 to 62,231 in 1958.674 The 
cash income from NFP exports continued to increase from £454,000 in 1958 to 
£500,000 in 1959.675 The provincial fleet of double-decked Diesel lorries 
increased from 36 to over 50; their range was extended to Ceelwaaq and Rhamu 
(in Mandera district), where the KMC instituted regular government-controlled 
livestock sales.676 In consequence, Garissa traders ‘prospered, searching out 
markets for themselves’, one consignment of 300 head of livestock even reaching 
Dar es Salam. Garissa alone exported 81,942 sheep and goats and 9,631 cattle in 
1958, becoming the wealthiest district in the Province.677 In 1960, the district 
exported what was believed to be a record-high figure of 17,203 head of cattle, the 
majority of which were sold to the KMC at Mombasa.678 
The intake by the KMC of slaughter livestock from Garissa was 
progressively increased at the expense of the cattle import quota from Somalia 
(see Chapter 4). This was discussed at a meeting in Malindi in August 1958 
attended by Provincial and District officers from the Coast Province and the NFP. 
Although the Somalia quota could not be abolished outright without risking 
jeopardising the Mombasa meat supply and Lamu’s economy, it was decided to 
gradually reduce the intake from Somalia, initially by 50 cattle per month, raising 
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the NFP quota accordingly.679 Further arrangements were made in March 1959; 
these provided that ‘the quota of cattle for Mombasa from the NFP would be 
increased from 900 to 1200 per month.’680 
The increase in livestock exports from the Northern Frontier Province was 
accompanied by modest though significant ‘progress in the developmental 
sense’.681 The demand for education gathered momentum. Until the late 1950s, 
the Government African Intermediate Primary school at Wajir, established in 
1948, was the only school above the primary level in the whole NFP. In 1958, the 
Northern Province Trust Fund and the Ethiopian Border Raids Trust Fund 
provided grants totalling £15,000 for the completion of primary schools at 
Garissa, Marsabit, and Mandera.682 As no Kenya development funds were 
available and the Trust Fund was insufficient, voluntary collections were 
authorised for the establishment of intermediate schools at Marsabit and Isiolo, 
and for the completion of a primary school at Garba Tulla.683 Subsequently, the 
demand for education increased steadily throughout the Province, rapidly 
outstripping the capacity to provide both teachers and accommodation.684 
Trade expansion nourished social interactions. Traders from across the 
NFP, all the way up to Mandera, began travelling to Isiolo more frequently. In 
1956, Barclays Bank opened a branch in Isiolo Township.685 ‘Alien’ Somali 
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traders would now go to Garba Tulla central market to buy livestock from up 
north which they sold in Isiolo and neighbouring areas, buying foodstuff, tobacco, 
and miraa from the Meru.686 Somali traders would sell food and clothes to the 
Uaso Boran in exchange for livestock, rhino horns, leopard skins and other game 
trophies. According to oral testimonies, Boran and Samburu – to whom killing 
game was a matter of bravery and honour and, therefore, had primarily a symbolic 
value – did not have a sense of the monetary value of the game trophies they sold 
to ‘alien’ Somali traders.687 Several of these built up their capital stocks through 
cross-border smuggling and poaching, benefiting from the thriving black market 
between the NFP and Kismaayo.688 As a Boran informant from Isiolo put it, 
Somali traders ‘were the link between people here and the “outside world”’.689 
Social assimilation was not limited to the ‘Somalisation’ of the Isiolo 
Boran but was, rather, a two-sided affair. It happened that Somali pastoralists who 
went to Isiolo as employees of Somali traders from Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera 
looked for work as herdsmen in Garba Tulla. Some of them, especially Ajuuraan 
from Wajir, were adopted by Boran families and given livestock, becoming part 
of Boran clans and marrying Boran ladies.690 One of the wealthiest traders in 
Isiolo district, Samatar Sheekh Cumar, was the son of an Isxaaq livestock owner, 
Sheekh Cumar Ismaaciil, who had been adopted by the Boran/Warjidda.691 
Samatar, therefore, was both Boran and Somali, which endowed him with total 
freedom of movement, making him a successful businessman. Shared use of 
rangelands, trade, and intermarriage between Somalis and Boran accentuated 
differences between the Badòle (Boran from Marsabit and Moyale) and the 
Uasòle (Boran in the Uaso Nyiro area, most of whom had immigrated from Wajir 
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in the mid-1930s), gradually bringing the Uasòle closer to the Somalis than to the 
Badòle.692 Despite recurrent conflicts over pastures, the Boran and the Somalis 
‘needed each other’.693 
Being neighbours influenced the way people thought about, interacted 
with, and classified the world around them. Religion was a key component of 
social assimilation. Most people in Sericho and Muddogashi received a religious 
education in qur’anic schools (dugsi) set up by Somali shuyuukh, mostly Ashraaf, 
whom the Boran kept in high esteem.694 Pupils graduated after four years, and the 
teacher (macalim) normally received one cow for each successful student or more 
than one if the pupil was particularly good.695 In this way, Ashraaf teachers and 
‘holy men’ acquired not only prestige but also large quantities of livestock, some 
of them becoming prosperous traders.696 
Against a background of deepening social and commercial interactions, 
people in the NFP townships became increasingly interested in politics, as a result 
of both developments in Somalia and the Lennox-Boyd Constitution of 1957-58, 
which increased the number of African members in Kenya’s Legislative Council 
and provided for one nominated representative for the Northern Frontier Province. 
Three ‘alien’ Somalis were initially identified as suitable candidates for the 
LegCo nomination, namely Axmed Faarax (Isxaaq/Habar Yoonis), BEM, chief of 
Moyale township and former District clerk; Xaaji Cabdalla Faarax (Isxaaq/Habar 
Awal), an Isiolo trader, son of a Somali lady from Kismaayo (whose father had 
been hired by Lord Delamere and transferred to Kenya) and a European soldier 
who had been stationed at Kismaayo; and Cali Aadan ‘Lord’ (Xarti/Warsangali), a 
Nairobi-born trader, who was employed by Cali Sigaara (see Chapter 4) as a shop-
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manager in Wajir and had carried on his own business in the NFP as a wholesaler 
and transporter since 1940.697 
Public opinion seemed to fix on Cali Aadan ‘Lord’, who was also the 
secretary of the Wajir Muslim Association and had been a member of the Somali 
Youth League.698 Although both Axmed Faarax and Xaaji Cabdalla Faarax had 
potential to become political brokers, as it was easy for them to deal with the 
British, the former was regarded as too moderate, while the latter, being ‘half-
European’, was considered as ‘belonging to neither camp’, according to British 
sources.699 Nevertheless, the administration’s choice fell on Axmed Faarax, who 
declined the appointment for personal reasons. The second choice fell on Shariif 
Kullatein (Arab), who had been the Principal of Wajir School since 1950. As his 
appointment, though, was ‘contrary to the popular desire’ for Cali Aadan ‘Lord’, 
Shariif Kullatein ‘soon found that the respect and popularity which he had earned 
during his seven years’ service in Wajir, was changing to hatred and contempt’.700 
By the end of 1958, Axmed Faarax’s affairs had improved sufficiently for him to 
agree to accept nomination and Shariif Kullatein was kindly invited to resign. 
In the meanwhile, ‘alien’ Somalis in Nairobi became increasingly involved 
in Kenyan politics. A Somali National Association (SNA) was formed in 
Eastleigh in November 1958, as the forthcoming independence of Somalia and the 
impact of African nationalism ‘induced in Somali communities a feeling of 
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insecurity’.701 Both the SNA president, Maxamed Cali Guleed, and vice-president, 
Axmed Warsame Cali, were Isxaaq, while the party’s secretary, Ibraahim Xasan 
Iido, was Xarti/Dhulbahante. The SNA leaders intensified their contacts with 
African politicians in Nairobi, which suggested that some Somalis at least hoped 
‘to use the nationalist bandwagon for their own ends.’702 Maxamed Cali Guleed 
reportedly sent a personal donation of Shs. 3,000/- to the African Elected 
Members’ defence fund in June 1958. The SNA president was on good terms with 
Tom Mboya and was ‘trying to interest him in Somali affairs’.703 Belonging to an 
educated elite, Maxamed Cali Guleed entertained friendly relations with Mwai 
Kibaki as well.704 By February 1959, both Maxamed Cali Guleed and Axmed 
Warsame Cali had become members of the Nairobi Peoples’ Convention Party, 
according to British intelligence sources.705 Although not everyone within the 
SNA appreciated cooperation with the Kenyan nationalists, Maxamed Cali Guleed 
reportedly met Tom Mboya in August 1959, asking for his assistance in obtaining 
a Somali elected representative in LegCo, the removal of the pass system in the 
Northern Frontier, and help for Ogaadeen Somalis who had been fined for 
entering Kenya.706 
Support from the Kenyan nationalists, however, did not materialise and the 
SNA remained the expression of a Nairobi-based trading elite, failing to secure a 
political constituency in the NFP. There, gradual socio-economic change and 
political events across the border were provoking subtle shifts in power balance, 
preparing the ground for the emergence of political parties. In Garissa, Chief 
Cumar Shuuriya (Ogaadeen/Cabdalla) saw his authority challenged by the 
growing prestige of Chief Macalin Maxamed Sanbul (Ogaadeen/Cabudwaaq), 
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who was extending his influence across all sections of the Garissa Somalis, 
including the Cabdalla. In 1958, the District Commissioner, Garissa, reported: 
 
He [Chief Macalin] is now without doubt the most powerful Political 
figure in the District.  […] It appears that he is anxious to consolidate 
his position as the leading Garissa Somali, in order to be able to bargain 
with both the British Administration and the Somalia Government from 
a position of strength. During the year he has moved away from the 
“Sitting on the fence attitude” to one where he must be regarded with 
respect as an independent leader.707 
 
One of Chief Macalin’s sons, Deeqoow, was emerging as a political 
activist.  Although he was only nine years old in 1947, Deeqoow Macalin Sanbul 
had been involved with the SYL before it was banned. As a teenager, Deeqoow 
had an uneasy relationship with his father and could not understand why a 
Suldaan had to take orders from the District Commissioner.708 In 1954, he became 
assistant clerk at Wajir but resented the fact that Somali pastoralists like him were 
not allowed to stay in townships overnight.709 When, in October 1957, he was 
convicted for theft, a copy of a report by the Central Committee of the Soviet 
Communist Party was found among his property. During his interrogation, he 
stated that he intended to show the report to his friends, acting in a way that ‘was 
provocatively anti-British’, according to a Special Branch report.710 Deeqoow’s 
political activism was motivated, first and foremost, by anti-colonial sentiments, 
which he later transferred into the secessionist campaign, becoming one of its 
leaders. 
Trade development in Garissa favoured the emergence of a new type of 
chiefs, most conspicuously exemplified by Yuusuf Xaaji Cabdi 
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(Ogaadeen/Cabdalla). Owner of the first ‘local’ Somali shop (opened in the mid-
1950s) in Garissa Township, Yuusuf Xaaji participated in the expanding livestock 
trade between Garissa, Lamu and Mombasa, sending cattle and shoats to the KMC 
in 1959.711 Along with a few other emerging Cabudwaaq and Cawlyahan 
businessmen, Yuusuf Xaaji was also indirectly involved in the sub rosa trade with 
Kismaayo.712 This trade was conducted by smugglers who sold livestock, ivory 
tusks, and game trophies to middlemen in Kismaayo and supplied traders in 
Garissa with goods, especially ‘Banaadir’ cloth, from Somalia. The livestock 
trade with Lamu, though, was the most lucrative business for Yuusuf Xaaji Cabdi, 
who actively engaged in political activity as soon as this was legalised in the NFP 
in 1960.    
In Wajir, livestock marketing did not expand as significantly as it did in 
Garissa. Nevertheless, in the late 1950s, successful government-controlled 
livestock sales were organised periodically by the KMC and, for the first time in 
the district’s history, ‘local’ Somali pastoralists were allowed to work as 
auctioneers and to obtain livestock trade licenses to participate in the KMC 
auctions. Among the newly licensed traders was Maxamed Yeroow Xasan 
(Digoodiya), an ex-military man; Maxamed Nuur Cali (Digoodiya), a town-boy 
coming from Tarbaj; and Xaaji Daqaane (Ogaadeen/Maxamed Subeer), a 
religious leader.713 These traders, with others, created the Wajir Trading 
Company, which became both a successful commercial operation and, covertly, a 
base for the organization of Somali politics. The Company’s members were the 
first Wajir pastoralists who became actively involved in party politics. 
 
 
5.3 The local dynamics of political mobilisation, 1960-61 
The commencement of the Lancaster House talks in London in February 
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1960, leading toward Kenya’s independence, had an immediate impact in the 
NFP. By March, Wajir ‘was seething with politics, and a political party, the 
Northern Province People’s Progressive Party (NPPPP), was in formation 
demanding the immediate secession of NFD to Somalia’.714 The party’s 
headquarters, though, were temporarily captured by Isiolo.715 By the end of 1960, 
another political party, the Northern Frontier Democratic Party (NFDP) was 
created in Garissa. Both parties were keen on secessionism for the people of the 
NFP.  A member of the Wajir Trading Company, Maxamed Nuur Cali, coined the 
slogan for the nascent secessionist movement: Kula Suusac – a mixture of Swahili 
and Somali terms literally meaning ‘[let’s] eat fermented camel milk’. Locally, 
the slogan was understood to say: ‘we will be better off if we keep our own 
lifestyle’.716 Support for secessionism and unification with the new Somali 
Republic, formed by the unification of former Italian Somalia and British 
Somaliland on 1 July 1960, grew rapidly throughout the NFP. 
However, neither of Kenya’s major political parties, the Kenya African 
National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), was 
willing to negotiate away the territorial integrity of the future state by supporting 
secessionism, although they had alternative visions of statecraft and governance 
for post-independence Kenya. Endowing the Northern Frontier Province with a 
degree of power and autonomy as a federalist region within Kenya was the only 
concession that KADU, which supported majimboism (regionalism), was willing 
to make. The aims of the Kenyan Somalis, though, went further than majimboism 
would then allow, as the political future of the NFD became a bargaining chip in 
the negotiations between the British Government and the emerging Kenyan 
political elite.717 
The issue of the future of the NFD brought together local histories and 
power struggles at various levels, intersecting high and local politics. The debates 
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around nationhood and self-determination were closely interlinked with social 
issues, like inter-generational conflict over authority, and access to land and 
resources. Inter-generational struggle was particularly evident in Isiolo township, 
where tensions within the local branch of the NPPPP reflected the younger 
generation’s challenge of traditional authority within the ‘alien’ Somali 
community. Cabdi Latiif Ayah (Isxaaq/Habar Jecelo), the chairman of the Isiolo 
branch of the NPPPP, was a young livestock keeper, regarded by elders as one of 
those ‘idle’ urbanites who engaged in politics because they ‘had nothing to do’.718 
‘Only in their dislike of “Kenya”, in their opposition to control of grazing in the 
Leasehold, and their opposition to ALMO are young and old at one’ – the District 
Commissioner, Isiolo, recorded in 1960.719 
Amidst pending land disputes, the registration of voters for the first 
Kenyan general elections, to be held in February 1961, became a hotly contested 
issue in Isiolo District, providing the NPPPP with an opportunity to strengthen its 
base among the Boran. Livestock raids had occurred between Boran and Samburu 
in December 1959, leaving a legacy of mistrust and hostility between the two 
groups. The Boran were still resenting the fact they had been found primarily 
responsible for the disturbances and ordered to pay over Shs. 15,000/-. When, in 
August 1960, they learned that they had been grouped together in the same 
electoral constituency as the Samburu, ‘this indeed seemed insult added to 
injury’– the District Commissioner commented – and ‘contributed largely to the 
boycott of the electoral registration which followed in September.’720 The fact that 
the constituency boundary had been fixed following the so-called ‘Somali Line’ 
(see Chapter 1) was interpreted as a trick to mark the territorial limit of secession, 
compelling those who lived to the west of it to ‘permanent association with 
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Kenya.’721 As a result, ‘an almost 100% boycott of the registration of electors as a 
protest against the delineation of the electoral constituencies and the grouping of 
the Somalis and Boran with the Samburu and Turkana’ was among the NPPPP’s 
major achievements in Isiolo in 1960.722 The party also protested against the 
ALMO monopoly, demanding open livestock sales, and engaged lawyers to 
pursue the claims that the Boran had risen against the Samburu as a result of the 
1959 raids.  
The idea of secession took root among the Uaso Boran. Towards the end 
of 1960, a branch of the NPPPP was formed at Garba Tulla and Jatani Wako 
Wariyo became one of its leading figures. Son of a chief who had converted to 
Islam and gone on pilgrimage to Makkah, Jatani Wako Wariyo was a livestock 
trader. Because of his business, he used to deal with various groups, namely 
Boran, Isiolo Somalis, Meru, and Somalis from Wajir, Garissa, and 
Muddogashi.723 Another Uaso Boran with a similar profile, Wako Hapi 
(mentioned in the previous section) was elected president of the NPPPP during a 
provincial meeting, attended by representatives from all districts of the NFP, 
which was held in Wajir in January 1961. The NPPPP vice-presidency was given 
to Alex Kholkholle, a Rendille from Marsabit, thus ensuring the party a foothold 
in that district as well. The above-mentioned Deeqoow Macalin Sanbul, son of the 
Ogaadeen/Cabudwaaq chief of Garissa, was elected secretary-general of the 
NPPPP, while Cabdi Rashiid Khaliif, son of the newly appointed Digoodiya/Reer 
Maxamuud chief of Wajir Khaliif Axmed, became the party’s treasurer. These 
appointments were intended to give the NPPPP a cross-ethnic identity, thereby 
strengthening solidarity among pastoralists and increasing the party’s social and 
political capital. During the same meeting, it was unanimously decided that the 
NPPPP would boycott the upcoming general elections. On Nomination Day, Cali 
Aadan ‘Lord’ was thus returned unopposed as an independent, having broken with 
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the NPPPP over the election issue.724 He then became the first member of the 
Legislative Council for Northern Province East. 
Despite the row over the election boycott, Cali Aadan ‘Lord’ maintained a 
close relationship with the NPPPP and, in May 1961, he led the party’s delegation 
that went to Nairobi to present a petition to the Governor, Sir Patrick Renison. 
The petition’s message was clear: should it happen that Britain did not give the 
Northern Province the right to self-determination before it handed over power to 
Kenya, the inhabitants of the NFD feared ‘neglect, bad administration and 
disregard of their rights as citizens at the best, and oppression, servitude, brutality, 
and civil war’ at the worst.725 Emphasizing the otherness of ‘the native inhabitants 
of the Colony’ – regarded as ‘alien in religion, language, race, background, 
custom and pastoral and social tradition’ – the petitioners expressed their concern 
that in an independent Kenya ‘they would not be permitted to continue their 
traditional way of life undisturbed’.726 In the event that any other group attempted 
to impose its own way of life on the people of the NFD, this ‘could only lead to 
bloodshed and riot’ – the petition stated.727 
While the secessionist movement was seeking to harness political capital 
by building a common identity among pastoralists, a split emerged between 
politicians and chiefs in Wajir, although, officially, they remained united in their 
demand for secession. The chiefs feared that the politicians would seize power 
from them unless they made a determinate effort to retain their traditional 
leadership, while the politicians argued that politics was not the concern of the 
chiefs.728 Concerns about leadership also differentiated the Northern Frontier 
Democratic Party from the NPPPP. When the NFDP opened a branch in Wajir in 
1961, a few people who had theretofore supported the NPPPP defected to the new 
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party; among these was Maxamed Yeroow Xasan (Digoodiya), one of the first 
licensed traders among the ‘local’ Somalis, and Ibraahim Maayo 
(Ogaadeen/Maxamed Subeer). The latter had spent several years in Kismaayo, 
where he had been employed first as a soldier then as a translator, before 
becoming a trader. He had returned to Wajir following a dispute with Xarti 
businessmen in Kismaayo.729 Ibraahim Maayo bragged that ‘he knew how things 
worked in Somalia’.730 Until the beginning of 1963, the NPPPP and the NFDP 
had the same position on secession. Oral testimonies, however, suggest that, 
although the supporters of NFDP (very few compared to those of the NPPPP) 
initially supported the idea of secession, they disapproved the way in which the 
NPPPP was being led.731 
In Garissa, where the NFDP was first established, tensions emerged 
between the two secessionist parties early in 1961, when chief Macalin Sanbul led 
a group of Ogaadeen/Cabudwaaq elders on a journey to Kismaayo to settle an old 
diya-payment issue but the trip ‘turned into a full-scale affair with a visit to 
Mogadishu’.732  Chief Macalin Sanbul was received by the President, the Prime 
Minister and various Ministers of the Somali Republic and was accommodated in 
the best hotel in the capital. The NFDP, which had its power base among the 
Ogaadeen/Cabdalla and was led by Yuusuf Xaaji Cabdi (mentioned in the 
previous section), thus feared to be marginalised in the secessionist campaign and 
began canvassing for support among the Orma along the Tana River.733 
The argument that the NPPPP leadership was not representative of the 
‘local people’ gradually shaped an autochthony discourse within the NFDP. The 
supporters of this party, mainly chiefs and elders who feared to lose their 
authority, claimed that those who were driving the NPPPP were not ‘locals’, but 
‘alien’ Somalis, thereby internalizing the categorization used by the British 
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administrators. As the main financers of the NPPPP were traders who belonged to 
‘alien’ Somali clans, these, especially the Xarti, were increasingly perceived by 
rival corporate groups as those who were calling the shots in the secessionist 
campaign. 
Tensions between ‘native’ and ‘alien’ Somalis also drove competition 
between Wajir and Isiolo to host the headquarters of the NPPPP. Although a 
Xarti/Warsangeli, Ismaaciil Xaaji, was among the NPPPP founders in Wajir, 
‘alien’ Somalis were more numerous in Isiolo than in Wajir. Here, ‘local’ 
Somalis, especially among the new livestock traders, formed the majority of 
NPPPP supporters. The Xarti, therefore, hoped to control the party from Isiolo.734 
Wajir, however, managed to temporarily capture the NPPPP headquarters. 
The issue of autochthony acquired particular salience in Mandera and 
Ceelwaaq, where NPPPP branches were registered in 1961. NPPPP supporters 
accused the colonial administration of discriminating against local people in 
labour recruitment in favour of people ‘imported’ from other provinces.735 The 
Somali National Association also complained to the Chief Secretary about ‘open 
discrimination’ allegedly practiced by the Ministry of Works in Mandera and Ceel 
Waaq, denouncing a government policy intended ‘to satisfy certain people of 
certain Province, (at our expense) to calm them down politically.’736 The Ministry 
concerned responded to these accusations explaining that preference was given to 
people from down-country tribes because there were no locals sufficiently 
qualified to replace them.737 This explanation, however, failed to quell popular 
discontent and feelings continued to run high in Mandera District. In December 
1961, the Assistant Meteorological Observer, a Nyanza man, ‘met his end at the 
hands of some Ethiopian Garre Murre’, while the Kikuyu Hospital Assistant at 
Ceel Waaq Dispensary was faced with a lot of criticism from the ‘locals’ and 
 
734 Cabdi Sabdoow Nuur, interview, Wajir, 23 March 2016. 
735 OBL, Micr. Afr. 515, Reel 44, PC/NFD 1/3/3, Mandera District Annual Report for 
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736 KNA, HAKI 1/325, Guled to Chief Secretary, 21 June 1961. 
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several demands were made for his replacement.738 Hostility, though, was partly 
fuelled by the attitudes of government employees: ‘I think it is true to say that 
where the down-country people behaved themselves and did not get involved in 
heavy drinking and “fitina” – the District Commissioner observed – they were 
tolerated, but not so any who did not go out of the way to help and be friendly to 
the locals.’739 
While the NPPPP was gaining strength in Wajir, Garissa, Mandera, and 
Isiolo, becoming the largest political party in the NFP, ‘pro-Kenya’ parties 
emerged in Marsabit, Moyale and Garissa. Among these, the Northern Province 
United Association (NPUA) was the most prominent. The NPUA, which had its 
headquarters in Marsabit and sub-branches in Moyale, assembled Boran, Gabbra 
and Burji groups against secession. In the attempt to extend its power base to 
Isiolo District, the NPUA attacked the secessionist movement on the grounds that 
‘the Somalis in the NFD were not the real natives of the province, which belonged 
to the Boran, Turkana, Rendille, Warda, and Samburu tribes’.740 The NPUA, 
though, failed to appeal to the Uaso Boran – in Garba Tulla the party had only 
three members.741 Another smaller anti-secession party, the Northern Province 
People National Union (NPPNU) was formed in Garissa to champion the interests 
of non-Somali communities living along the Tana River. These parties adopted an 
‘explicitly nativist rhetoric’ to voice the concerns of ‘minority groups’ that 
‘remained unconvinced by the promise of equality within the Somali Union – due, 
most likely, to remembered histories of being driven off land or forced into 
oppressive relations of clientship’ – as Keren Weitzberg has pointed out.742 The 
nativist rhetoric was also encouraged by Ethiopia, which supported the NPUA 
politically and financially.  
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5.4 The internationalization of the NFD issue, 1960-62 
At a time when the whole region’s geopolitical landscape was being redesigned, 
anti-secession parties gave Ethiopia leverage in the NFP and on Kenyan politics 
more broadly. During 1961, NPPPP leaders repeatedly accused Ethiopia of 
supporting the creation of anti-secessionist parties and of conspiring with African 
leaders in Kenya with the aim of perpetuating the division of the Somali 
territories.743 British sources confirm that in Moyale the Ethiopians ‘were carrying 
out a fairly large-scale campaign to convince the Boran of the necessity for Boran 
unity and opposition to any demands for secession to Somalia’.744 
Addis Ababa also supported the United Ogaden Somali Association 
(UOSA). Created in Eastleigh in 1960, the UOSA had only a few members, most 
of whom were Ogaadeen/Maxamed Subeer from ‘outside’ the NFP – according to 
Deeqoow Macalin Sanbul.745  Officials at Government House were convinced that 
the UOSA was patronised by the Ethiopian Consul-General in Kenya and was 
‘totally bogus’.746 This notwithstanding, the UOSA was very vocal. It complained 
to the Governor about the lack of representation of ‘indigenous’ Somalis in the 
Legislative Council, accusing the NPPPP of being ‘only a party of the people who 
had immigrated to the Northern Province from alien territories’.747 The UOSA 
claimed that the Ogaadeen were the ‘indigenous Somalis’ of the Northern 
Province of Kenya and owed ‘their loyalties to Kenya only’.748 While rejecting 
unification with Somalia, the UOSA claimed that the lands which encompassed 
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the NFP, former Jubaland, and Ethiopia’s Ogaden Province were ‘the property of 
Ogaden tribe’ and should, therefore, be ‘united to make a separate Region’.749 In a 
December 1961 letter to the British Parliament, the Association emphasised that 
‘the Ogaden countries are very rich and bigger than Somalia. There is much 
water, livestock and etc., with a trading Custom Department at Kismayu. So it can 
depend on itself’.750 
Contrary to the widely held perception that the secessionist movement was 
an emanation of the Somali Republic, it was not until the autumn of 1961 that the 
Somali Government began to fund the NPPPP. In October, Maxamuud Yuusuf 
Aadan ‘Muro’ (Daarood/Majeerteen), Member of the Somali National Assembly 
and Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Sheekh Maxamuud 
Maxamed Faarax (Ogaadeen/Malingur), Secretary-General of the SYL, visited 
Isiolo, Garba Tulla, Wajir, Garissa, and Nairobi on a ‘fact-finding mission’.751 
Maxamuud Yuusuf Aadan ‘Muro’ had been a frequent though clandestine visitor 
to the NFP since the 1950s. He used to travel from Mogadishu to Wajir via 
Kismaayo illegally, relying on the support of local people who provided him with 
passes – according to his grand-son Cabdi Casiis.752 The two-man delegation 
spent about So. 10,000 (So. 20=£1) on propaganda during the visit and left a 
further sum of So. 25,000 with the Somali Consul-General in Nairobi for a similar 
purpose. However, the report that Maxamuud ‘Muro’ prepared for the Somali 
Government after he returned to Mogadishu was ‘somewhat pessimistic in tone’ 
and assessed ‘support for secession in the NFP as about 50%’, in comparison to 
an alleged 80% some months earlier – according to British sources.753 This drop 
was blamed partly on Ethiopian propaganda and partly on the ineffectiveness of 
the Somali Consul-General, who apparently was ‘not very active in contacting 
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NFP Somalis’.754 Following the mission report, the Somali Government began to 
provide the NPPPP with financial assistance on a regular basis.755 
The nature and extent, though, of the Somali Republic’s support to the 
secessionist campaign was still a matter of debate in Mogadishu, as there were 
differences of opinion among government officials. During a visit to Nairobi in 
July 1961, Cismaan Axmed Xasan, senior Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs ‘advised the Somali community to associate themselves with the Africans 
and with African politics’ and to support the creation of an East African 
Federation.756 British sources reported him as saying that ‘if the Federation was a 
success Somalia might join it a few years hence’.757 According to Cismaan 
Axmed Xasan, ‘the pressure for secession of the Northern Frontier was 
unnecessary’; although ‘the inevitable outcome would be secession’, the whole 
matter was under discussion in the Somali Government.758 
A delegation of fifteen representatives from the NFP, including politicians 
and chiefs from each of the Province’s districts, went to Mogadishu in September 
1961, seeking moral and material support for the secessionist campaign. The 
delegation stayed in the Somali Republic for nearly three months and attended the 
session of the Somali National Assembly, at which a motion was passed asking 
the Somali Government to bring pressure to bear on the British Government to 
find a speedy settlement of the Northern Frontier Province problem before Kenya 
became independent. Nevertheless, the Somali Prime Minister Cabdirashiid Cali 
Sharmarke confidentially warned the NFP representatives that the future of the 
Somali Republic looked bleak, as the country’s economy and security were in 
jeopardy, according to Deeqoow Macalin Sanbul, who was part of the 
delegation.759 Somali ministers allegedly shared their fears that the project of 
unification of the Somali lands, although enshrined in the Constitution of the 
Somali Republic, could not be achieved, as foreign interests in the Horn of Africa 
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were too strong and a united Somalia would represent a threat to both the West 
and the East.760 Moreover, the NFP delegates found that political factionalism was 
undermining the state they wanted to become part of. The secessionists apparently 
were under no illusion that they were going to win. What was at stake, though, 
was not whether they would win or lose. To them, it was a matter of ‘honour and 
dignity’ – as Deeqoow put it.761 Although the outcome of the delegation’s visit to 
Mogadishu ‘somewhat dampened enthusiasm for immediate secession of the NFD 
and its unification with the Somali Republic’, temporary disillusionment was 
somewhat compensated by increasing financial support from the Somali 
Government.762 
Cali Aadan ‘Lord’, who had also been part of the delegation, died shortly 
after his return from Mogadishu and was replaced by Cabdi Rashiid Khaliif, the 
NPPPP treasurer, in February 1962. In the by-election, Cabdi Rashiid secured 
1034 votes against 590 obtained by his rival, the vice-president of the NPPPP 
Alex Kholkholle (Rendille), who stood as the party’s official candidate.763 Oral 
testimonies suggest that the majority of the ‘local people’ in Wajir voted for 
Cabdi Rashiid Khaliif, whereas most of the ‘alien’ Somalis and the other NPPPP 
leaders (who wished to strengthen Boran and Rendille support for the secessionist 
cause) voted for Alex Kholkholle.764 Despite this split vote, in the Legislative 
Council Cabdi Rashiid spoke for three parties: the NPPPP, the NFDP, and the 
People’s National League (PNL), an off-shoot of the NFDP which had its 
headquarters in Garissa. 
As a member of the Legislative Council, Cabdi Rashiid Khaliif attended 
the plenary session of the second Lancaster House conference in February 1962. 
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Meanwhile, an official delegation from the NFP, consisting of leading figures 
from each of the Province’s six districts, flew into London, accompanied 
unofficially by representatives of the three secessionist parties (NPPPP, NFDP, 
and PNL). By admitting to the conference an official delegation of pro-secession 
representatives from the NFP, ‘the British Government appeared to give tacit 
acknowledgment that there was a case to answer’ and to go against the wishes of 
Kenyan leaders and Addis Ababa, as John Drysdale has rightly observed.765 
During the conference, the British Government indicated that they would give 
effect to the will of the majority of the inhabitants of the NFD before Kenya’s 
self-governing constitution came into operation. As a consequence, the Northern 
Frontier District Commission was established. The British Government, however, 
did not consult the delegates from the NFP about sending an independent 
commission to the area to ascertain the people’s opinion. The British proposal was 
accepted by Cabdi Rashiid Khaliif ‘in place of a referendum under United Nations 
auspices’, which the pro-secession delegation from the NFP preferred.766 
 
 





Delegates from the Northern Frontier Province with Somali government officials in 
Mogadishu, September 1961. Courtesy from Deeqoow Macalin Sanbul.  
 
First row (bottom), from left to right: Cabdi Megaag, First Secretary of the Somali 
Embassy in Nairobi; Xaaji Maxamed Sheekh Cali, chief from Mandera; Deeqoow 
Macalin Sanbul, Secretary of the NPPPP. Second row, from left to right: Aadan Jiiraan, 
NFDP politician from Wajir; Maxamuud ‘Jiijiile’, Minister of Internal affairs of the 
Somali Republic; Axmed Faarax, former appointed member of the Legislative Council 
(1958-1961), from Moyale; Chief Macalin Sanbul from Garissa; Maxamed Xaaji 
Ibraahim Cigaal, Minister of Education of the Somali Republic; Yuusuf Xaaji, President 
of the NFDP, from Garissa; Haadi Sheekh, chairman of the Mandera branch of the 
Northern Frontier United Congress Party; chief Jatani Guyo from Moyale. Third row 
(top): Cabdirashiid Khaliif Axmed, treasurer of the NPPPP (sixth one from the left); 
Cabdi Latiif Ayah, chairman of the Isiolo branch of the NPPPP (seventh one from the 
left); Chief Xaaji Galma Dido (eighth one from the left). 
 
 
5.5 The Northern Frontier District Commission and its implications 
The announcement of the creation of the Northern Frontier District Commission 
revamped the demand for secession, on the one hand, and increased political 
activity on the anti-secession front, on the other hand. At Garissa, for instance, the 
Orma under Chief Guyo Dube broke away from the Northern Province Peoples’ 
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National Union and formed their own party, the Northern Province Peoples’ 
National League (NPPNL).767 A branch of KANU was registered in Isiolo, but 
apart from assembling numbers of Turkana and Meru to parade before the 
Commission appeared to achieve little.768 KANU sought to capitalise on long 
standing land disputes between Meru and Somalis – in 1961 a group of Meru even 
petitioned the Governor asking that the Somalis be evicted from the Isiolo area – 
to assemble the Meru against secession and challenge the NPPPP.769 A minor riot 
occurred in Isiolo on 26 August 1962, when the KANU Youth Wing organised an 
anti-secession rally among the Meru and the Turkana. NPPPP supporters broke up 
the rally and took to the streets, moving to the centre of the township. A General 
Service Unit (GSU) of the Kenya Police restored order using tear gas and twenty-
eight people were injured.770 
Mr G.C.M. Onyiuke, QC, from Nigeria, and Major-General M.P. Bogert, 
CBE, from Canada, were appointed as members of the Northern Frontier District 
Commission. They toured the NFP during October and November 1962. The 
NPPPP and the NFDP prepared a joint memorandum which made three demands, 
namely ‘secession from Kenya forthwith, the establishment of a Legislative 
Assembly, followed by independence and reunification with the Somali Republic 
by an Act of Union’.771 The commissioners started at Garissa where they 
established a ‘pattern of enquiry’ followed in successive districts. The principal 
means they employed were public gatherings (barazas) at which the leaders and 
other representatives of the NFP people ‘could address the Commission in the 
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presence of a large audience’.772 Thirty-five public barazas were held. The 
Commission also received written and oral petitions from a variety of political 
groups, including the NPPPP, the NFDP, the NPUA, the NPPNU, and the PNL, as 
well as individual submissions from chiefs and elders, traders, and religious 
leaders.  
In its final report, the NFD Commission described having heard two 
bodies of opinion. The so-called ‘Somali Opinion’, which advocated the 
amalgamation of the NFD with the Somali Republic, was shared by all who gave 
evidence to the Commission in Wajir and Mandera districts and the majority of 
petitioners in Garissa district, plus some groups of Ajuuraan and Boran from 
Moyale and Isiolo.  The ‘Kenya Opinion’, which advocated that the NFD should 
remain part of Kenya, was expressed most forcefully in Marsabit, but also in some 
areas in Moyale and Isiolo districts, and by the Bantu riverine people and most of 
the Orma in Garissa district. The report argued for a religious explanation: ‘we 
noted that the division of opinion almost exactly correspond to the division 
between Moslem and non-Moslem’.773 This argument implied that the 
commissioners could not believe that the non-Muslim Rendille ‘genuinely’ 
wanted to join the Somali Republic.774 
Evidence indicates, though, that religious belonging was not a self-evident 
motive for political mobilisation. It was, rather, the result of ongoing social 
processes and acted as a catalyser. This was particularly evident in Isiolo District. 
The number of families of ‘holy men’ and sheikhs arriving in Garba Tulla each 
year had increased from an average of two between 1944 and 1958 to five in 1959 
and six in 1960, eventually reaching a record-high of fifteen in 1962.775 Oral 
testimonies suggest that what the Uaso Boran feared the most was being 
marginalised and trampled on by a hostile Kenyan government. Islam provided 
the best guarantee against marginalisation: ‘all faithful Muslims are brothers’ – 
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‘innamal mu’minuuna ikhwatun’ ٌةَوِْخإ َنُونِمْؤُمْلا اَمَّنِإ  – the tenth verse of the Qur’anic 
chapter (surah) ‘Al-Hujuraat’ says. As Hassan Wako Wariyo, the younger brother 
of the Boran leader of the NPPPP in Garba Tulla, put it: ‘We fought against our 
fears. […] We told ourselves: if we go and fight, we will die. If we don’t go, we 
will die anyway.[…] We fought for our land.’776 Religious belonging increased 
the Boran’s resolve to fight for secession but was not the main motive for 
mobilisation. 
The NFD Commission concluded that the ‘Somali Opinion’ was 
decisively predominant. The British Government, however, was by now unwilling 
to keep its pledge to act on majority opinion in the Northern Frontier Province.777 
Publication of the NFD Commission report was delayed until the Regional 
Boundaries Commission had defined the territorial areas over which future 
regional authorities would exercise their jurisdiction, the results of both 
Commissions being made public at the end of December 1962. The conclusion 
reached was that, despite the findings of the NFD Commission, ‘British interests 
would be best served by keeping all of the NFD districts within Kenya after 
independence’.778 Moreover, secession would have angered the Ethiopian 
Government, which was strengthening its military ties with the United States. 
There was also a possibility that oil might be found in the NFP, which was one 
more reason to keep the province within Kenya.779 
As the British Government anticipated that the publication of the reports 
by the Regional Boundaries and NFD Commissions might cause disturbances in 
certain areas, two companies of the King’s African Rifles were deployed on 17 
December in the Northern Frontier Province. The prepositioning of forces by the 
Kenya Government, nicknamed Operation LATE FORK, was run concurrently 
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with a joint Army-Royal Air Force signals exercise, Operation DIAL ZERO.780 
This was aimed at practicing certain aspects of Operation INSTALMENT, by 
which the police and armed forces, with the support of ancillary troops of the 
British Army, were expected to ‘cooperate in the restoration of law and order if 
necessary’.781 During Exercise DIAL ZERO, the headquarters of the 70 Infantry 
Brigade, King’s African Rifles, and a small Royal Air Force headquarters were 
established at Isiolo, ‘and two battalion headquarters were located one at Wajir 
and the other at Garissa.’782 Counter-insurgency measures had been envisaged 
since the summer of 1962. Contrary to British expectations, though, there was no 
immediate breach of the peace in the NFP. The secessionist movement developed 
into an insurgency largely as a consequence of the reactions it prompted from the 
British and Kenyan governments, which deliberately closed political space, 
thereby pushing the secessionists into violent confrontation, as we shall discuss in 




This chapter has shown the importance of looking at the transformations that the 
social and economic fabric of the Northern Frontier Province underwent in the 
second half of the 1950s and the early 1960s for understanding the possibilities 
 
780 KNA, BB/43/30, ‘Draft – 70 Inf Bde KAR - Ex DIAL ZERO - Ex Instructions’, 
enclosed with Fitzalan-Howard to Biggs, 17 November 1962; Dentto PCs, 7 
December 1962; Brigadier Commander, 70 Inf Bde KAR, ‘Ex DIAL ZERO/Op 
LATE FORK, December 1962; TNA, FCO 141/7040, GOC, East Africa Command, 
‘East Africa Defence Committee. Report on the Army in East Africa’, Part II, para 
10, enclosed with East Africa Defence Committee, Meeting agenda, 23 April 1963.  
781 TNA, FCO 141/7129, Gov to SoS, 29 July and 9 August 1963; PS, ‘Use of British 
forces in the N.F.D.’, 8 August 1963; Chairman, East Africa Command, to 
Commander-in-Chief, Mid-East, 9 August 1963. 
782 TNA, FCO 141/7040, GOC, East Africa Command, ‘East Africa Defence Committee. 
Report on the Army in East Africa’, Part III, para 26, enclosed with East Africa 
Defence Committee, Meeting agenda, 23 April 1963. 
244 
 
and constraints that framed political options in the borderland in the process of 
decolonisation. Recruitment for the anti-Mau Mau campaign produced a cleavage 
between the NFP northerners who fought for the British and down-country 
‘Africans’, reinforcing the assumption of racial superiority amongst the Kenya 
Somalis and strengthening the alliance between the Somalis and the Uaso Boran. 
At the same time, British policy towards the so-called ‘Somalia threat’ curtailed 
the possibilities for self-determination for the Kenya Somalis. The British 
established the backbone of what was to become the infrastructure of 
counterinsurgency on the Kenya-Somalia frontier as early as 1958, before the 
secessionist movement began. However, new possibilities seemed to emerge with 
the gradual transformation of the material base of pastoral society, particularly 
through the expansion of livestock trade, which fostered social interaction and 
economic exchanges in the NFP, and with the legalisation of political parties in 
1960. All these transformations played a fundamental role in defining the 
positions that the borderlanders later adopted in the secessionist insurgency.   
Within this context, religious belonging was not a self-evident determinant 
of political behaviour but, rather, a catalyser for political mobilisation. Islam was 
a key component of social and cultural assimilation amongst the borderland 
Somalis and their neighbours and acted as a glue within the secessionist 
movement, although its effectiveness in overshadowing political divisions 
depended on contextual factors. Whilst the independence movement in Somalia 
and the first Somali Republic did not put Islam at the forefront of political 
discourse, the fear of religious marginalisation played an important role in the 
development of ‘aspirational secessionism’ in the Kenya-Somalia borderland.783  
The issue of the future of the former NFD brought local histories to the 
surface, at the intersection of the high politics of decolonisation and the deep 
politics of grassroot mobilisation. Debates around nationhood and self-
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determination were entwined with inter-generational conflict over authority and, 
most importantly, with issues of access to land and resources. Pending land 
disputes influenced political alignment, bringing the issue of autochthony into 
political discourse. Even within the secessionist movement, the idiom of 
autochthony was used to articulate concerns about the movement’s leadership, 
reflecting a deepening division between the Northern Frontier Democratic Party, 
basically led by government-paid chiefs, many of whom were involved in trade, 
and the Northern Province People’s Progressive Party. The autochthony argument 
was also used by the so-called ‘pro-Kenya’ parties to discredit the secessionist 
claim of those whom they saw as immigrants from alien territories. 
The anti-secession parties, particularly in Marsabit and Moyale, gave 
Ethiopia leverage in the NFP and in Kenyan politics more broadly, contributing to 
the internationalization of the NFD issue. It was this new dimension that 
prompted the Somali Government, within which different views regarding the 
future of the NFD and the modalities of secession persisted, to fund the NPPPP at 
the end of 1961. The regional dimension also influenced the ambiguous attitude of 
the British Government towards secession. Concerns about the threats to regional 
stability and political calculations related to the Cold War eventually convinced 
London that British interests would be better preserved by keeping all the former 
NFD within Kenya after independence. The path to the future was not as open as 
the NFD Somalis had hoped, as we will see in the next chapter. 
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6 COLONIAL RESPONSE AND THE POLITICS 
OF INSURRECTION 
 
6.1 Popular discontent and the 1963 general election 
Following the publication of the reports of the NFD and Regional Boundaries 
Commissions, a delegation from the Northern Frontier Province led by Cabdi 
Rashiid Khaliif visited the Somali Republic. From Mogadishu airport, Cabdi 
Rashiid warned the British Government that, if secession were not to be granted, 
the people of the NFD would ‘die in order to achieve their aims’.784 
It was decided that the Secretary of State for the Colonies Lord Duncan 
Sandys would make an announcement on the future of the NFD on 8 March 1963. 
In anticipation of possible disturbances, 70 Infantry Brigade KAR together with 
British supporting detachments were placed at notice on 4 March to implement 
Operation Instalment (see Chapter 5) and one Beaver aircraft was positioned at 
Nanyuki.785 Lord Duncan Sandys announced from Government House in Nairobi 
that a seventh Region of Kenya, the North Eastern Region (NER), would be 
formed, consisting of the districts of Mandera (plus that part of Moyale 
corresponding to the Ajuuraan grazing area), Wajir, and Garissa, excluding the 
Orma and Riverine tribes. In this way, ‘the British Government merely committed 
themselves to an administrative decision’ – the Somali Government protested.786 
The Somali Republic consequently severed diplomatic relations with the United 
Kingdom. 
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The Colonial Secretary’s announcement provoked intense indignation, 
which erupted into violence in Mandera, Ceelwaaq, and Rhamu. In Mandera, 
about two hundred men, women, and children regrouped in front of the Fort, 
screaming anti-British slogans and ‘wearing white head-bands splashed with red 
(white for mourning, red for blood).’787 Three non-authorised demonstrations 
were held at Isiolo, but no disturbances occurred, except when ‘the Union Jack 
was accidentally pulled down’; the flag, though, was ‘handed over by the culprit 
to the TP officer on duty nearby’ – the District Commissioner, Daud Dabasso 
Wabera, reported.788 According to witnesses who were present at the scene, 
however, things went differently. Wabera was a Gabbra from Marsabit who had 
been appointed District Commissioner in Isiolo in January 1963. He was the first 
African to hold such a post in the Northern Frontier Province. Oral testimonies 
indicate that he took decisive action to prevent a British officer from shooting the 
protesters who were tearing down the Union Jack on purpose.789 The protesters, 
NPPPP supporters from Garba Tulla, were led by Jatani Wako Wariyo 
(menyioned in Chapter 5).790 Daud Dabasso Wabera, who knew them one by one, 
allegedly got hold of the British officer’s arm, imploring him not to shoot.791 
Although Wabera worked on the Government’s side, he saved the lives of the 
protesters, as he saw them, first and foremost, as his kin, according to oral 
testimonies.792 It seems that, following this incident, British officials in Isiolo 
didn’t look too kindly on Wabera. 
A mass rally attended by secessionist chiefs, headmen and political leaders 
from across the North Eastern Region was held in Wajir between 19 and 22 
March 1963 to decide whether or not the traditional authorities of the NER should 
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stop cooperating with the Governor. Thirty-four chiefs handed in notice of their 
collective resignation, which was refused on the grounds that only individual 
resignations could be accepted by the Kenyan Government.793 Subsequently, 
confidential discussions were held locally, in which British officials encouraged 
the rebellious chiefs to revert their decision to resign.794 
Following the Wajir rally and the mass resignation of chiefs, Alex 
Kholkholle was arrested and restricted to an area in Kwale district, Coast 
Province, on 27March. The restriction order against Kholkolle, the first to be 
served in the NFD since 1948, was issued on the grounds that ‘his continued 
presence in the Province would have constituted a threat to security in that 
area’.795 A profile of Kholkolle prepared by the Special Branch a few weeks 
earlier emphasised that, in 1961, he had made several public speeches ‘urging 
audiences to throw off the “Colonialist yoke”’, reportedly stating, on one 
occasion, that ‘this would be achieved by force and the British flag replaced by 
that of the Somali Republic.’796 In August 1962, he had ‘announced publicly that 
he was ready to die in order to achieve secession and that the Somalis would have 
to spill blood before they could fly their own flag’.797 The fact that Alex 
Kholkholle envisaged the secessionist struggle primarily as an anti-colonial 
struggle made him a dangerous extremist in the eyes of the British administration. 
His restriction, though, did not quell the demand for secession, to the contrary.  
Elections were scheduled for late May 1963, but the NPPPP indicated its 
intention to boycott them. As the secessionist party fielded no candidate, and other 
candidates also eventually withdrew, no representatives were returned to either of 
the national legislatures or the Regional Assembly in the North Eastern Region. In 
Isiolo Township, the two KANU candidates for Senate and for the Regional 
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Assembly, both Meru government employees, were returned unopposed on 
Nomination Day, while Adan Wako Bonaya, a Boran from Garba Tulla, and 
Erastus Mwangi Muteru, Kikuyu, contested the House of Representatives seat, the 
former on an NPUA/KANU-sponsored ticket and the latter as an independent.798 
A serious riot occurred in Isiolo during the polling, on 24 May. According 
to British sources, about 1,000 Somalis encircled the polling booths armed with 
rocks, slings, and knives and clashed with groups of people who were waiting to 
vote. Tear gas failed to restore order and ‘officers opened fire on the 
demonstrators who were slinging stones at the police’.799 Four Somalis, including 
a woman, were killed and nine were injured.800 Following the incident, one 
company of the 5th Battalion, KAR, was sent to Isiolo to support the police and 
one platoon was deployed at Garba Tulla. A dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed 
on Isiolo for three days and a further daylight curfew order was enforced ‘on 
persons of Somali and Boran origin’.801 Between 24 May and 3 June, the KAR 
company in Isiolo was employed in patrolling and ‘in joint operations with the 
police and GSU’ in the Isiolo and Garba Tulla areas.802 
In the immediate aftermath of the Isiolo riot, restrictions orders were 
issued against three secessionist leaders, Wako Hapi, Maxamed Faarax Muuse 
Shaacur and Xirsi Xaaji Jaamac (two Xarti/Majeerteen from Isiolo).803 Their 
removal from the NFD, however, had been decided more than two weeks before 
the riot occurred.804 Portrayed as ‘leaders in the policy of non-co-operation with 
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the Kenya Government and in the boycott of elections’, the three secessionists 
were accused of using intimidation and advocating violence to achieve their goals. 
Although it was agreed that the Government’s press statement would ‘naturally 
emphasise’ that the sole reason for restriction was the preservation of law and 
order in the area, ‘the chief danger’ – the Acting Governor admitted – had always 
been ‘the subversion of Chiefs and Kenya Government employees in the area’.805 
The riot only made ‘the question of publicity much easier’.806 
Following the May 1963 general elections, Kenya was granted internal 
self-government and Jomo Kenyatta was appointed Prime Minister in June.  
 
 
6.2 Shadows under the sun: an unsolved double murder 
In the afternoon of 28 June 1963, Daud Dabasso Wabera and the pro-secession 
chief Xaaji Galma Dido, together with six headmen and elders, a driver, and a 
tribal policeman, were heading back to Garba Tulla after visiting Sericho trading 
centre. At about 4.00 p.m., seven miles north of Muddogashi, they were halted by 
a civilian Land Rover blocking the track and caught in an ambush. Two Somali 
gunmen shot Daud Dabasso Wabera and Xaaji Galma Dido to death and drove off 
in their Land Rover. After crashing through a road barrier and rifle fire at Wajir 
and being pursued to the Kenya-Somalia border at Weel Garaas unsuccessfully, 
they crossed into Somalia. Two days after the incident, the Governor of Kenya 
Malcom MacDonald reported to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that ‘this 
was a deliberate, planned assassination by two expatriate Mijertein Somalis’.807 
The two killers, however, were not ‘expatriates’: one, Maxamed Maxamuud 
Faarax, was an ex-inspector of the Kenya Police who had been dismissed from 
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service and had been living in Nanyuki and Isiolo, while the other, Maxamed 
Gele, was an ex-KAR soldier from Isiolo.808 
Writing to Lord Duncan Sandys three days after the murder, the Governor 
indicated what he considered to be the possible motive for the crime:  
 
The Regional Government Agent [Wabera] had arranged a public 
meeting for the next day, 29th June, at Garba Tulla, which was to be 
attended by Chiefs and other leaders from both Marsabit and Isiolo 
districts. The primary object of the meeting was to encourage co-
operation with the Government in the maintenance of law and order and 
the proper conduct of administration. Since the success of the meeting 
would have been a blow to the pro-secessionists, it is possible the 
immediate motive for the crime lay here.809 
 
Although it is widely accepted that Xaaji Galma Dido was killed by 
accident, neither the instigators nor the motive of Wabera’s murder have ever 
been identified. Daud Dabasso Wabera had developed close connections with 
Boran and ‘alien’ Somalis in Isiolo before being appointed as District 
Commissioner. In 1961, he had been converted to Islam by Xaaji Cabdalla Faarax 
(mentioned in Chapter 5). Wabera’s appointment ‘had been a political choice’ – 
as Hannah Whittaker has pointed out –, intended to quell the demand for 
secession amongst the Boran and to draw those Somalis with whom he had 
connections into cooperation with the Kenyan Government.810 The political task 
he had been assigned, though, did not prevent Daud Dabasso Wabera from 
developing genuine relationships with the secessionists, even when this entailed 
going against the wishes of other government officials, as we discussed in the 
previous section. Oral testimonies suggest that ‘he was like a son’ to the people of 
Isiolo, who regarded him as ‘a good Muslim’.811 
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Daud Dabasso Wabera allegedly offered the ‘alien’ Somalis to give them 
land titles if they refused to join the secessionist campaign.812 The Isiolo Special 
Leasehold Area, where most of them lived, was governed by the Trust Land 
(Isiolo) rules. These prohibited the occupation of land or the possession, herding, 
or grazing of livestock in that area without permission from the Settlement 
Officer, and the construction of any permanent building. Xaaji Cabdalla Faarax 
allegedly encouraged his kinsmen to accept the District Commissioner’s offer, but 
the Somali elders refused, for fear that land registration would hamper their 
freedom of movement and prevent them from keeping livestock.813 Oral 
testimonies indicate that Daud Dabasso Wabera also attempted to convince Xaaji 
Cabdalla Faarax and Maxamuud Maxamed ‘Jabaani’, a Xarti trader and 
transporter, to stand as candidates in the 1963 general elections.814 Wabera, 
however, failed on this front as well. Xaaji Cabdalla and Maxamuud ‘Jabaani’, 
who feared consequences and wanted to safeguard their business interests, 
declined the invitation.815 Apparently, the District Commissioner even proposed 
Jatani Wako Wariyo to stand for the senatorial seat, which the NPPPP leader, 
after some temporizing, refused.816 
Hannah Whittaker has mentioned that ‘in some popular accounts…the 
death of Wabera is understood as the result of a conspiracy between the Somali 
and some colonial employees at Isiolo’, but she has dismissed the alleged 
involvement of British officials in Wabera’s assassination as ‘highly 
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improbable’.817 Nevertheless, oral testimonies suggest that Leslie Thomas 
Pridgeon, the Regional Commissioner of Police, Eastern Region, participated in 
planning and organising the murder of Daud Dabasso Wabera.818 Pridgeon 
allegedly provided the killers with the guns (obtained from Lokitaung) for the 
execution. Other sources indicate that the money for the killing did not come from 
the Xarti/Majeerteen community to which the killers belonged.819 Some people in 
Isiolo believe that the Provincial Commissioner, Peter Walters, was also involved 
in (or least aware of) the assassination plan. According to a Somali who worked 
as a Police Constable in the Report Office in Isiolo at that time and was later 
appointed to the Special Branch, the killers visited Pridgeon and Walters on 
several occasions in the weeks preceding the murder of Wabera, which was very 
unusual and seemingly inexplicable.820 
Several testimonies suggest that Pridgeon’s relations with the District 
Commissioner were not good and became rather hostile following the 24 May riot 
in Isiolo. Wabera was reportedly shocked by the shooting of Somali protesters – 
he allegedly broke down in tears – and threatened to take Pridgeon to court.821 
British sources indicate that, after the police prepared its report on the Isiolo 
deaths, it became Wabera’s duty to decide ‘whether an inquiry should be held in 
addition to the investigation made by the police and, if he considered that an 
inquiry should be held, to hold it’.822 On 18 June, after spending ‘some time in 
deliberation’, Wabera informed the Superintendent of Police that: 
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... a judicial inquiry should be held by a Magistrate into the cause of the 
deaths of four deceased persons killed on the day and at the time of the 
riot on the 24thMay, 1963, and trial of 37 or 34 rioters now held in 
remand in Nyeri Prison. I consider it is highly desirable for avoiding 
allegations of lack of impartiality that such inquiry into the deaths of 
and the trial of the rioters should be held by another Magistrate and not 
either by 2nd Class Magistrate Isiolo or myself (1st Class Magistrate). I 
further consider it will be a security risk for such an inquiry to be held 
in Isiolo or Meru. I consider it should be held either at Nyeri or Embu. I 
have retained a copy of your (Police) Inquiry file for my record and 
would be grateful if a copy of the Magistrate’s Inquest file could be sent 
to me as soon as the inquest has been finalised.’823 
 
On 22 June, the Director of Criminal Investigation Mr. McBrierley 
discussed Wabera’s letter with the Attorney General by telephone. McBrierley 
subsequently met with the Registrar, Supreme Court, who took up the matter with 
the Chief Justice with a view to appointing a magistrate to inquire into the deaths 
of the four people who died during the riot in Isiolo.824 Four days later, Wabera 
was murdered.  
The judicial enquiry into the causes of the death of the four people who 
were killed during the riot was envisaged as an inquest and was conducted by the 
Resident Magistrate, Nanyuki, late in July 1963. The Magistrate found that: 
 
Two of the people died from gunshot wounds as a result of the Police 
opening fire on the crowd, but he returned a verdict of justifiable 
homicide, without in fact being able to identify any particular 
policeman as having fired any of the fatal shots. Of the other two people 
who died one had been struck by a number of blunt instruments which 
could have been stones thrown from the crowd or Police batons, but 
there was no evidence to decide which, while the other (the woman) 
had no apparent external injuries and no post mortem had been 
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performed upon her; the Magistrate returned open verdict in respect of 
the deaths of these two.825 
 
The double assassination of Daud Dabasso Wabera and Xaaji Galma Dido 
has remained an unsolved case. The enquiry of the Criminal Investigation 
Department into the two murders reached the conclusion that these were well 
planned, but no evidence was obtained to indicate who ‘the instigators of the 
incident’ were or what precisely the motive was.826 Elements who had different 
agendas but who all regarded Wabera as a thorn in the flesh might have colluded 
in organising his elimination. What is certain is that Wabera’s murder precipitated 
the escalation to violence, as political assassinations often do.  
 
 
6.3 Military escalation, fractured politics, and insurrection 
Following the murders of Daud Dabasso Wabera and Xaaji Galma Dido, the 
political climate in Isiolo was increasingly tense. The Boran threatened that, if the 
authorities achieved no results in bringing the assassins to book within ten days, 
‘they would themselves take retaliatory measures against the Somalis’.827 
Nevertheless, there were no serious incidents in Isiolo District. On 30 June, a 
group of NPPPP officials led by Deeqoow Macalin Sanbul visited Garba Tulla to 
apologise to the Boran for the death of Xaaji Galma Dido, ‘to offer to seek out the 
culprits in Somalia, to make compensation by way of a cash payment, and to 
educate the Senior Chief’s children in Mogadishu’.828 A request from the British 
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Government for the arrest and handing over of the two alleged killers was 
transmitted, through the US Ambassador in Mogadishu, to the Government of the 
Somali Republic. The President Aadan Cabdule Cismaan assured the US 
Ambassador that ‘his Government had not inspired or incited the assassination’, 
but he refused to extradite the assassins.829 
British officials believed that it was quite possible that the whole Boran 
tribe ‘may unite in opposition to the Somalis and withdraw completely from the 
secessionist movement’.830 This did not happen though. If, on the one hand, some 
Boran had become ‘suspicious of Somali motives’ and were now ‘questioning the 
wisdom of continued alignment with the secessionists’, on the other hand, this 
emerging group of ‘sceptics’ had no strong leadership and little unity of purpose, 
while the majority of NPPPP supporters, led by Jatani Wako Wariyo, was still 
strongly in favour of secession.831 Jatani, however, issued a press statement 
deploring the attitude of the Somali Government with regard to the return of the 
alleged assassins.832 
Following the arrival of the new Regional Government Agent (RGA) in 
Isiolo, the Special District Administration Ordinance was vigorously enforced 
with the assistance of the police and GSU, leading to the arrest of 122 persons, 
‘largely Somalis’, of whom 100 were convicted. The only Somalis permitted to 
reside in Isiolo were Isxaaq and Xarti whose names appeared in the tax register. 
The RGA subsequently requested six ‘alien’ Somali chiefs to sign ‘bonds to be of 
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good behaviour and keep the peace in relation to other tribesmen living in the 
District’; three chiefs refused to sign the bond and were accordingly arrested.833 
The British Government, in time-honoured fashion, adopted a carrot-and-
stick approach. In July 1963, a plan for the development of water supplies, 
veterinary, education and health facilities in the NER was announced.834 At the 
same time, the Governor ‘reached complete and good-humoured agreement’ with 
Kenyan ministers on a number of actions that – he admitted – ‘might be described 
as ‘repressive’: the opening of new police stations and military posts and the 
deployment of more forces to the NER; the banning of the carrying of arms by the 
Somalis; the conduct of an army exercise in the region, as a show of strength; the 
banning of public meetings; and the compulsory registration of ‘alien’ Somalis in 
the region.835 Meanwhile, Operation Instalment was being kept under regular 
review.836 The 3rd Battalion, KAR, subsequently carried out a flag march and 
training exercise in the Eastern and North Eastern Regions between 10 and 17 
July.837 Finally, in the summer of 1963, Kenyan Ministers signed a Military 
Defense Agreement with Ethiopia, giving Addis Ababa ‘a card of entry into the 
NFD in the event of any overt move there from Somalia’.838 
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During a baraza with chiefs and politicians from across the North Eastern 
Region which was held in Garissa on 23 July, the Governor announced that a 
meeting would soon be held between the Governments of Great Britain, the 
Somali Republic and Kenya. This news, however, was poorly received by the 
chiefs and politicians of the North Eastern Region, who accused the British 
Government of indulging in a policy of procrastination, with the aim of leaving 
the final decision on the NFD issue to the Kenyan Government after 
independence.839 Meanwhile, the announcement of Kenya’s Independence Day, 
on 12 December 1963, brought ‘a sense of both frustration and fear amongst the 
secessionist leaders’.840 
Following the meeting with the Governor, a delegation of secessionists 
from the NER left Garissa for Somalia at the end of July.841 The delegates, led by 
chief Macalin Sanbul, were finally allowed to meet the Minister of Interior 
Maxamuud Cabdi Nuur ‘Juuje’, Maxamuud Yuusuf Adan ‘Muro’, and the 
Minister of Defence Hilowle Macalin Maxamed on 3 August, after a one-week 
stay in Kismaayo. The secessionists informed the Somali officials that they had 
been notified about the proposed meeting between the British, Somali, and Kenya 
Governments, emphasising that the future of the NFD was a matter between the 
British Government and the people of the ex-District and that such talks, 
therefore, should not take place without NFD representation. Although the Somali 
ministers stated that it was their intention to ask for NFD representation at the 
talks and that their government ‘was prepared to give assistance from the 
background’ to the people of the NFD, they made it clear that the Somali 
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Government ‘would not openly demand secession’.842 The delegates were 
informed that the Somali Republic ‘could not give armed assistance at the present 
time’, as it ‘was not strong enough to deal with what was tantamount to war’, 
according to British intelligence sources.843 The Somali Republic was already 
struggling to negotiate its position in the Cold War context, and Ethiopia’s 
Ogaden Province was strategically more important than the NFD. 
The Conference between the Governments of Great Britain, Kenya, and 
the Somali Republic on the future of the former NFD was held in Rome from 25 
to 28 August 1963. The leader of the British delegation Peter Thomas, Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs, announced that Her Majesty’s Government was not in a 
position to cut up a colony on the eve of independence and that it would not 
countenance the secession of any portion of the NFD. The conference ended in a 
deadlock.844 
As the issue of secession became increasingly engulfed by Cold War 
politics, the people of the NFD found themselves standing between a rock and a 
hard place. In Garissa and Wajir, the chiefs who supported the NFDP, such as 
Yuusuf Xaaji and Khaliif Axmed (Cabdi Rashiid Khaliif’s father), began to 
cooperate with the Kenyan Government. The leaders of the NFDP accused the 
Xarti, whom they saw as Mogadishu agents, of holding a dominant and 
domineering place in NFD politics and in the NPPPP in particular, to the 
detriment of the interests of the ‘local’ people.845 The NFDP consequently 
changed its position on secession: it now advocated regional autonomy for the 
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NER but opposed the region’s unification with the Somali Republic. The chiefs 
who supported the NFDP argued that promoting a ‘good link’ with the British and 
the Kenyan government was the only way to improve infrastructure and social 
services and bring development to the NER.846 These chiefs, who constituted a 
small minority among a population that strongly supported secession, feared for 
their futures and even their lives. They reached the conclusion that they would get 
no benefit from joining Somalia; instead, if they accepted to cooperate with the 
British and the Kenyan Government, they would be able to secure their position 
and to retain some influence and authority.847 
Meanwhile, the supporters of the NPPPP became more and more 
entrenched in their position, as the British and the Kenya Government squeezed 
political space. In September 1963, chief Macalin Sanbul resigned his position, 
and political temperature rose in Wajir.848 As tensions between NFDP and NPPPP 
supporters deepened, representatives of the Digoodiiya clan reportedly held a 
meeting in Wajir at which it was decided that political pressure should be brought 
to bear on the Reer Maxamuud section to force them into more active support for 
the secessionist campaign.849 The chief of this section, Khaliif Axmed, favoured 
co-operation with the Kenya Government. Moreover, the Reer Maxamuud 
comprised the bulk of the limited support that had been forthcoming for Cabdi 
Rashiid Khaliif’s proposed new party, the Frontier Independence Party (FIP), 
which advocated regional autonomy within Kenya as the best immediate solution 
to the NFD problem. On the day following this meeting, a group of about thirty 
Digoodiya supporters of the NPPPP threw stones at the house of Chief Khaliif 
Axmed; the chief’s backers resisted and, in the fight that ensued, four people were 
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injured.850 Strong police patrols and a dusk-to-dawn curfew restored the situation 
to normal. A few days later, an attempt was made to burn down Chief Khaliif’s 
house.851 
Tensions between pro- and anti-secession groups escalated in the Eastern 
Region as well. On 20 September, Axmed Nuur Maxamuud Cali, a well-known 
political figure in Isiolo, was murdered in Marsabit District by a group of Gabbra. 
Divisions between the Boran in the outlying area of Isiolo District, on the one 
hand, and the Boran and the Sakuye in the secessionist stronghold of Garba Tulla, 
on the other hand, also deepened. Upon his return from the Rome Conference, 
Cabdi Latiif Ayah, the leader of the Isiolo branch of the NPPPP, signed a bond to 
be of good behaviour under the Special District Ordinance: ‘the solid front of 
alien Somali resistance broke finally’ – the Regional Government Agent 
commented.852 By the end of September 1963, twenty-one influential leaders had 
been bonded in Isiolo and all but two sub-sections of Isxaaq and Xarti were 
covered. As routine policing resulted in further arrests of non-‘alien’ Somalis, 
Digoodiya and Ajuuraan ‘illegal immigrants’ were removed from Isiolo 
District.853 In October, numbers of Isxaaq in Isiolo township came out in favour of 
participation in the Regional Assembly.854 Oral testimonies suggest that Isxaaq 
and Xarti businessmen were now concerned with trying to protect their interests 
and their lives.855 
A group of NPPPP delegates, who had been chosen to represent the 
majority view on the issue of the NFD, visited Mogadishu in October 1963. The 
delegates from the NER, however, received a cold reception: ‘it was evident that 
 
850 ‘Retaliation’,Daily Nation, 14 September 1963, p. 2. 
851 ‘Wajir Arson Attempt’,Daily Nation, 19 September 1963, p. 13. 
852 KNA, DC/ISO 4/1/13, Resident Commissioner Isiolo, to Civil Secretary, Eastern 
Region, ‘Monthly Report – Isiolo District. September, 1963’, 3 October 1963, p. 2. 
853 Ibid., p. 3. 
854 KNA, DC/ISO 4/1/13, Resident Commissioner Isiolo, to Civil Secretary, Eastern 
Region, ‘Monthly Report – Isiolo District. October, 1963’, 5 November 1963, p. 1. 
855 Interviews with Ali Wako Godana, Isiolo, 1 March 2016; Hassan Wako Wario, Isiolo, 




the Somali Government leaders found their presence in Mogadishu an 
embarrassment’ – a source close to the delegation reported.856 The Prime Minister 
Cabdirashiid Cali Sharmaarke reassured the NPPPP representatives that the NFD 
issue was being discussed at a ‘high level’ and advised them to return to Kenya. 
Nevertheless, the delegation ‘gained the impression that there were wide 
differences of opinion among Somali Government officials’: while the President, 
the Minister of Defence and the Interior Minister ‘advocated seeking a solution by 
negotiation’, the Prime Minister favoured a militant approach.857 In November, 
though, after negotiations with West Germany, the USA, and Italy over a tripartite 
program for the supply of military aid failed, the Somali Republic accepted a 
multi-million-dollar proposal for military cooperation from the Soviet Union, 
which boosted the Somali Government’s support for the secessionists.858 
Meanwhile, the British agreed with the Kenyan administration that the 
NER would be given another opportunity to elect a Regional Assembly and 
parliamentary representatives either before or immediately after independence. On 
2 November, shortly after announcing his intention to stand for one of the Lower 
House seats, Cabdi Rashiid Khaliif was kidnapped and taken to Mogadishu.859 
According to oral testimonies, when Cabdi Rashiid joined the anti-secession camp 
in the summer of 1963, speculations that he had sold the land to Kenya spread in 
Wajir. As a result, he was progressively marginalized, as most people could not 
understand why he had changed his mind and thus refused to listen to his ideas. 
Oral testimonies suggest that ‘even the Digoodiya, his own people, turned against 
him.’860 Moreover, all the other clans in Wajir became hostile towards the Reer 
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Maxamuud because of Cabdi Rashiid, who was considered guilty of trying to 
‘confuse people’.861 As escalating tensions intermingled with long-standing inter-
clan rivalries, the Reer Maxamuud were blamed for creating problems. As one of 
Cabdi Rashiid’s kidnappers, a Reer Maxamuud, stated: ‘we decided to take Cabdi 
Rashiid to get some peace’.862 
While Cabdi Rashiid Khaliif was being taken to Mogadishu, Deeqoow 
Macalin Sanbul was removed from the NER and restricted to Kajiado District. 
Chief Macalin Sanbul fled to Somalia soon afterwards.863 Early in December, ‘a 
warrant was issued for his arrest and the seizure of all his property’.864 According 
to British sources, in September Macalin Sanbul had met with the Provincial 
Governor of Kismaayo, to whom he had given a list containing the names of 
twenty-eight Kenyan Somalis from Garissa who had previous military or police 
experience. The Provincial Governor had allegedly advised that those who were 
on the list should report to Bilis Qooqaani, where they would be issued with rifles 
and grenades, but had declined to make automatic weapons available.865 Around 
mid-November, numbers of young men left Garissa District for Somalia to join 
Macalin Sanbul, who was reportedly based at Dunyali, a few miles from the 
Kenya-Somalia border. He was believed to have about 120 men under his 
control.866 
Meanwhile, Captain Cabdulaahi Maxamed of the Somalia Special Branch 
reportedly visited Buulo Xaawo to assess the degree of support for secession 
 
861 Interview with anonymous (identity withheld), Rongai, 26 April 2016. 
862 Ibid. 
863 Interview with Deeqoow Macalin Sanbul, Garissa, 28 July 2017. 
864 ‘Ex-Somali chief a shifta leader’, Daily Nation, 7 December 1963. 
865 TNA, CO 822/3055, ‘The Security Situation – N.E. Region. Interference & 
Complicity by the Authorities in Somalia’, 3, enclosed with MacDonald to 
Secretary of State, 27 November 1963. 
866 TNA, CO 822/3055, Director of Intelligence, ‘Somali activity – North East Region. 
Tabulation of recent trends of events’, 2, enclosed with MacDonald to Secretary of 
State, 23 November 1963; ‘The Security Situation – N.E. Region. Interference & 
Complicity by the Authorities in Somalia’, 3, enclosed with MacDonald to 
Secretary of State, 27 November 1963. 
264 
 
among Kenyan Somalis and met the Gharri chief Maxamed Jarri from Mandera at 
Buur Hache police post, on Somali soil, early in November. Captain Cabdulaahi 
allegedly informed the Gharri chief that fifty rifles and one hundred grenades 
were available at Buur Hache for insurgents in the Ceelwaaq area.867 According to 
British sources, Chief Maxamed Jarri subsequently returned to Somalia with 
about one hundred men from his Gharri/Sabdawa clan. It was reported that nine of 
the NPPPP delegates who had visited Mogadishu in October and were still in 
Somalia arrived in Buur Hache and joined the insurgency.868 Pistols and automatic 
weapons were allegedly being brought to Buur Hache from Baydhabo and issued 
in conjunction with the local Somali police.869 
Between 13 and 20 November, a series of small-scale attacks took place 
against police posts along the Kenya-Ethiopia and Kenya-Somalia borders. A 
small party of Somalis armed with rifles and grenades attacked Rhamu police 
post, along the Kenya-Ethiopia border, injuring five policemen.870 Another attack 
was made against the GSU camp at Weel Mareer, in the eastern part of Wajir 
District, near the Somalia border. A few police posts and the Shell B.P. 
seismographic camp in Garissa District were also targeted and a grenade was 
thrown at the camp of the 3rd KAR Company stationed at Garissa.871 During these 
attacks, all repelled by Kenyan security forces, a few Kenya policemen were 
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wounded but no one was killed. British intelligence sources estimated the strength 
of ‘shifta’ groups from across the border at approximately five hundred men.872 
These were known to operate from three main centres, namely Buulo Haawo 
(opposite Mandera Township), Haraadi (in the Buur Hachi area opposite 
Ceelwaaq), and Dunyali (opposite Garissa District). The camp at Dunyali was 
reported to be under the command of Macalin Sanbul.873 Somali military vehicles 
containing approximately seventy men arrived at Buulo Haawo on 24 November, 
according to British sources.874 New hit-and-run attacks were carried out against 
the police posts at Finno and Ceel Waaq at the beginning of December.875 Small 
groups of insurgents also began to ambush KAR convoys.  
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Map 7: Sketch Map of the Area Concerned by ‘Shifta’ Activity. 
Source: TNA, CO 822/3055, enclosed with MacDonald to Sandys, 23 November 1963. 
 
While ‘shifta’ activity intensified, politics continued to fracture, as 
pressure mounted on the people of the ex-NFD. The Civil Secretary of the NER 
held a baraza in Wajir on 7 December attended by nearly all the Region’s chiefs 
(except those who had resigned). The chiefs accepted to pay taxes, obey the laws 
of Kenya, co-operate with development plans, hold local Government elections, 
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and ‘do everything possible to defeat Shifta’.876 Although the chiefs maintained 
that their ultimate aim was union with Somalia, they agreed that ‘under present 
circumstances, it would be desirable to remain part of Kenya for the time 
being’.877 Political parties other than the NPPPP supported the chiefs’ statement.     
Meanwhile, the borderland was increasingly militarized with the help of 
British forces. By 3 December, a platoon of KAR had been deployed in company 
detachments at Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera and a twin Pioneer aircraft had been 
stationed at each of these places.878 As the Regional Government Agent, Garissa, 
recorded: ‘the European population of Garissa continues to increase. Apart from 
the increase in Regional Staff, we have been reinforced by the KAR and the 
RAF.’879 In early December, the Governor Malcom MacDonald asked Lord 
Duncan Sandys for British military support to the Kenya Government in the North 
Eastern Region on the grounds that ‘refusal to provide essential support by the 
British troops would lead to a very serious, and possibly disastrous security 
situation’.880 In his telegram, the Governor summarised the nature and extent of 
the support required: ‘RAF aircraft for mobility and for air-dropping’; ‘Army Air 
Corps aircraft for reconnaissance and casualty evacuation’; Royal Army Medical 
Corps; Royal Engineers; Royal Army Service Corps for air dispatchers; Royal 
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, whose assistance would be required in the 
event of large scale transport activities.881 
Within a fortnight of Kenya’s Independence Day, celebrated on 12 
December 1963, the Kenyan Government declared a state of emergency in the 
North Eastern Region, officially marking the beginning of the so-called shifta 
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war. As Jomo Kenyatta now ‘seemed to offer the best protection’ for British 
interests, Britain struck a series of defence agreements with the Kenyan 
Government.882 As a consequence of these deals, the Royal Air Force remained in 
the country to assist in counter-insurgency operations. Richard Catling, who had 
arrived in Kenya in 1954 during the Emergency, stayed in post as Inspector-
General of Police until the end of 1964.883 
Amidst struggles for hegemony and competing visions of political order 
and regional stability, a cluster of overlapping conflicts emerged in the Kenya-
Somalia borderlands by the time Kenya gained independence. Jomo Kenyatta’s 
government, with the support of British forces, responded to these intertwined 
conflicts with counterinsurgency campaigns. These created systemic political 
violence in north-eastern Kenya and shaped the mode of existence of the post-
colonial state in this periphery. Although the shifta war officially ended in 1967, 
forms of state-sponsored political violence extended into the 1970s and 1980s. 
The Wagalla massacre, in which Kenyan security forces killed several hundred 
Digoodiya Somalis in Wajir District in February 1984, is the most blatant 
evidence of this.884 The systemic political violence counterinsurgency created has 
left an indelible scar on the collective memory and the identities of the 
borderlanders and, to some extent, still characterizes state-society relations in the 
Kenya-Somalia borderland today. 
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Secessionism in north-eastern Kenya represented the imagined solution to 
marginalisation; in it was ‘embedded the idea that things will need to change’.885  
The borderlanders who fought for secession tried to pursue what they saw as the 
unfinished agenda of decolonization. They attempted to define the relationship 
between the local, the national, and the global on their own terms, by affirming an 
identity under threat.  
Secessionism brought up vital questions of identity and history. This 
chapter has shown that the various positions the borderlanders took in the lead-up 
to insurgency were not pre-determined by self-contained identities. Rather, they 
were influenced by the shrinking of possibilities, the carrot-and-stick approach the 
British used in the course of 1963 to break the secessionist front, and the lived 
experience of violence. These contextual dynamics provoked a clash of social 
imaginaries. The ideas of a trans-territorial Somali identity and of a borderless 
community of pastoralists clashed with the hardening of territorialised ethnic and 
clan identities, as the issue of secession intermingled with issues of land and 
resource access, power, and leadership. This, however, was not solely a product of 
local forces. 
External factors, particularly British policy and the impact of the Cold War 
on the political landscapes of Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia, played a fundamental 
role in shaping the local dynamics of political mobilisation and insurgency. The 
British response to the threat of insurrection after the publication of the NFD 
Commission’s report pushed the NPPPP leaders towards armed struggle and 
shaped the counterinsurgency practices of the post-colonial state in Kenya. The 
support the Somali Republic now received from the Eastern bloc enabled the 
Somali government to back the insurgents and provide them with rear bases in 
Somali territory. This interplay of local and external forces created a cluster of 
conflicts which exploded into the shifta war.   
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Conclusion: The borderlanders and the state, an 
ambivalent but vital relationship 
 
This thesis has begun to trace out the actual histories of the state in the Somalia-
Kenya borderlands. It has highlighted the differences and the similarities between 
British and Italian colonialisms, especially with regard to patterns of 
governmental practice, in the colonies of Kenya and Italian Somalia. It has shown 
how the borderlanders responded to colonial interventions through adaptation, 
dissent, or resistance, and how European policies reacted to the borderlanders’ 
initiatives. 
If, on the one hand, the frontier remained porous and border control 
largely nominal, on the other hand, the maintenance of what Julie MacArthur has 
called a ‘hybrid regulatory order’ entailed the regular use of force and normalized 
violence in these borderlands.886 This occurred on either side of the border, 
regardless of the difference in the borderlanders’ experiences of state power: an 
experience of coercion on the British-ruled side and one of predation on the 
Italian-ruled side. British rule in North-Eastern Kenya resembled more what 
Tobias Hagmann has termed ‘garrison rule’ – that is to say the pattern of control, 
characterized by regular military coercion, by which the Ethiopian Empire (and 
later the Ethiopian state) controlled its Somali periphery – than British indirect 
rule.887 As David Anderson has noted, after independence the Kenyan state simply 
maintained ‘garrison government’ in the country’s north-eastern region, 
strengthening this pattern of control as the campaign against the shifta insurgency 
developed.888 On the Somali side of the frontier, war – against the Ethiopian 
Empire first, then against Britain during World War II – and plantation agriculture 
shaped the pattern of domination by which the Italian colonial government 
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exploited manpower and resources in the borderland. Despite the differences 
between the British and Italian modes of governance, colonial officials on both 
sides of the border devolved power and the means of violence to government-paid 
chiefs and headmen, thereby transforming power relationships within borderland 
communities as well as ‘traditional’ forms of authority.  
This thesis has shown how the borderlanders navigated different systems 
of colonial rule, at times capitalizing on the ‘hybrid forms of frontier 
governmentality unevenly imposed across the region’, at other times 
circumventing or resisting state control and influence.889 However, this study has 
challenged the argument that Somali pastoralists essentially escaped the state, 
perfecting in what James Scott has termed ‘the art of not being governed’.890 In 
her recent analysis of the struggles over different conceptions of sovereignty 
which have marked the history of the Kenya-Somali frontier, Julie MacArthur has 
argued that Somali histories of ‘state evasion’ resonate with Scott’s ‘formulation 
of “statelessness” not as disorganization but as political strategy […], as a 
coherent expression of sovereignty without a state’.891 While MacArthur has 
rejected both the idea of absence of sovereignty and that of ‘ordered anarchy’ to 
account for this form of statelessness, she has argued that the Somalis’ avoidance 
of governance was ‘an alternative that… predated and existed outside of the state 
as sovereign’.892 Indeed, the reach and power of the colonial state should not be 
overstated. Both Weitzberg and MacArthur have persuasively shown that the 
Kenya-Somalia frontier remained ‘ill-defined and relatively open, reflecting the 
strategically partial exercising of colonial sovereignty’.893 Nonetheless, in their 
struggle for hegemony over these frontiers, colonial states fundamentally altered 
the social and political dynamics of territorial appropriation, increasingly linking 
ethnic and clan identities to territory and creating a contested space of entangled 
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territorialities. The borderlanders embedded these transformations in the 
production of politics. If decolonization put ‘increasing emphasis on bounded 
spaces of sovereignty’, prompting ‘an investment in the territorialisation of 
political identities’, this phenomenon was rooted in decades of colonial rule in the 
borderlands.894 
This thesis has shown that the territorialisation of identities (whether based 
on ethnicity or lineage) accompanied colonial attempts to extend and consolidate 
territorial control over the Kenya-Italian Somalia frontier since the end of the First 
World War. The double process of territorialisation of ethnicity and ethnicization 
of territory which occurred, although in different forms, on both sides of the 
frontier, influenced the formation of political identities and shaped the ways in 
which local groups expressed their political grievances and asserted their goals 
vis-à-vis each other and the states that competed for sovereignty over the frontier. 
Struggles over the appropriation of territory entailed struggles over land, power, 
and authority. These struggles, which occurred at the intersection of local, 
regional and international politics, shaped the conditions of historical possibility 
in the borderlands. 
While competing against each other for access to land and resources, both 
material and symbolic, borderlanders became linked to the state (understood here 
as an ensemble of institutions, practices, representations, and people) by a 
multiform – often ambivalent – relationship: a relationship of dominance and 
resistance at times, of avoidance or cooperation at other times; a conflictive yet 
vital relationship. The state was not doomed to fail or intrinsically fragile in these 
borderlands as a consequence of cultural specificity or due to the political ecology 
of the frontier. Historically contingent power relations shaped politics in these 
borderlands in a way that undermined state legitimacy and the borderlanders’ trust 
in state institutions. State formation was not a unidirectional process from the 
state’s centre to the periphery, from which the borderlanders attempted to escape. 
Rather, the allocation of state resources and the negotiation of state-sanctioned 
political authority influenced socio-economic organisation and political options in 
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the periphery, while peripheral politics, in turn, shaped the character of the 
emerging nation state in both Somalia and Kenya.  
The borderlands’ economy, particularly trade, played a fundamental role in 
shaping and transforming the local power relations through which the state was 
negotiated. This thesis has rejected both the ideas that trade was autonomous from 
the state and that it necessarily challenged state sovereignty. Implying the mobility 
of goods and people, trade networks tended to circumvent or defy territorial 
boundaries. Nonetheless, cross-border flows exploited the economic differentials 
produced by different modes of governance and different state regulations. 
Moreover, the borderlanders involved in trade – traders, merchants, brokers, 
smugglers and middlemen – needed to work out arrangements with government 
officials in order for trade networks to function. These arrangements, though, 
were fragile and had to be constantly renegotiated, thus creating an ambivalent 
relationship between traders, most of whom were also smugglers, and government 
officials. Depending on context, this relationship took different forms: 
competition, accommodation, avoidance, compromise, or collaboration. 
Furthermore, the colonial state, on each side of the frontier, used trade routes and 
commercial networks to extend government control and assert its sovereignty over 
the borderlands.   
This thesis has retraced the history of state-society relations in the 
Somalia-Kenya borderlands through the study of localized encounters between 
pastoralists, farmers, traders, chiefs, brokers, and colonial government officials. It 
has shown how these different players participated in negotiating, manipulating, 
and remodelling political authority and state functions. It has demonstrated that 
the ways in which the state was locally negotiated profoundly influenced ‘identity 
work’. As Charles Tilly wrote, ‘the word identities belongs in the plural’.895 
Identities are time-bound and cannot be understood apart from the context in 
which they form. As an old Arab proverb says: ‘Men resemble their times more 
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than they do their fathers’.896 This thesis has examined how the borderlanders 
worked out their identities and allegiances between two critical junctures, namely 
the redrawing and eventual fixation of the colonial border following the cession of 
Jubaland, and the creation of independent nation states in Somalia and Kenya. In 
so doing, it has shown that territorial appropriation, by blending resource access 
and power relations with issues of authority and belonging was at the heart of the 
production of politics in these borderlands.  
There are similarities in the way in which blood-based identities – be they 
genealogical, ethnic, or national – became linked to territory on each side of the 
border, despite the differences between the British and Italian patterns of rule. In 
Kenya’s north-east, political identities became entangled in a combined process of 
territorialisation of ethnicity and ethnicization of territory. In the trans-Jubba 
region, genealogical and political identities became intertwined with deegaan 
(clan ‘homelands’), matching clan to a territorial base and blending political 
competition for acquiring bargaining power at the state’s centre with competition 
for access to land and resources. As a result, on both sides of the frontier, 
governmental practices conflated the issue of access to land and resources with 
historical claims to territory. As Catherine Boone and Christian Lund have noted, 
land issues are not only about land, but, rather, they implicate the construction of 
authority over territory, resources, and persons.897 
This thesis has revealed the link between identity, control over access to 
land, and political authority, highlighting the role of historical claims to territory 
in defining identity in these borderlands. Whenever the stakes of politics rose, the 
key question became: who came first? Whenever the borderlanders felt that their 
status was insecure or threatened, they resorted to what Boas and Dunn have 
called ‘tales of origin’. This term denotes ‘discursive constructions that shape 
perceptions and inform people’s actions by linking identity and space in specific 
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ways’.898 The rationale behind these tales is: ‘This is ours because we were here 
first’. The recourse to these tales is an attractive response to uncertainty. However, 
discourses concerning first comer/late comer status are like a Pandora ’s box: they 
have no end. It is always possible to find someone who was there before the 
others. 
Tales of origin, however, provided an answer to the question of visibility. 
Colonial governance and later the emergence of independent nation-states 
heightened the importance of ‘being visible’ for the borderlanders. Only those 
groups who were visible could stake historical claims to territory and, hence, 
access resources, including the state. Only those who were visible could 
participate in the negotiation of political authority and state sovereignty. At the 
end of colonial rule, ‘being visible’ became key to the definition of citizenship, to 
defining who could enter the struggle for resources and who could not. This is 
where my analysis of the historicity of genealogical claims to territory in the 
Somali-speaking lands diverges from Barnes’s. In the Somalia-Kenya 
borderlands, the dual identification with genealogy and territory was rarely a 
claim to a parochial identity, a protective local/subaltern reaction against a 
hegemonic nationalist project. Rather, Somali local elites (on both sides of the 
border) saw autochthony narratives linking genealogy and territory as a means to 
enter the struggle for resources – be they land, water points, trade licenses, or 
political representation – and to manage their relationship with the state. On both 
sides of the frontier, the borderlanders used claims to territorial belonging as a 
means of becoming visible in the process of state formation. For instance, 
although the assertion of Somali national and Muslim identities was supposed to 
temper the vigour of the autochthony argument, Somali nationalists acknowledged 
the relevance of this discourse and the importance of the claims it involved. In 
fact, the leaders of both the SYL and the NPPPP who were appointed, selected, or 
elected in a particular area were chosen from among the members of the kinship 
groups who were seen as those to whom the land ‘traditionally’ belonged. 
 
898 Morten Bøås and Kevin Dunn, Politics of Origin in Africa (London: Zed Books, 
2013), p. 2. 
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By examining how and why specific groups of borderlanders turned to one 
identity or another, this thesis has emphasised the historical contingency of 
identity formation in these borderlands. It is generally acknowledged that tense 
and volatile situations provide opportunities for the manipulation of identities; the 
history of identity formation in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands is no exception. 
This is particularly visible in the malleability of kinship. As Abdurahman 
‘Baadiyow’ has noted, kinship ‘criss-crosses the lines of social stratification and 
those of integration within the state in a permanent process of interweaving’.899 
This thesis has demonstrated that in the tumultuous transition from 
colonialism to independence, genealogy and ethnicity per se proved less salient 
than ‘terroir’ in shaping identities and allegiances in the Somalia-Kenya 
borderlands. The French term terroir, which can be loosely translated in English 
as ‘locality’, denotes an appropriated territory, constructed by a group of 
individuals exercising a degree of power (via set regulations) and sharing social 
representations and an intimate relationship with the ‘places’ that shape its 
identity. So far, the history of the Somalia-Kenya borderlands has been 
approached primarily through the lenses of Somali nationalism or segmentary 
politics. This thesis has shown that the history of these borderlands is, above all, a 
history of terroirs. It has thus challenged the conception of Somali nationalism as 
a non-territorial or trans-territorial phenomenon, showing the relevance of 
boundaries, whether material or symbolic, in shaping social relationships and 
politics in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands. Moreover, this study has demonstrated 
that Somali nationalism was not a monolithic entity, but, rather, it included 
different ‘nationalisms’, which reflected various imbrications of interests and 
different visions of citizenship, the nation, and the state. Discourses about 
autochthony, citizenship, and sovereignty intertwined with inequalities of status 
and power in drawing the boundaries of belonging and defining political 
allegiances in the Somalia-Kenya borderlands. 
 
899 Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow), ‘Revisiting Somali Historiography: Critique and 





By showing the fundamental role that colonial transactions and exogenous 
factors played in the process of state formation, this thesis has challenged 
Cristopher Clapham’s argument that state failure in the Horn of Africa stems from 
the region’s anomalous ‘non-colonial’ past and, therefore, is primarily a product 
of endogenous forces.900 It has argued against the idea that the Somalia-Kenya 
borderlands – and the Somali-speaking lands more broadly – represent an 
exceptional case in the context of African History. Situating the borderlands and 
the borderlanders within the broader academic debate on the state in Africa, this 
thesis has rejected the prevailing argument that state fragility in this region is due 
to the imported origin of the state and to the failure of adapting its institutions. 
Rather, this thesis has revealed the ambivalent, yet mutually constitutive 
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